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Institutional isomorphism suggests that three forces (normative, coercive and mimetic) create strategic inertia within an institutional field and offers a perspective on firms' behavior when they are confronted with similar challenges. However, we know little about how these forces work over an extensive longitudinal period. This manuscript examines the extent to which factors that drive isomorphism shift over time and identifies the consequent implications for the strategic behavior of firms. Our historical case study of the Japanese beer industry, spanning 60 years, demonstrates how domestic pressures led to homogeneity and convergence in a closed setting from the 1950s to the 1980s, while new industry pressures prompted by globalization resulted in strategic change favouring product differentiation and diversification between 1990 and 2017. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article follows the evolution of biopharmaceutical firms as they bore great uncertainty and risks in their endeavours to commercialise new therapies – through the regenerative medicine industry in the United States, Britain and Japan. Despite its beginnings in the 1970s, regenerative medicines have yet to become a widely accepted form of medicine. A large part of the problem lay with the lack of 'fit' with the broader health context. This article illustrates how the trajectory of the sector was shaped, not only by the nature of the technology, but also by the complex contexts in which firms were embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the various factors that have shaped the internationalisation of the Japanese cosmetics industry over six decades of economic transformation from 1951 to 2015. Whilst Japanese cosmetics companies have expanded overseas, their focus has largely been in Asia. This article advances a multifactorial explanation that analyses a number of factors that led to regionalisation, including foreign consumers’ perception of Japan, managerial perceptions and strategies toward export markets, as well as the challenges pertaining to cross-border mergers and acquisitions activities by Japanese firms. Using Shiseido as the case example, the article offers a highly-textured account rooted in an understanding of the evolving historical setting, cautions against simple explanations and extends previous discussions concerning the reasons behind the regional orientation of the Japanese cosmetics industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the experience of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry to show how Japan's national system of innovation evolved from a closed, firm-based domestic system toward a more open, networked, global system. This occurred in the face of a crisis of economic and technological dimensions. During the Lost Decades, the nature of innovation in this industry shifted from incremental toward more radical innovation, as the system internationalised and as firms leveraged different environments around the world. This article highlights the varying roles that the components of the system of innovation play in shaping innovative industries. It also shows how institutions can be remarkably malleable in times of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Japan has led the world in certain high-technology industries, such as automobiles and electronics, it has remained a minor player in the global pharmaceutical industry. Japan's leading pharmaceutical firms invest less in R&D and record lower sales than leading global firms. Japan remains a net importer of pharmaceuticals and few Japanese drugs are found outside the country. The global pharmaceutical industry is led by firms from the United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, rather than those from Japan. This article explains why the pharmaceutical industry has remained largely in the second tier of Japan's dual economy. For the purposes of this paper, the dual economy refers to the pronounced divide observed between the globally competitive and non-competitive sectors of the Japanese economy. Japan's pharmaceutical industry long subsidised other sectors, including those in the competitive tier, by providing medicines at low prices for a universal health care system. This played a critical role in shaping the industry's domestic orientation. While no single reason explains why pharmaceuticals did not become one of Japan's first tier industries, the major reasons lay in the smaller size of Japanese firms, the lack of R&D incentives, and the government's protectionist policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how 'regenerative readiness' varies between different national research and healthcare systems. Here, 'readiness' refers to both the readiness of a given technology and the ability of a given setting to adopt a new technology. We compare two settings that have taken active yet dissonant approaches to improve readiness: the UK and Japan. Existing scholarship observes that disruptive technologies such as regenerative medicine require many adaptations to become useable and function along the principles of their design. We incorporate the sociotechnical systems framework to consider the range of adaptive measures taken across elements of the sociotechnical system for novel technological adoption. Building upon existing works on technology readiness and institutional readiness, we also expand the conceptualization of readiness toward system-wide readiness.

Unlike its automobile or electronics industries, Japan's pharmaceutical industry did not become a global leader. Japan remains a net importer of pharmaceuticals and has introduced few global blockbuster drugs. Alfred Chandler argued that Japan's pharmaceutical firms remained relatively weak because Western firms enjoyed an insurmountable first first-mover advantage. However, this case study of the anticancer drug sector illustrates that Chandler's explanation is incomplete. Japanese medical culture, government policy, and research environment also played a substantial role in shaping the industry. In the 1970s and 1980s, these factors encouraged firms to develop little few effective drugs with low side effects, and profit from Japan's domestic market. But, these drugs were unsuitable to foreign markets with more demanding efficacy standards. As a result, Japan not only lost more than a decade in developing ineffective drugs, but also neglected to create the infrastructure necessary to develop innovative drugs and build a stronger pharmaceutical industry.