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Works on coalition formation and survival have traditionally focused on tactical and policy considerations at the elite level, and frequently neglected the role of voters. This study draws attention to how policy preferences among supporters may constrain parties' coalition choices and affect their subsequent electoral performance. New Zealand and Japan, which have seen both significant party systemchanges and the emergence of previously unfamiliar coalition cabinets as the newnormsince the 1990s, provide suitable cases for hypothesis testing. Analysis of cross-temporal survey data demonstrates that the distance between the ideological mean of each coalition partner (measured by its supporters' left-right positions) and the coalitionmean is negatively correlatedwith its vote share change in the following election. Parties participating in or supporting an ideologically distant cabinet, especially when alternative coalition choices are possible, face particularly heavy electoral sanctions. These findings highlight a micro-political explanation complementing existing coalition theories, and confirm the ideal of democratic representation that governments are held accountable by their voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1990s, popular discontent with politics in Italy, New Zealand, and Japan led to the enactment of new electoral systems in all three countries. The results of the reforms have been mixed, as they have dramatically altered politics in some cases but in others have been a great disappointment to many observers. This essay examines the reforms and the conditions under which they successfully addressed the problems of their party systems. The cases highlight the limitations of using electoral systems to explain political Outcomes that are not direct effects of electoral rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]