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Explores how historical empathy can give students a richer understanding of the past, focusing on the development of the students' historical understanding through an analysis of 18 documents on President Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan. (CMK)

Presents results of a questionnaire asking Japanese teachers how and what they teach about World War II. Reports that survey included broad and narrow questions on the war in Asia, Europe, and the Pacific. Concludes that Japan's postwar peace education has been a success but that more emphasis needs to be placed on cause and effect in history. (DK)

Examines scientific discoveries which underlie the atomic bomb and its technological development in the United States during World War II. Changing views, super-weapon development, early American efforts, production/dropping the bombs, and the Oppenheimer case are considered. (DH)

A review of 19 recently published, secondary-level United States and world history textbooks found only brief coverage of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Japan) bombings, slight attention to the arms race and disarmament, and concentration on scientific and technical developments behind the atomic bomb rather than on its effects. (Author/RW)

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have profoundly shaped global conflict and security landscapes throughout history. From the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the chemical attack in Halabja, these catastrophic events underscored the devastating potential of WMDs on health, humanity, ecosystems, and international stability. This study explored the immediate and long-term impacts of WMDs, analyzing historical precedents and current global conflicts to highlight ongoing risks. Emphasizing the urgent need for international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, the study aimed to raise awareness of the humanitarian, psychological, and ecological consequences of WMD use. By examining the geopolitical hotspots and the humanitarian crises they generated, it called for proactive crisis prevention strategies and enhanced global cooperation to mitigate the catastrophic effects of WMDs and protect global security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little is known about military attitudes toward weapons taboos or the durability of nonuse norms in wartime. Chemical weapons are a key case given public revulsion and clear international prohibitions. We explore soldiers' attitudes in a salient setting: the Pacific theater of World War II. We draw on a declassified survey covering a representative sample of enlisted US soldiers in Hawaii in 1944. This unique context, during a total war against an adversary that had employed chemical weapons, represents a hard test for the chemical weapons taboo. Up to 91% of soldiers supported using chemical weapons against Japan, including 24% who favored initiation and 67% who favored retaliatory use. To understand the influence of military instruction, we exploit a novel regimen still used in basic training, which saw some troops exposed to lachrymatory gas. We find exposure to chemical weapons in training reduced support for use. Visceral experiences can mobilize support for weapons taboos in otherwise permissive environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As North Korea emphasized its "second mission," the reunification of the two Koreas, with its nuclear weapons, South Korea has been mobilizing all potential resources to deter North Korea's attempt. Indeed, it rapidly improved its relations with Japan as well as strengthened the U.S. extended deterrence through the "Washington Declaration" in early 2023. The United States, South Korea, and Japan even initiated their trilateral summit meeting to discuss their combined deterrence posture against North Korea. This article evaluates South Korea's current nuclear preparedness, including preemptive/preventive strikes, missile defense, and civil defense, identifies weaknesses, and analyzes whether Japan can mitigate the weakness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informed by the concept of plausible deniability and newly-declassified U.S. and Japanese documents, this study explores the interconnectedness between public and private security assurances made during the 1957-1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The role of secret agreements is conceptualized as a form of covert operations in U.S.-Japan allied secret diplomacy. The revised security treaty and joint communiques announced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi were reinforced by secret agreements. Dual confidential arrangements enabled the transit of nuclear-armed U.S. vessels and warplanes into Japanese territorial waters and airspace, along with the free-use of U.S. bases in Japan for Korean contingencies. The U.S. employed overt and covert mechanisms to preserve its extended deterrent capabilities in East Asia as well as to meet Congressional and military requirements to preserve U.S. base rights in Japan. Japanese officials utilized covert strategies, including concealing the existence of secret agreements, thereby denying alleged public deception and ensuring their political survival for decades. In essence, secret agreements lay at the heart of the U.S.-Japan asymmetric alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Atomic energy has played an important role in international relations as a means of state power. From 1945 to 1959, Japan was significantly influenced by developments in atomic energy as a result of the Anglo-American "special relationship." During World War II, Britain and the United States cooperated to develop atomic weapons to use against Japan. In the ensuing Cold War era, the two countries advanced peaceful uses of atomic energy for Japan to counter the influence of the Soviet Union through psychological warfare. The U.S. Atomic Energy Peace Mission visited Japan in May 1955. However, the Japanese government altered its nuclear policy to solicit support from Britain because the United States was falling behind in atomic energy development. A British nuclear reactor was used as the first commercial nuclear power station, in 1959, whereby Britain earned parity with the United States in the context of nuclear power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a historical overview of the role of scientists during World War II, focusing on their involvement in the development of nuclear weapons. It discusses the contributions of scientists from both Allied and Axis-aligned nations, including the discovery of plutonium and the potential development of atomic bombs. The article explores the ethical considerations surrounding the use of atomic bombs on Japan and acknowledges the differing perspectives among scientists. It concludes by emphasizing the importance of reflecting on the sacrifices made during the war and working towards a peaceful future. The article also suggests classroom activities to engage students in understanding the complex relationship between science, technology, and society. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Nachrichten aus der Chemie is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study aims to examine Japan's policy towards DPRK nuclear issue. It summarizes current Japan's policy pattern towards DPRK nuclear issue. Japan's entrenched marginal position in the Northeast Asian security architecture fundamentally shaped the outward appearance of Japan's policy towards the DPRK nuclear issue. However, there is still some room for Japan to play out. Some factors determine why current Japan's policy towards DPRK nuclear issue is ineffective. These factors include the following: Japan did not handle its relations with its neighbors China, South Korea, and Russia well, but instead further deteriorated the three pairs of bilateral relations; China, Russia, and North Korea constitute a potential alliance, further increasing the pressure on Japan; Japan's domestic public opinion abducted the government's DPRK policy; The last assumption is that current Japan is a country without nuclear weapons. Japan's willingness and ability to deal with the above issues will determine the future trajectory and effectiveness of its policy towards the DPRK nuclear issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discussions on peace in Japan have significantly changed since the end of the Second World War. This can be clearly illustrated by the development of the peace studies field, which has been strongly influenced by the pacifism of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the experiences of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This article traces the historical development of Japanese peace studies and analyzes its characteristics. Since pacifism has been accepted as the key element for understanding political culture in Japan since 1945, peace research, the practice of peace education, and peace museums are also regarded as important factors that constitute Japanese peace studies and peace culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Japanese public has been assumed to possess a deeply ingrained aversion toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We employ a survey experiment to ascertain whether this aversion is unconditional or may erode in the face of hypothetical deterioration in Japan's security situation, and in particular a hypothetical withdrawal of the US security-nuclear umbrella, increased North Korean nuclear weapons testing activities, and movement by South Korea toward the attainment of a nuclear arsenal. We find that the Japanese nuclear aversion may come under stress in the face of such developments. Additionally, we find that the elasticity of Japanese attitudes with respect to the nuclear option in the face of external security deterioration may be associated with an important individual-level demographic characteristic, namely, gender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the redress campaign waged by activists in Japan on behalf of roughly 2,000 North Korean A-bomb victims (pipokja). These victims were repatriated from Japan after being subjected to the 1945 US nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while under colonial rule. From the early 1990s through to the twenty-first century, activists in Japan pursued redress for these A-bomb survivors in close synchronicity with the redress movements centred on South Korean victims. Highlighting the potential of the individual as entrepreneur within collective action settings, the redress developments were initiated and largely driven by an activist, Lee Sil-gun (1929-2020). Although Tokyo and Pyongyang were initially reluctant to acknowledge that A-bomb survivors existed in North Korea, in the face of sustained pressure by the Japan-based activists, the two governments facilitated a limited redress process for the victims by making various concessions on the issue. How did these activists navigate the structural constraints of the authoritarian North Korean state and the volatile bilateral relationship in enacting their transnational activism? How were they able to elicit concessions on their redress objectives from Tokyo and Pyongyang in the absence of formalized diplomatic relations? Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Japan and South Korea, this article probes these questions by empirically tracing and analyzing the evolution of the redress campaign for the North Korean A-bomb victims. I utilize the concept of polylateral diplomacy to elucidate the dynamic of engagement between the activists and the two governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Japanese perceptions of nuclear technology from 1945 to 1956, the early stage of the introduction of nuclear technology, by using discourses of the government and of antinuclear civil movements. It is based on the theoretical framework that discourses construct social perceptions of science and technology. For this purpose, statements such as official documents of the Japanese government and declarations made by the antinuclear movement were used as main resources of analysis. This article finds that various technological aspects influenced the formation of the Japanese nuclear technological system. In addition, the Japanese government tried to keep open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. It tried to justify its 'peaceful use of nuclear power' by portraying itself as the sole victim of nuclear weapons while hiding its intention to develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nuclear safety myth was formed at the beginning of the introduction of nuclear technology. As a result, we can see that in Japan, the nuclear safety myth was growing from the beginning of the introduction of nuclear technology amid a dichotomous understanding of good and bad uses of nuclear power and the desire to enter an advanced state of science and technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons is said to be an effective declaratory policy for advancing nuclear disarmament. In Japan, which suffered two atomic bombings, there are many voices that expect the US to declare the NFU, hoping to promote nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, Japan faces a tough security environment with North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities and, above all, China's more assertive actions along with the expansion of both nuclear and conventional forces. The Japanese strategic community thinks that it is essential to maintain the credibility of the US extended deterrence and to further develop strike capabilities to counter China's medium-range strike capabilities in the region. In this context, there is a concern that a possible US declaration of NFU, while it may reduce the nuclear risk between the US and China, may signal to China that the US would allow China's assertive activities at the regional level. Measures must be taken to dispel concerns about such regional instability, and stakeholders should pursue stability at both strategic and regional levels so that declaratory policies such as NFU can effectively contribute to reducing nuclear threats and risks. To this end, it would be beneficial to discuss arms control and build confidence through a multi-layered strategic and arms control dialogues among primary players, namely one between the US and China, one among the US, Japan, and China, and another that add other regional players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy & Peace is the property of Ihsan Dogramaci Peace Foundation, Center for Foreign Policy & Peace Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has had a longstanding and significant relationship with Japan. The Institute, originally founded in 1958 as the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), recognized the need to think strategically about nuclear weapons during the Cold War and sought to develop ways to assess and control nuclear arsenals. Engaging with Japan, the only country to have experienced a nuclear attack, was seen as a logical first step. Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, Deputy Director of the IISS from 1967 to 1977, played a crucial role in establishing this relationship and was recognized by the Japanese government for his contributions. Over the years, the IISS has maintained strong connections with Japan, with Japanese diplomats regularly visiting the Institute and Japanese leaders participating in its events. The IISS has learned from Japan's foreign-policy and strategic communities and plans to further strengthen its relationship with Japan in the future. [Extracted from the article]

The goal of this study is to examine factors determining Japanese citizens' attitudes toward nuclear armament. Previous studies have suggested that Japanese citizens have been strongly opposed to the idea of nuclear armament. However, this study questions the robustness of the anti-nuclear stance among the Japanese population. More specifically, I contend that ethnocentric tendencies among Japanese citizens significantly boost their support for nuclear armament. The statistical analysis relying on the survey data in Japan verifies this hypothesis. Findings from this study are essential in understanding the current discourse surrounding nuclear armament in Japan. Dissecting the process through which Japanese citizens develop their attitudes toward nuclear weapons, this study significantly advances our understanding of Japan's identity issues in the security arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mitchie Takeuchi’s mother and grandfather survived the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 70 years ago. Miyako Taguchi’s parents survived the bombing of Nagasaki three days later. Takeuchi and Taguchi both are part of the second generation (and in Takeuchi’s case also the third generation) of hibakusha—the Japanese term for people who were exposed directly to one of the two bombings or their radioactive fallout or who were exposed while still in their mothers’ wombs. Although many hibakusha have been reluctant or unwilling to discuss the bombings with their children, some have not only talked about their experiences with family members but also become active in groups such as Hibakusha Stories—which brings survivors into New York City schools to discuss their experiences with students. In this pair of interviews, Takeuchi and Taguchi talk about what it’s like to be the child of a survivor and why they feel a responsibility to share their family stories and to speak out about nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Donald Trump's "America First" policy questions the fundamentals of the global U.S.-led alliance network. Where other allies implemented hedging strategies, Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō pledged to "make the alliance even greater," insisting that the bilateral ties were "airtight" and "stronger than ever before." However, Trump's approach to trade, détente with North Korea, and off-the-cuff remarks regarding nuclear weapons invigorated criticism in Japan: the U.S. is an unreliable partner and Japan needs to prepare for life after the alliance. We argue that Abe's embrace of Trump was successful in staving off the worst, maintaining stability at the cost of personal humiliation and certain trade and security interests. However, Trump's cavalier treatment of Japan has laid bare the realities of the alliance, potentially revitalizing a more autonomous discourse of alternatives to the current and often "humiliating" modus in alliance management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the transformation of nuclear fear in Japanese film after the Allied occupation of Japan in 1952. Topics discussed include a brief background of Japanese cinema to 1952, the Allied occupation's tempering of dissenting voices, especially in Japan's film industry from 1945 to 1952, and the evolution of the Japanese cinema from depicting tragedy to atrocity.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced a serious threat only a few years after it came into force in 1970. India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) in May 1974 rocked the nuclear-nonproliferation regime and cast doubt on the prospects of the NPT. Yet during the two years following the PNE, several significant countries ratified the treaty. Why did states that had been notable holdouts, like Italy, Japan, and South Korea, ratify the treaty soon after the Indian nuclear test? This article finds that the PNE galvanized pro-NPT forces in the United States and Canada, leading to changes in nonproliferation policy. In particular, it led them to threaten to withhold access to nuclear technology and materials unless the holdouts ratified the NPT. It also motivated Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to change his secret advice to Japan that the United States did not want Japan to ratify the NPT in order to keep the People's Republic of China unsure about Japan's nuclear intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese security policy has undergone significant changes lately. Japanese policymakers have recently argued over advancing Japan's Self-Defense Forces with new weapon systems. In particular, the Abe government has decided to purchase long-range cruise missiles for its new F-35A jetfighters, and to reconstruct a newly-built helicopter carrier into an aircraft carrier. While specific policy proposals continued dividing policymakers and other stakeholders, the underlying story specifying Japan's place in East Asia, the rise of China, the threat of North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, the tight security relationship with the United States and the vulnerability of the Japanese archipelago has faced little core criticism. The lack of alternative national security narratives suggests the emergence of a Japanese security consensus in the mid-2010s. The strength of the narrative in deterring policymakers to refrain from critique, through the significant costs incurred by opposition, could also suggest a hegemonic narrative (but not necessarily a consensus). We find that the dominant narrative provided a necessary foundation for unorthodox policy proposals, which arguably enabled the Abe government to push through military instrument expansions in the Self-Defense Forces, moves far from politically sustainable only a decade earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of two nuclear tests in 2016, an additional test in 2017 and a series of missile launches by North Korea in 2016-17, Japan's government is facing a critical set of security challenges. These require adaptation and careful planning by the Abe administration and raise important questions about the future of Japanese defence policy, alliance relations with the United States, and cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The following article considers both the history and current state of relations between Tokyo, Washington and Seoul, the relationship between elite and public opinion within Japan, and the character of Prime Minister Abe's leadership at a time of acute strategic risk. While the danger of conflict in northeast Asia should not be minimized, the gravity of the current crisis potentially offers an important opportunity for policy innovation for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States that Japan should take no part in nuclear arms development and should lead in the establishment of a nuclear-free zone. Reasons behind the suspicions on Japan's nuclear capabilities; Deterrents to Japan's nuclear weapon development including the Japanese Constitution of 1946; Views on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States.

Argues that even if the world has survived the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, it does not guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used again. Annihilation of the two Japanese cities on August 6 and 9, 1945; Increase in the number of nuclear-weapons-capable nations; Rapidly spreading technology of nuclear power; State of the East-West relations; Attempts to control the use of nuclear weapons.

The article discusses the dilemma faced by scientists if they devote themselves intensively to public affairs, with special focus on how young U.S. scientists reacted in the months following Hiroshima's bombardment. Led by scientists Leo Szilard and Harold Urey, Manhattan Project scientists opposed a War Department bill that placed domestic atomic energy programs in the hands of a part-time commission which could include military representatives. By January 1946 the coalition of Manhattan Project site groups expanded into the Federation of American Scientists, an organization that brings its members' knowledge and experience to bear on national critical decisions.

The article discusses issues related to the consequences of a possible thermonuclear attack on a major city in the United States. On one hand, the nature and magnitude of the effects of hypothetical nuclear attacks are entirely specifiable, on the other hand, these effects are completely immeasurable. This difficulty primarily occurs due to the attempt of describing an event that is without precedent. It has been suggested that in attempting to comprehend the consequences of such an attack, it is useful to consider the case of a single city and a single weapon. Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan do not serve as precedents for any hypothetical nuclear war scenario.

The article presents the author's opinion on the importance of preventing a nuclear warfare. He also shares his experience in treating the victims of devastation caused by the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Day by day the world is moving closer to destroying itself. There could be total annihilation of mankind if the contemporary nuclear weapons were used. These weapons have thousands times greater destructive power than atomic bombs dropped in Japan.

The author talks about his visit to Hiroshima in April 1962, which is 17 years after the dropping of the first atomic bomb. He went there to study the psychological and social effects of the holocaust. He was confronted with the brutal experiences of human beings who sat before him. He felt profoundly shocked and emotionally drained after each interview that he almost abandoned the study. Psychic numbing or partial emotional desensitization allowed him to distance himself to fulfill his role as investigator.

The article discusses the issues concerning the participation of scientists in the events leading to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombardments in Japan. A report prepared by James Franck, a Nobel laureate in physics, seemed to be one aspect of the influence of scientists upon the decision to drop the bomb. The attention to this document was disputed for many years resulting the formation of the Interim Committee. The committee was initiated to understand what happened to the Franck report and was designed to deal with the matters of secrecy, publicity and domestic organization of the atomic energy effort after the war.

The article offers information on the symposium entitled "Review of Nuclear Proliferation Problems" organized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and conducted in Tallberg, Sweden on June 15-18, 1973. The meeting delved into various topics including the spread of nuclear technology, nuclear developments, safeguards, cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, military consequences of the proliferation of nuclear technology, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference, and security problems involving non-nuclear weapon countries. Delegates from India, Israel, Japan, USSR, Mexico, and the United States attended the gathering.