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Free and easy access to an unusually rich variety of sources (primarily books, newspapers, and periodicals) is the hallmark of the Database of Sources Concerning the War of Resistance against Japan and Modern Sino-Japanese Relations (Kang Ri zhanzheng yu jindai Zhong Ri guanxi wenxian shuju pingtai), launched in 2017. Continuously expanding with new uploads, this database contains both familiar and rare sources for the study of not just the two topics that make up the database name but also many other aspects of Republican China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Cool Japan' is an instance of Japanese government's nation branding exercise as part of its soft power projection in which the unique selling point is identified as Japanese national identity. In this paper, I examine the relationship between Cool Japan and Japanese national identity and highlight a tension in the construction. Cool Japan is about emphasizing Japan's attractiveness for public diplomacy, while the top-down nature of the branding undermines the imagery that the branding is designed to convey. I show that policy elites resolve this tension by invoking the traditional Japanese identity narratives that construct Japan into both a non-Western and an un-Asian entity, reproducing the myth of Japanese uniqueness. I argue that the elite narratives surrounding Cool Japan readily replicate the language reminiscent of prewar identity construction. Despite the contemporary popularity of manga and anime, the purported 'coolness' of these products are framed within older constructions of Japanese Self that can trace their pedigree back to the nineteenth century. Using the minutes of committee meetings, policy documents, as well as media interviews given by policy- and business elites, I show that Cool Japan is effectively a twenty first century rendition of the familiar Japanese identity construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores how a zainichi (residing in Japan) Korean athlete reveals often-concealed postcolonial and post-Cold War tensions revolving around ethnic essentialism and nationalism in East Asia. The focus of the study is Jong Tae-se, a third generation zainichi Korean football player who has become a star in Japan, North Korea and South Korea. By examining media representations and online responses to Jong in South Korea as well as his autobiographies written in both Korean and Japanese, it is explained how Jong, as a zainichi Korean sport celebrity, both represents the arbitrariness of nation-ness and reproduces unresolved geopolitical and historical issues of postcolonial East Asia. Whereas his mobility, multilingual capability and fluid belongingness may signal changing dynamics of national-ness in East Asia, this analysis also reveals that his media discourses keep him tethered to anti-Japan and anti-communist sentiments. Such vicissitudes of the discourses around him attest that colonial and Cold War memories and historical wounds continue to be conjured in contemporary East Asia. Ultimately, this study discusses both the possibilities and the limits of a zainichi Korean subjectivity as a de-colonial tool for destabilizing national, colonial, and Cold War ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study explored the strength of national identification and intergroup attitudes of Chinese youth (n = 591, aged 12-15) toward the Chinese, the Americans, the Japanese, and the South Koreans. The participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire and write down reasons why they 'like' or 'dislike' the four groups. The results showed a consistency in in-group favoritism. Gender and age were both related to Chinese youths' national identifications and their national intergroup attitudes. Confucian ethics, media influence and historical complex were identified as main factors that may contribute to their attitudes toward the four groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Japanese colonial period, Korea's reading public paid close attention to Chinese revolutions against Japanese and Western empires. Korean nationalists viewed China's revolutionary struggles as important for liberating Korea from Japan, a stance that reveals a transnational basis of Korean nationalism in the colonial era. One such nationalist was Sin Ŏnjun (1904–38), Tong'a Ilbo 's Shanghai-based correspondent, who played a critical role in conveying the momentous events in contemporary China to colonized Koreans. Drawing on Sin's example, this article shows how Sino-Korean transnationalism constituted Korea's left-wing, progressive nationalism in the 1930s. Although Sin Ŏnjun was a nationalist rather than a communist, he highlighted the communist struggles in China in his dispatches. He saw communism as the only viable way of solving China's internal and external problems, although he, at the same time, disapproved of Chinese communists' "terrorist methods." This article argues that this position also reflected his stance in favor of a broad communist-nationalist alliance in the Korean independence movement. He saw Korea's liberation agenda as closely related to the revolutionary events in China, thus accomplishing a synthesis between Korean nationalistic and social aspirations and an East Asia–wide transnational paradigm of a universal emancipatory struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editors discuss migration, nationalism and immigration regime in Japan.

While some countries take relatively generous attitudes towards immigrants, other countries retain illiberal stances towards them. Why can the latter retain their first strict immigration policies? What mechanism would guide the countries towards more liberal attitudes? This article addresses these questions, with focusing on refugee policy in Japan. Japan has kept its strict and illiberal policy on accepting refugees. In 2016, she recognised only 26 cases as refugees among 10,901 asylum applications. Why can Japan retain its strict and illiberal refugee policy? Firstly, due to the sudden dissolution of the empire after World War II, the mono-ethnic understanding of nationhood and citizenship has remained in Japan. Then, in the institutional aspect, the Ministry of Justice retains its power in charge of immigration and refugee policies. Although there is a sign that international pressure makes the illiberal refugee policy a bit lax, like recently having an increasing number of asylum applicants from various countries and accepting Syrians as students not as refugees, no decisive factor is found to guide Japan towards more generous stance to accept refugees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers in Japan have adopted a discourse to link the Tokyo 2020 Olympics to the recovery of Japan's northern Tohoku region following the March 2011 triple disaster (3.11). This discourse has created a dissonance between 3.11-affected communities, policy-makers and wider Japan. To understand this dissonance, this article explores the implicit agendas behind Japan's Olympics efforts (such as positioning sports as a facilitator and symbol of recovery), its Cool Japan initiative (as a nation-branding and nation-building strategy) and other actions (such as labelling the 2020 event 'the Reconstruction Olympics'). It then analyses the opinions of people from affected areas, gathered through interview research and from popular media, to demonstrate that the use of recovery rhetoric to promote the Olympics is being poorly received among some in 3.11-affected communities. Community concerns circle around availability of construction resources as well as the fact that recovery is not yet complete. This article contends that the events of 3.11, combined with the pursuit of the Olympics, has effected changes in the social imaginary and in regional ideas of belonging among 3.11-affected communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mirai. Estudios Japoneses is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes two original datasets, which cover 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and the careers of municipal leaders, to analyse the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China's 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top Party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, a finding that is consistent with the widely held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party's cadre evaluation system. We also see a negative effect of nationalist protest on foreign direct investment (FDI) growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests appear to arise through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders' performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1968, the conservative Japanese government of Prime Minister Satō Eisaku mounted a year-long celebration of the 100th anniversary of the 1868 'Meiji Restoration' that had launched Japan's modern era. Although the government took pains to make the commemoration seem non-political, the centennial aroused fierce opposition among those on the left, who feared it represented an effort to revive aspects of pre-World War II militarism. The resistance was led by Japanese historians, who felt the view of the previous 100 years promoted by the government clashed with an alternative understanding of Japan's history indicated by their professional research and training. This article examines the nature and scope of the 1968 Meiji centennial, elucidates why historians in particular were so opposed to it, and investigates the real aims for the celebration on the part of the conservative Satō government, as revealed in the private minutes of the government's planning committee. Ultimately, the historians' fears were partially justified: the government did intend the centennial to revive Japanese nationalism and patriotism along pre-war lines, as shown by their close modeling of the main ceremony on an earlier fascist ceremony - the 1940 celebration of the 2600th anniversary of Imperial rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a critical appraisal of the Abe Cabinet's plans to orchestrate a national celebration of the 150th anniversary of Meiji in 2018, following the example of the Meiji Centennial celebrations of 1968. The article begins by introducing some of the criticisms voiced at the time of the 1968 Centennial by prominent Japanese historians such as Tōyama Shigeki and Yamaguchi Keiji, who saw clear links between the post-war celebration of Meiji and broader efforts to revive Japanese nationalism and promote the long-term goal of re-militarization. It goes on to consider some of the public statements that have been made by Prime Minister Abe regarding 'Meiji 150ʹ and explores the significant gap between the government's vision of the significance of Meiji and the perspectives that emerge from scholarship on the Restoration period produced in recent decades by historians in both Japan and the English-speaking world. It concludes with a brief consideration of the divide that separated Japan's post-war historians from some of their American colleagues in the 1960s, and the role that scholars today have to play in combating the manipulation of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction provides a brief overview of some of the ways the Meiji Restoration is being commemorated at home and around the world in this sesquicentennial year. Doing so demonstrates the complexity of this history and current remembrances of the event and the new era it launched. It also serves to introduce the six essays in this volume, and the ways they problematize the Meiji national paradigm to reveal inherent tensions between the development of Japanese nation-building and nationalism and the country's engagement with globalizing forces. Focusing on the idea of "Global Meiji" highlights the era as both national and global. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's new treaties with the Western powers came into force in the summer of 1899. These signified Japan's recognition as a modern state, but also opened the whole of Japan to residence and commerce for the nationals of the Western powers. This article examines Japan's legislative response to this new era of both political equality and expanded foreign intercourse and exchange. This comprised two new laws, Japan's first nationality law and new entry restrictions, both of which defined the boundaries of Japanese identity. The West played a paramount role in the crafting of these laws, but often forgotten is the role played by China. By examining the international contexts and the debates that attended the passage of these laws, this article shows that each law enacted a form of exclusion: the former sought to mitigate Western influence, while the latter sought to minimize Chinese immigration. Together, they reflected Japan's international position between two others: China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses how Spanish and Japanese Social Science textbooks represent Europe and Asia discursively, and in what way the national viewpoint from each country is manifested in that representation. We analysed 15 textbooks used in secondary schools, and we focused on Geography and Civic Education subjects. Our analysis was developed mainly at semantic levels, and we examined the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ answering four interrelated questions. We found that in both countries’ textbooks, Europe is in general described in a positive or even idealized way as a developed and rich region, whereas Asia has a reverse negative image. Underlying this opposition, we can observe a Western ethnocentric view which takes Western development as the implicit standard to rank all societies hierarchically and builds discursively the dichotomy between developed and underdeveloped countries. ‘Our’ country’s position in the world is also conditioned by this Western-centred perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews the papers `Army as Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited,' and Arthur Waldron, `War and the Rise of Nationalism in Twentieth-Century China.' Essential and distinctive elements of the Western way of war; Militarization as vital part of modernity.

Kosaku Yoshino is one of the few Japanese sociologists who bravely pioneered to tackle the thorny issue of nationalism in postwar Japan I from a sociological perspective i . Kosaku's contributions to the study of nationalism in general, and Japanese nationalism in particular, have been noteworthy and well recognized, particularly in those positive reviews of his celebrated book I Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan i ([4]). Kosaku perceptively points to the call for a "wholesome" ( I kenzen na i ) nationalism in postwar Japan, and he distinguished between two types: the resurgent cultural nationalism and the prudent revivalist nationalism. [Extracted from the article]

Why do conservative nationalists in Japan continuously seek to revise the constitution despite the past failures, and what is the likelihood of successful revision and its impact on Japan's norm of pacifism and its use of force? The article offers an analytical framework for the issue based on national pride and national security, and argues that the ‘revisionists’ seek to create a new national identity, one that infuses a greater sense of national pride among the public and enables the exercise of collective self-defense, thereby removing Japan's postwar psychological and institutional limitations on nationalism and military activities. The LDP's 2012 draft is most explicit and ambitious in this regard, with the current revision attempt under Abe having the highest chance of success since the 1950s. Successful revision would significantly expand Japan's security activities, particularly within the framework of the US-Japan Security Alliance, and entail the end of Japan's unique postwar institutionalized pacifism, although the norm of pacifism will linger on as a constitutional principle. For a smoother return to the international military scene, the Japanese government must distance itself from historical revisionism and utilize its enhanced military role to promote regional public goods rather than merely protecting its narrow national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1970s, many critical Japanese Studies scholars have problematized nihonjinron discourses, which overemphasize Japanese uniqueness and its exclusive nature, as a manifestation of cultural nationalism for establishing ethnonational identity. Similarly, Japanese journalists and online writers have also begun to criticize the recent rampant praise of Japan in mass media as cultural nationalism. The present study explores this issue through a close analysis of a television variety show entitled Bukkomi Japanīzu 3 [Sneaking in a Japanese Expert 3] aired in 2014. Recent years have witnessed increasing nationalistic tendencies in Japan, expressed in both overt hate speech and political activities and in covert cultural nationalism. This article focuses on the latter, offering a textual and discursive analysis of a television show that features non-Japanese people engaging in Japanese cultural practices outside of Japan. It examines the structure, narrations, and interactions of one episode of the show as an ‘encoding’ process, which is followed by a ‘decoding’ of the show through the analysis of online viewer comments. Thus, the present study discusses how the show constructs the essentialist view that Japanese culture belongs exclusively to Japanese people and how audience members respond in diverse ways in online commentary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea remains puzzling according to international relations theory. The two countries have failed to develop stable peace relationships even though they are both democracies, bound to each other by security arrangements with the United States, and have considerable interdependence between them. So, why have these two countries failed to produce equitable trust? Scholars tend to focus either on structural causes, or nationalistic actions and remarks by political leaders as possible reasons. While these reasons may explain their unstable relationship, it does not explain the worsening public perception in both countries. This article advances domestic economic inequality, which has been largely neglected in the literature, and argues that the growing economic inequality has aggravated the public's opinion. Findings from statistical analyses and case-study methods largely show that public opinion with nationalistic movements have fluctuated following the growing socio-economic inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 2000s, a new wave of xenophobic activism known as the ‘Action Conservative Movement’ (ACM) began to engage in prominent actions against ethnic minorities. Its aggressive use of hate speech confirmed fears of a rightward shift in Japan, echoing the rise of nationalist movements elsewhere around the globe. However, as the ACM moved from online organizing to high-profile public protest, pre-existing factions of rightist activists challenged ACM methods and viewpoints on multiculturalism. These ‘fights on the right’ highlight the diversity of rightist groups that are often treated monolithically in academia and the media. The critique some rightists made of the ACM’s xenophobic activism was based on a view of ethnicity that embraced Japan as a multi-ethnic empire—an iconoclastic view itself, and a reflection of Cold War geopolitics, the dynamics of domestic political polarities, and Japan’s colonial legacy manifested by ethnic minorities. It built as well from the cultivation of a particular form of anti-establishment ethos. Based upon my ethnographic fieldwork since 2005, this article offers a detailed typography of several generations of right-wing activism in Japan and an examination of how their diverse views of social citizenship, activist method, and ideological commitment have come into conflict as they grapple with ethnicity in contemporary Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan’s early modern Tokugawa government (1603−1868) sponsored a series of projects of national mapping. The Matsumae family, ruling what is now Hokkaido, were loosely incorporated into these projects. It was only during the last of these, in the Tenpō era (1830−1848), that their lands were represented in the same manner as the rest of Japan because the central government made the final Matsumae-no-shima map. This article examines the production of this final official map of Japan’s north to argue that the Tokugawa’s institutional mapping made this region part of the nation through its own mapping framework, distinct from the cartographic forms with which national or imperial states are usually associated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwanese film KANO recounts the passage of a mixed-race baseball team to Japan’s Koshien Tournament during the colonial era of the 1930s. Its release evoked in both Taiwan and Japan critical responses in view of its rosy depiction of colonial modernity. Through analysing the film’s text and reviews in both Taiwan and Japan, we identify KANO as a “post-national” cinematic event. Its inviting nostalgic invocation of Japanese colonialism at the civilian level has launched divergent discourses on colonial legacies in the contemporary re/making of national identities, reflecting on the post-colonial socio-cultural conditions facing both Taiwan and Japan. We found that KANO in Taiwan instigated a re-examination of the state’s role in crafting the foundational myth of baseball as a “national” sport. Furthermore, the film brought on schemes of othering in which two national others were distinguished to manifest Taiwan subjectivity: Japanese colonialism versus Chinese nationalism. On the other hand, KANO in Japan was stripped of its colonial connotation. Its honouring of juvenile devotion to baseball was employed as a psychic introjection of Japanese-ness, which many considered losing in the globalizing social milieu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mirai. Estudios Japoneses is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses sexuality and prostitution as key elements in the emergence of postwar Japanese nationalism. It analyzes discursive practices, which Japan's authorities used to conceptualize the recreational facilities aimed at "comforting" the Allied occupiers during the still imaginary encounter of occupier and occupied in the immediate post-surrender period. The conceptualization of prostitution at the end of WWII is a pivotal example for the clash of competing empires, the disintegration of Japan's empire, and postwar imagination of the Japanese nation-state. Since the early twentieth century Japan's aggressive war and colonial rule in Asia exported sex workers as well as specific notions of sexuality-often mediated through further global entanglements with the West and its colonies-that had shaped the understanding of Japan's empire and Japanese imperial subjectivity. With defeat in 1945, Japan's imperial dreams shattered, but imperial experiences of sexuality and prostitution continued to shape ideas of Japanese belonging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addressing the issues surrounding nationalism and women trafficking in Japan. Topics discussed include relation of Japanese nationality to the history of the wartime comfort women; role of government in rebuilding survivors of wartime sexual violence; and issues of gender discrimination in the country.

In 1914, approximately 4500–4800 German men were transported to Prisoner of War (POW) camps in Japan following the occupation of the German colony in China. They were the only European POWs held captive by an Asian Great Power, making this a unique colonial case study. This is the first essay to analyse how German POWs in Japan perceived of and narrated their experiences in their letters, with particular focus on the recurring themes of patriotism, nationalism, and cultural-racial constructs. I will analyse the ways in which the POWs used these socio-cultural concepts to make sense of their circumstances and maintain a link to the German diaspora and metropolis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay examines the challenges faced by government experts in thought crimes as they attempted to combat radicalized nationalist organizations during the 1930s. The established system of containing subversive political movements, organized around the Peace Preservation Law (1925), was built on the premise that challenges to the government would come from the ideological left. The fact that activists were now attacking political and financial leaders in the name of patriotism presented ideological and procedural difficulties and reveals a destabilization in the discourse of nationalism enabled by the advent of patriotic terrorism that threatened the state's monopoly over the mantra of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on thriving populism and populist nationalism and democracy in East Asia and its comparison with that in the West. It discusses the ignorance of populist governance in post-war East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and China. It states that history of national humiliation and wartime record are condemned as part of international conspiracy in these countries. It discusses extreme nationalism under leadership of Ja­pan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, China's Xi Jinping, and Korea's Park Guen-hye.

In the midst of rising tension between China and Japan, two powerful countries in Asia, the favorable attitudes of each country's citizens toward the other country have dropped to a historical low. The Taiwan issue, historical legacy, island disputes, and maritime resource competition are major obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations, but the most fundamental issue is a deep-seated mutual distrust and suspicion between the two countries, which result in rising threat perceptions. Beyond the structural and political elite-centered approaches, this study examines the evidence related to the three approaches (face-to-face contact, cross-cultural exposure, and social identity) to reduce mutual distrust and antipathy in the two countries. With a careful analysis of the survey data, this study sheds light on the conditions under which contact (a) results in improved attitudes toward outgroup, (b) has little or no effect on intergroup relations, and (c) yields more prejudice and hostility toward the outgroup. The findings of this study not only identify factors that could facilitate mutual understanding between Chinese and Japanese people and more favorable impressions of one another, but are also relevant to planning interventions to reduce prejudice and distrust among people from different races, religions, and countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After 60 years maintaining Self-Defense Forces rather than a normal military, Japan is moving towards exercising collective self-defence, long restricted by interpretations of its 1945 Peace Constitution. The merits of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's 'proactive pacifism' are intensely debated by those welcoming greater international contributions from Japan and others suspicious of Japanese 'remilitarisation'. A nation's defence posture can theoretically be hijacked by aggressive nationalists, shift to pacifist isolationism, or rely on non-military internationalism or multilateral security cooperation. This article assesses competing explanations about the post-war trajectory of Japan's defence posture by charting variation in military doctrine and capabilities. The analysis finds that Tokyo has made incremental policy adjustments under domestic and international constraints, and is not aggressively remilitarising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the characteristics of contemporary Japanese nationalism. Topics covered include the role of revisionist myth making since the 1960s in contemporary right wing identity politics, moral and patriotic education initiatives of Prime Minsiter Shnizo Abe and the view that Abe aims to overcome the reforms during the U.S. Occupation which debilitated Japan's political, social and educational systems.

The article examines public discourse concerning divisive war memories in Japan. Topics covered include the culture of defeat, the influence of nationalism, pacifism and reconciliation on war memory, the debate on constitutional revisionism and the so-called Abe Doctrine, and description of civil society organizations committed to defend the constitution.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the different dimensions of nationalism in Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, public discourse on divisive war memories, and New Right transformation of Japanese politics.

Japan and Germany were allies during World War II, and both countries committed crimes. Even though the Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany was unprecedented in history, Japan has also been found guilty of serious misdemeanours. Today, Germany acknowledges the magnitude of its responsibility and strives to deal with this legacy. However, in Japan, we find no consensus on dealing with the matter. Nonetheless, it would be short-sighted to conclude that Germany did a better job than Japan from the outset. In analysing the different approaches to remembrance culture in the two countries, we use the theoretical framework of civil religion to assess the impacts of the respective civil religions on the culture of commemoration. We hereby analyzed the structural factors as well as the influence of individual political behaviour. Immediately after the war, neither Germany nor Japan were interested in coming to terms with their past. Both countries were subject to Western integration, and both countries experienced remarkable economic growth. One of the major differences between both countries concerns civil religion. While Germany no longer relied on strong nationalism-based politics and instead pursued European integration, in Japan. Shintôism has continued to influence feelings of national belonging, making it more difficult to establish a critical dialogue with the past. Further differences are apparent: the Western origin of Japan's constitution, the conflicting international environment in Japan, the late regime change, differences in education and, most importantly, the impacts of generational change in Germany. The 1968 student generation strongly condemned Nazi aggression and demanded that the older generation face responsibility, which strongly contributed to a reappraisal of the past in the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents an analysis of the portrayal of North Korea in the contemporary discourse of the two largest Japanese newspapers: the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun and the more left-wing oriented Asahi Shimbun. Analysed patterns and discursive practices in the two major national media outlets attempt to construct a certain notion of national identity, albeit through the use of different means and key ideas. Drawing on a post-structuralist understanding of language and discourse and theory of national identity based on the relational dichotomy between Self and Other, this study attempts to explain the construction of national identity in Japanese print media discourse, demonstrating the link between linguistic and societal practices. While Japan is portrayed as organised, democratic, rational and cooperative, North Korea is associated with discursive practices evoking irrationality, unpredictability and danger, often conveniently represented directly by Kim Jong-un. The newspapers tend to either stress the hard security aspect of the current status quo or emphasise harsh criticism of North Korea while simultaneously posing Japan as a victim. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the Self as well as the Other are rather fluid and context dependent. Given the link between Japanese politics and media, outlets with a high level of trustworthiness and credibility may significantly influence the readers' perception of their own identity and security. Ultimately, this raises questions about the possibility of the country's normalisation of its foreign and security policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews the papers `Army as Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited,' by Shin'ichi Kitaoka and `War and the Rise of Nationalism in Twentieth-Century China,' by Arthur Waldron. Distinction in the balance China and Japan sought to maintain between civil and military power; Absence of a central government; Links between militarization and nationalism.

This article condemns the Persian Gulf war as an example of American militarism, parallels such policies with Japan of the 1930's, and offers recommendations for Japan's place in the new world order. Viewed from Japan, America's euphoria about the war against Iraq and the so-called new world order is both ironic and a cause for deep pessimism. Japan was indisputably a naked aggressor against China, but it is questionable--more so now than ever--whether the Japanese were peculiarly war-loving, ultranationalistic, conformist, and intolerant of dissent. Part of the explanation lies in the quick-fix military ardor of contemporary America (and Britain), coupled with fear and envy of Japan's economic capabilities. At the same time, the image of the United States as a war-loving, sloganeering, extremist country (all World War II Western images of Japan) has been strengthened. Japan should establish all feasible controls on such technology, link economic assistance to arms control, and make its technology available for the surveillance and verification tasks essential to international arms control.

At the end of the Allied occupation in 1952, the Japanese press reported that two hundred thousand ‘mixed-blood’ children had been fathered and abandoned by foreign (mostly American) soldiers in Japan. Japanese commentators often converged on a single solution: the expulsion of all foreign troops and all ‘mixed’ children from Japan. Although most scholars treat the 1950s sense of ‘crisis’ surrounding ‘mixed’ children as a product of concern for their welfare, the ‘crisis’ is better understood as a complexly co-authored moral panic. Opposition politicians deployed wrath and fear over ‘blood mixing’ to discredit the dominant Liberal Party and its alliance with the United States. Meanwhile, ideological activists and mass media circulated false facts to present ‘mixed’ families as doomed and dangerous. Moral panic over ‘mixed-blood children’ fostered a ‘pure-blood’ identity in Japan after World War II and helped reconstruct Japanese nationalism on a new basis: that of the ‘pure’ race rather than the failed state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]