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When faced with the threat of invasion by the Mongol Empire and Goreyo, its vassal state, Kamakura Japan could have followed a diplomatic course with the Mongols or formed an alliance with anti-Mongol forces on the continent. Authorities in Japan, however, rejected both options, choosing instead to fight the Mongols alone on their own soil. International-relations models fail adequately to explain Kamakura Japan's preference for self-reliance. By contrast, Asuka Japan, when faced with a similar invasion from Tang–Silla forces in an earlier era, opted to form an alliance with Baekjae, which culminated in a battle on the continent. Despite the copious scholarly treatment of the Mongol invasion, an important question about the Mongol–Japan War remains unanswered: How and why did Kamakura Japan's governmental structure incline it to choose defensive self-reliance rather than diplomacy or military alliance? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When faced with the threat of invasion by the Mongol Empire and Goreyo, its vassal state, Kamakura Japan could have followed a diplomatic course with the Mongols or formed an alliance with anti-Mongol forces on the continent. Authorities in Japan, however, rejected both options, choosing instead to fight the Mongols alone on their own soil. International-relations models fail adequately to explain Kamakura Japan's preference for self-reliance. By contrast, Asuka Japan, when faced with a similar invasion from Tang–Silla forces in an earlier era, opted to form an alliance with Baekjae, which culminated in a battle on the continent. Despite the copious scholarly treatment of the Mongol invasion, an important question about the Mongol–Japan War remains unanswered: How and why did Kamakura Japan's governmental structure incline it to choose defensive self-reliance rather than diplomacy or military alliance? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In comparison with the external wage structures of more economically advanced countries, almost every kind of wage differential is much wider in Japanese industries. In addition, the internal wage structure in many firms and industries is, to a large extent, a function of the age distribution of the work force, since wages increase with length of service with the employer. The shaping of this pattern of wage relationships, which has prevailed in Japanese industry throughout most of the period since World War I, is traced in this article as an integral aspect of Japan's development from feudalism to a modern capitalist economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the social structure of Japan in 2000. One of the most striking features of the Japanese social system seems to have been that the changes in control of the social system which accompanied the change from feudalism to industrialization were changes in the balance of power within the already existing class groups rather than, as in the West, a shift of control between classes. The transition of Japan from feudalism to modern industrialism has not been accompanied by the rise to power of any new class. Roughly speaking, six social classes may be distinguished in modern Japan. In order of their level in the social stratification of Japan, these groups are as follows: the Imperial Family, nobility, upper middle class, lower middle class, industrial proletariat, and peasants. The Imperial Family, consisting of the Emperor and his relatives, stands at the pinnacle of social structure. The Emperor is in a very real sense the focal point of the entire social system. The symbolic position of the Emperor and the Imperial Family is of peculiar significance. The next group in the Japanese system of stratification is the nobility. This group may be subdivided into three groups in which power and prestige vary inversely. The group having the greatest prestige is that of the old court nobility called the Kuge. Next in order is the Daimyo group. These are the descendants of the dukes and counts who ruled the various principalities of the seventeenth and following centuries.

Before the Meiji Revolution (1867-8) Japan could hardly be regarded as a modern state. The country was divided into some 300 domains, in each of which people were subdivided under four broad castes, the samurais, the farmers, artisans and the merchants. Each domain was ruled by a feudal lord, under the control of the Tokugawa family. The Tokugawa had established a central government in Edo (Tokyo) at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but the influence of its administration was declining rapidly towards the end of the era. The domains were becoming increasingly independent of the central government; some ultimately even plotted its downfall. The domain and the caste systems were identified by the new Meiji government as major obstacles to the unification of the nation and were soon abolished. Although the Tokugawa era is regarded as part of Japan's feudal age, samurai were virtually cut off from the land; their stipends were fixed in terms of rice, and revised on promotion or if the financial position of the clan worsened. By the latter half of the Tokugawa era most samurai had lost their status as petty feudal lords and were treated much as government officials and military officers are now.

This article discusses the history of Japanese management, describing the legal and ethical codes of the feudal system. Japan has been based, since the emergence of the feudal legal codes, on a meritocratic society. If performance does not yield an improvement in status, the Japanese will not work. Organization is based on the central power-ikki relationship, and does not simply assume a systematic Western organizational structure. This develops naturally, and the question is how best to make use of it. Things do not go as organizational theories predict. There will always be up-and-down movement in Japanese society. But if in this vertical movement the courtesy and music hierarchy is ignored, the organization will fall apart.

This article discusses the concept of state formation in Japan and Western Europe. Historians of pre-modern Japan have become more suspicious of European analogue theories, even if they do not explicitly reject the very notion of feudalism, and analysts of Japanese capitalism have tended to opt for either of two viewpoints that are equally at odds with comparative models of developmental pattern. There is, in other words, an obvious difference between the emergence of states out of primitive societies and the rebuilding of states after the collapse of earlier ones and a temporary regression to lower levels of political organization. From the viewpoint of historical sociology, however, this transformation must be understood as a process, rather than an abrupt break. In general terms, processes of secondary state formation differ with regard to the characteristics of the breakdowns which precede them and of the more or less significant legacies left behind by earlier state structures. In the Western context, the latter aspect was of particular importance. The image of imperial power survived and remained strong enough to inspire recurrent projects of restoration. They all ended in failure, but their direct and indirect effects were an integral part of the process which gave rise to the European state system.

The article discusses post war Samurai films. Some Samurai films contain little killing; others seem devoted exclusively to the use of the sword; some focus on feudal society and politics while others virtually ignore the historical setting. The Samurai film is set in Japan's feudal past, which at its broadest can be considered from the years 1188-1868, encompassing the Kamakura, Muromachi, Momoyama, and Tokugawa eras. The first subgenre of the Samurai film to emerge in the postwar era was the Nostalgic Samurai Drama.

The article focuses on difficulties experienced by native industries in China during the Golden Age. During the war China's native capitalists could not overcome the burden of feudalism and imperialism. The difference between the war period and the period before the war is that Japan and America took the place of England and the warlords substituted for the Qing monarchy. However, Japan and America quickly established a firm hold on China during the war and created monopolies there. Under the opposing pressures from within and without China, the native industries still exhibited vigorous growth, but their foundation was weak and primitive. Because of high wartime profits, their propensity to speculate became quite visible and the industrial foundation remained unstable. Because the development of the native industries was insufficient, because native industries remained primitive and weak, native capitalists were forced to maintain connections with feudal and imperialist powers. Thus, in the Golden Age, Chinese native capitalists encountered many difficulties. They could not expand and develop sufficiently. Because of this they continued to exhibit a feudal mentality, a colonial slavishness, a propensity to speculate and a weak nature.

The article discusses the privilege against self-incrimination under the law in Japan. It is not easy to realize the true picture of the Japanese system designed for protecting human rights against illegal or unfair exercise of investigating authority without having some preliminary knowledge about the historical background of the Japanese legal system. From the 8th century down to the 1860's criminal justice in Japan was profoundly influenced by Chinese legal tradition. Ancient Chinese laws had been adopted and modified by feudal precedents and ordinances. The thought and philosophy basic to the administration of criminal justice were the result of a mixture of traditional Japanese morals under feudalism and the Japanese interpretation of Confucian ethics. The governmental system of Japan underwent a fundamental change when the Constitution of Japan came into force in 1947. It is submitted that Japan was so hurried in adopting the concept of privilege against self-incrimination that she overlooked the possible unbalance between the privilege and the whole structure of traditional criminal justice. Under Anglo-American law it has been well settled that once the accused has taken the witness stand he is assumed to have waived his privilege against self-incrimination and may be cross-examined by the prosecution with respect to what be stated in the direct examination.

The Japanese family has been released from the institutional bonds of a feudalistic system. This change has been more evident in its structural aspect, however, them in the aspects of attitudes and values. In addition to these structural changes, a new trend has been noted in the informal activities of the Japanese family, particularly among the urban white-collar groups. This article discusses findings obtained from comparative research in four communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information related to the influence of the U.S. on the education in Japan. Since the Meiji Restoration, a great change has taken place in the life and culture of Japan. In order to reorganize and modernize the feudalistic society, it was necessary to transplant the culture of modern European countries and the U.S. In the field of education, its antiquated system had to be fundamentally altered by taking its cue from the educational systems in Europe and the U.S. The embryo of the school system in Japan can be traced back to the school regulation established in 1872. From the point of view of administrative set-up, it was patterned after the French system, however as a matter of fact, there were not a few instances in which the American system were adopted in the line of its set-up and practices. The future schools must teach practical knowledges which are necessary in the daily lives of the people and students must be taught the knowledge which will make possible the creation of a new era and discard the learnings of Japanese poetry, Chinese poetry or classics etc., which belonged to the feudalistic society.

Social thought in the broadest sense has never been lacking in Japan, the researches of Japanese scholars have incontestably shown that not only was the mainland heritage of Confucian and like ideologies zealously perpetuated, but those in addition new departures bearing a strictly indigenous stamp were abundant. This holds true for that earlier period when sociologists were open to culture contacts of all sorts, and for the later era of feudal isolation and xenophobia as well. Unfortunately, however, Japanese treatises in this field have not been translated and Occidental scholars have made almost no researches of their own, so that they are compelled to pass over what is undoubtedly a most interesting body of social lore with this bare reference. It is now a commonplace to say that no nation in recorded history underwent so sudden a transition from agrarian feudalism to highly developed industrialism as did Japan after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Keeping at least equal pace with the march of material culture went a host of new ideas from England, Germany, France, and the U.S. that challenged and in many instances overcame the sway of ancient lore and immemorial usage.