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The United States and Japan have maintained their strategic alignment for nearly an half century. This is the longest alliance ever for Japan and the second longest one for the United States besides NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, theoretical understanding of this bilateral relashionship is relatively poor. In particular, existense of the alliance after the Cold War generated further explanative disturbance. This paper attempts to grapes U.S.-Japan alliance as an "security community," modeled by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, that is more convincing theoretical framework than neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Although his model was created upon "transatlantic" relationship between the United States and Western Europe, the author considers the model is largely applicable to "transpacific" alignment. This paper argues a mechanism of peaceful change on multilateralism, military planning, and common definition of threats by examining institutions, norms and identity between the two countries in the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about the policy transformation of pension regimes is presented which is prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference, in Toronto, Ontario, on September 2-6, 2009. The paper discusses topics including the recent pension reforms in the U.S., Great Britain, Sweden and Japan, and the relationship between income inequality and pension regimes.

This study investigates the relationship between the media and public opinion by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. Specifically, this work has two sections. First, I analyzed all the content of the two news papers' articles regarding the war from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. This work reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. Among other things, the study quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in the degree of negativity about the U.S. policies toward Iraq (The negativity was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.)The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, particularly, the end of 2003, the New York Times also becomes gradually critical of their government. In some months, the New York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.Second, this work statistically examines whether media's impact is significant in shaping public opinion. This work constructs a statistical model to test hypotheses about the media's impact on public opinion during the Iraq War. Variables in the model include: the data of content analysis of two news papers, misery index (consumer price index and jobless rate), sentiment toward their leaders (presidential supporting rating in the United States and Japanese Cabinet supporting rating in Japan, respectively) and public favorability toward other nations. The result discovers that poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi's critical assessments of the Japanese government's Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times' unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government's policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings. Finally, as a conclusion, this study ponders ramifications of media's content toward public policy process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The government responded to American advances in the Pacific by selecting policies of war rather than policies of peace. Why did Japanese decision-makers choose the path of military confrontation rather than the path of diplomacy? What prompted them to confront the United States at Pearl Harbor? Was it the configuration of the international system, or the capabilities and resources of nation-states that compelled them all to choose war? Or were structural circumstances fluid enough for people to disagree, and for differences among decision-makers to reflect variations in the cognitive costs of making judgments?This paper will review Japanese decision-making dynamics in 1941, and investigate whether structural conditions or the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making best accounts for the foreign policy preferences of individual actors. It will draw attention to deliberations at several levels of government, including within the military services themselves, and consider whether the transparency of American provocations forced all decision-makers to routinely choose force, or if the ambiguity of American actions prompted some people to prefer diplomatic initiatives while others preferred military solutions. In particular, it will explore the proposition that because all individuals are cognitive misers or cognitive processing cost-minimizers who unconsciously prefer judgments that are mentally cheap to those that are mentally dear, differences between civilian and military actors predictably reflect the influence of three different cognitive cost-cutting cues: decision stage (problem definition or solution definition), decision role assignment (leader or advisor), and a decision-maker’s level of substantive knowledge (novice to expert).By examining the evolution of Japanese foreign policy over the course of several months, this paper will not only assess whether and when the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making can offer a most useful explanation for this case, it will address whether the actions of Japanese officials in 1941, like those of British decision-makers in 1938 and American decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis, the turn toward peace in Vietnam, and the 9/11 responses of 2001 (four cases already investigated), reinforce and extend the power of the theory. It will consider whether the cognitive calculus explanation can account for the preferences of different individual actors, in different states, facing different national conditions, and different international circumstances. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for future scholarly and policy efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation, numerous experts were deployed from the United States to survey the postwar landscape of the Philippines. They were sent to collect images of and collect statistical information on the extent of damages to Philippine agricultural and manufacturing industry, transportation and shipping facilities, urban and village structures, and natural resources. This collection of information urgently framed the Philippine Islands as "utterly devastated." Within the U.S. congress, immediate calls were made not for short term relief, as originally thought, but rather for long term plans of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1946 discussions of a Rehabilitation Act were steadily pursued. By 1946 the "original Rehabilitation Bill had been expanded, the kinds and amounts of claimants had been extended and definitions broadened, the amounts appropriated had been multiplied over five times." Bundled along with the disappointing Bell-Trade Act of 1946, the Rehabilitation Act still ushered in a sense of optimism in the immediate postwar Philippines. By the sheer amount of money it provided, numerous projects and institutions were planned to aid in gaining the newly independent Republic the international recognition it deserved. Yet at the same time, inhabiting the shadows of optimism was the anxiety of mismanagement of money. In 1947, one particular group, the Joint Philippine American Finance Commission made up of both Philippine and American members reported their findings and recommendations. Their findings conclude that the initial years of Philippine independence was of critical importance in the "economic development" and stable future of the nation. Chief in their concerns was the potential mishandling of rehabilitation loan money entering the young nation. In response the joint commission makes several recommendations. Of utmost importance is the principle proposal of a Central Bank. The establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as the chief authority on national currency, can ensure that all of their other recommendations are followed. This paper thus proposes to look at the emergence of the Central Bank as an object produced out of the uncanny postwar discourses of economists. These postwar discourses center on the anxiety over the twofold possibilities of misrecognition of money as well as a collapse into a non-modern economy. In the imaginary of economists, the existence of a Central Bank guided by techno-knowledge and sound management, acts as the bulwark against such devastating possibilities. Furthermore, the potential success of the Central Bank is demonstrative of the potential success of a sovereign Philippine political economy. Yet in order to legitimate the existence of a Central Bank, this paper asserts that through disciplined economic research, a recurring non-modern economic world is created by economists. This non-modern economic world is then historically presented as inhabiting the present postwar space of the Philippines. Furthermore, it also threatens to subsume it. It does so in two interrelated ways. The first is the potential misrecognition of money as speaking a language other than the value of capital. The second is the discourse created by economists in order to produce uncanny effects through the economy. These two methods intertwine in order to combine, what they imagine as a chaotic and fragmented space of islands: peasants, rebellions, decrepit banks, atrophied agricultural industries, and other non-modern elements, into a unitary and coherent whole. The name of this object is the Philippine national economy. And like any object, once solid and tangible, it can be continuously manipulated, managed, and exploited by both state and international banking institutions... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, nuclear debates in the United States have centered on the “unspeakability” of nuclear war drawing this silence from the apocalyptic power of nuclear technology. This “unspeakability” is mirrored institutionally and, ultimately, this silence leads to depoliticized and sanitized policy paths and political realities. This can manifest itself in greater secrecy in policy decisions concerning nuclear technology and the phenomenon of “nuclear reclusion” in the public realm. Given the undisputed destructive power of nuclear weapons, the US tendency toward depolitization and secrecy short circuits democratic accountability. I will examine two cases toward this end: This paper compares the memorialization of nuclear weapons in Japan and the US. How do our collective memories differ? Can methods of remembering history lead us toward different policies or aid us in creating memories of the future that include open debate and de-sanitized nuclear policy? This paper seeks to analyze how nuclear memory operates within the democratic state, and how we bridge the apparent incongruity with global nuclear realities and the (re)creation of democratically accountable nation-states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about the re-posturing of U.S. forward presence in Japan is presented. It asserts the possibility of mismatches between the U.S. global strategy and the local re-posturing process. It addresses existing theoretical works on U.S. forward presence. It discusses the Cold War origins of U.S. military bases in Japan. It examines the strategic implications of the re-posturing strategy for Japan.

Focusing on the experiences of Japan, the United States, and Sweden, the paper examines how differing conceptions of citizenship and moral personhood shape policy outcomes. The paper employs this analytic framework to interpret institutional variations in immigration politics, and to then show how these political factors affect each country's welfare policy. It argues that different kinds of policy assumptions are based on distinct political mythologies and their often-implicit philosophical traditions, and that these "moral parables of citizenship and personhood" provoke different kinds of immigrant activism. In Japan, this concept is framed in terms of purity and hierarchy. In the United States, the relevant terms involve civic features of citizens, and the abiding importance of freedom. Finally, in Sweden the abiding terms are a more substantive conception of equality, and again a concern with freedom. Thus Japan's "control policy," which treats immigrants as workers (rather than persons with equal moral standing to citizens) provides the greatest impetus for local activism through informal democratic institutions. In contrast, the United States' "assimilationist policy" and Sweden's "multicultural policy," both of which treat immigrants as potential citizens (albeit in very different ways), provide greater national activism through both formal and informal democratic organizations and processes. As a member of the European Union, Sweden is also witnessing activism at the supranational, multilateral level. As a result, Japan has a greater proportion of immigrant rights NGOs, the United States has more faith-based organizations, while Sweden has focused on immigrant ethnic associations. The paper then addresses how the institutional variations in immigration policies and activism have impacted each country's social welfare policies, particularly for immigrants. Japan's system of universal healthcare covers all except for "polluted" illegal foreigners while Sweden's universal healthcare treats everyone equally. The United States private healthcare system offers excellent services and choices to those who can pay while the government subsidizes faith-based organizations and other private institutions to provide free/low-cost health and welfare services to the needy, including the newly arrived and poor immigrants. These social welfare policies are consistent with each country's interpretation on the concept of the person and its immigration policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the relationship between the media and public opinion by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. Specifically, this work has two sections. First, I analyzed all the content of the two news papers' articles regarding the war from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. This work reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. Among other things, the study quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in the degree of negativity about the U.S. policies toward Iraq (The negativity was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.). The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, particularly, the end of 2003, the New York Times also becomes gradually critical of their government. In some months, the New York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.Second, this work examines whether media's impact is significant in shaping public opinion. The result discovers that poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi's critical assessments of the Japanese government's Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times 'unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government's policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings. Finally, as a conclusion, this study ponders ramifications of media's content toward public policy process.This study investigates the relationship between the media and public opinion by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. Specifically, this work has two sections. First, I analyzed all the content of the two news papers' articles regarding the war from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. This work reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. Among other things, the study quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in the degree of negativity about the U.S. policies toward Iraq (The negativity was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.). The Asahi is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, the New York Times is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, particularly, the end of 2003, the New York Times also becomes gradually critical of their government. In some months, the New York Times was even more negative than the Asahi, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.Second, this work examines whether media's impact is significant in shaping public opinion. The result discovers that poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi's critical assessments of the Japanese government's Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times 'unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government's policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will historically and theoretically study conditions under which states develop bilateral versus multilateral security alliances. Specifically, the paper will discuss a question on why the United States built mainly bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region while it established a multilateral alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early Cold War period.Understanding security alliances have been the subject of major research in international relations studies. However, there has been so far insufficient scholarly attention and rigorous archival research focusing on the question I proposed above. The findings of the proposed paper will not only be historical and theoretical, but will also attempt to provide insights on how future Asia-Pacific alliance policy can be managed.This paper argues that the difference between the German rearmament and the Japanese rearmament is a key for solving the puzzle. The nature of the German rearmament is very much different from that of the Japanese counterpart, because the Japanese rearmament was far modest and limited in its nature and scope. The large-scale German rearmament generated more complex interdependent interactions among the United States and its European allies, while the limited Japanese rearmament created less interdependent relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the Atlantic alliance developed into NATO with multilateralism, while alliances in the Asia-Pacific remained bilateral in nature. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I tackle two puzzles in this paper: why did Japan and the United States begin to develop health insurance policies almost from scratch during WWII; and why did they adopt different systems by the end of postwar reconstruction? For the first question, I argue that the health insurance systems in both countries were developed for making war mobilization more efficient. For the second question, I argue that the differences in each country's wartime experience-the state's projection about the duration and depth of mobilization, the eventual length of the war, the sequence of war planning, and the result of the war-influenced how, and to what degree, the Japanese and American states intervened in health insurance. The goal of this paper is to construct a framework for understanding the relationship between war and health insurance by examining the cases of Japan and the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Impact of War and Successful Reconstruction: Evaluating the Bush Administration's Germany-Japan-Iraq Analogy" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the legitimacy of the analogical reasoning by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush in the Iraq war based upon on an assessment of the commonalities across Japan, Italy and Germany. The paper mentions different meanings of path dependence theory according to several authors.

This paper uses a comparison of Japanese koenkai and American political machines in order to build an analytical framework with which to better understand reciprocal relationships between those in power and their constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, free trade agreements concluded between developing and developed countries have proliferated rapidly. By including rules for investment and services, these recent FTAs comprise much more than tariff elimination. Why the sudden proliferation of these agreements, when most-favoured-nation tariffs are at a historically low level? This paper identifies the interests behind these agreements, arguing that they are a reaction to the liberalization taking place in advanced developing countries, conditioned by specific institutional features of the global trade regime. Motivated by an accelerating competition over markets and access to foreign direct investment, countries conclude more and more bilateral agreements out of fear of being left behind. The central finding is greatly increased role of interests around foreign direct investment, a factor that has been overlooked in previous analyses. The study is based on comparative case studies of FTAs concluded by Japan, the US, and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American scholars might argue that Gaiatsu still plays an important role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of 911. However, the Constructivist’s analysis will show Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s trauma and his complacency are the key factors and weigh more than Gaiatsu in the current U.S.-Japan alliance. It will also mean that what the U.S. and Japan seem to enjoy might not be there once Prime Minister Koizumi stepping down and Japan will not be able to deliver what the U.S. expects. In the aftermath of 911, the U.S.-Japan alliance immediately faced the problem of show the flag incident, but it did not become too big a stumbling block between Washington and Tokyo after all. Washington owed big to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His trauma concerning the Gulf War and his guts against Hashimoto, his enemy in the LDP, paved a way for Washington’s Gaiatsu (outside pressure) strategy to work. In face of the U.S. and British actions against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi staunchly supported their actions even without the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions. On the surface, his decision signaled Japan’s departure from its postwar diplomacy, was welcomed by President George W. Bush, Jr. As a token of appreciation, during the recent bilateral summit, President Bush invited Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time to sit in on a secret meeting of the CIA. On the surface, as Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, secretary of the cabinet stated, In the century and a half since (Commodore Matthew) Perry came to Japan, Japan-U.S. relations have probably never been better. However, in reality, to the constructivists, Japan’s attitude toward the alliance has not changed at all; a dependent and blind follower. Otherwise, Japan should have made its position clearly and opted to turn the cold shoulder to the United States when the U.S. and Britain decided to act without the U.N. security resolutions. What Japan has done since 1945 is to go with the flow of the United States. Washington has no intention to comment on Japan’s action as long as Japan is in her side. However, as a result, Japan has not made an effort to develop an independent spirit and historical understanding. Dependence does not lead to mutual trust and respect. It is high time for Japan to have a realistic look at history to derive lessons that look to the future. For Japan to develop its own perspective, it is important to understand that the nature of the alliance has not changed a bit from the outset for Japan. In this paper, using the Constructivist’s approach, I will trace back Japan’s problem to the beginning of the U.S.-Japan alliance and explain why the problem remains intact more than a half century. By doing so, I will point out the way for Japan to develop an independent spirit to win stronger mutual trust and respect from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Fuji-Kodak photo film, port business, and NTT interconnection charge disputes, which developed between the U.S. and Japan around and after the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), significantly increased the importance of multilateral trade rules. The Japanese government?s response to U.S. pressure varied in each of these disputes; it was more conciliatory in the NTT interconnection charge dispute than the other two. To explain this variation, this paper presents an argument: the timing of a trade dispute in the development of multilateral rules is an important determinant of the response, because the timing determines the gap between multilateral rules and Japanese domestic government and business practices. The case analyses of the three disputes demonstrate that, since a smaller gap exists in the early and late stages of multilateral-rule development than in the intermediate stage, the Japanese government resisted U.S. pressure more effectively in the former than in the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important ingredient in democratic politics is the realization of political disagreement through patterns of social communication and political discussion. If people fail to encounter contrary viewpoints, their own political views are never challenged, they are never forced to reconsider initially held preferences or opinions, and they are effectively excluded from democratic deliberation. This paper examines patterns of agreement and disagreement within the political communication networks of citizens in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Several questions are addressed. Are there cross-national differences in the patterns of agreement and disagreement that occur among citizens? To what extent are these patterns subject to individual characteristics, opinions, and attitudes? Are they dependent on the structure of citizens’ communication networks? Finally, to what extent are patterns of political agreement and disagreement affected by the levels of aggregate support for a citizen’s political preferences and opinions? The empirical analysis is based on cooperative election surveys conducted in each of the countries during the early 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is the military and economic rise of China a threat to powers such as Japan and the United States? This paper examines this question using the theoretical predictions of realist theories (classical realism, neo-realism, and power transition theory), liberal theories (classical liberalism and neo-liberalism), and constructivist theory. While the qualitative analysis of Chinese, American, and Japanese behavior indicates some support for each theory, classical liberalism and constructivism are most strongly supported by the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students with cultural and linguistic competence are needed to navigate an increasingly globalized society. This study collected and analyzed cultural awareness data from students who communicated with people of other cultures through Virtual Reality (VR) environments. Students from a private university in Japan engaged in directed communication with other students from the USA using an online virtual chat program. A questionnaire based on the Global Perspectives Inventory (GPI) was used by the students to self-report their views on the intercultural interactions and give a metacognitive analysis of their intercultural competence/knowledge of intercultural phenomena. In addition to directed communicative objectives, students were given the chance to engage in free conversation in the digital space created by the software to facilitate intercultural critical cultural awareness skills. Early findings show that students were able to improve critical cultural awareness through a virtual experience. [For the complete proceedings, see ED600837.]

The high dependence on technology for economic activities in developed countries stresses the importance of lifelong learning in order to equip adult workers with the skills required to perform work related tasks, and also increase labor force participation. We use data from the 2012/2014 Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) to examine relationships among problem solving skills in technology-rich environments (PSTRE), participation in adult education and training (AET), and income in Australia, Finland, Japan (high PSTRE scoring countries), Chile, Greece (low PSTRE scoring countries), Ireland, Estonia, and the United States (similarly scoring countries). Although PIAAC measured literacy, numeracy, and PSTRE skills, our research focus is on PSTRE because of its emphasis on problem-solving skills and critical thinking. These skills are undoubtedly important in any global economy currently experiencing rapid technological transformation. In four of five age groups, Japan had the highest PSTRE scores. With the exception of Greece, PIAAC respondents in the oldest age group had lower PSTRE scores than younger age groups. Men had higher PSTRE scores than women in all countries except Australia and Greece. Overall, those with higher PSTRE scores were more likely to participate in AET but there were variations by age, income, and education categories. Greater PSTRE scores were associated with higher hourly wages in the U.S. Australia and Estonia whereas no significant association was observed in other countries. With limited availability of data, females benefited financially from higher PSTRE scores more than males in the U.S., Finland, Ireland and Japan.

Utilizing Baumgartner and Jones (1993) theory of punctuated equilibrium, we examine several terrorist attacks that occurred in the U.S. and Japan during the past decade: the World Trade Center Bombing of 1993; the Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995; the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995; and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The analysis demonstrates that earlier incidents failed to mobilize sufficient public interest to bring about major change. Only in the aftermath of September 11, was sufficient public attention focused on homeland security to bring about significant change. We also examine the institutional evolution of homeland defense in the U.S. and the creation and missions of the Office of Homeland Security and proposed Department of Homeland Security. The paper concludes with a critical assessment as to whether the new organizations have been given the necessary tools to adequately confront the threat posed by terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]