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The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which was carried out under the leadership of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas on October 7, 2023, represented a shock whose effects did not stop at the borders of the Palestinian issue and the extended conflict it entails between Israel and the Palestinians over land, history and sanctities, but rather went beyond it to confuse regional calculations and evaluate international assessments of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on both levels official and popular, especially in countries that do not support Palestinian rights. The Al-Aqsa flood operation in the Gaza Strip represented a strategic, not a hypothetical turning point, It's considered aqualitative operation, unprecedented in its timing, size, and geographical depth. Most ceasefire attempts in the Gaza Strip failed, as a number of perceptions emerged about the future of the Gaza Strip after the end of the war. In the face of this new round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which resulted in results of which the humanitarian catastrophe was the most prominent feature,The operation forced the Israeli mind to reconsider the literature of political optimism about the future of Israel, which was promoted by the Zionist right, and caused a shock in the Israeli security system. It led to the loss of the Israeli deterrence theory. This round also brought the issue back into the spotlight of international attention, and the process gave consideration to the military option as a major option in the process of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But the repercussions of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation will carry with them for the coming years multiple paths and implications that must be paid attention to, and thinking about preparing strategic plans to deal with them. Hence the importance of the research to identify the importance of these features and study them, as this research presents the repercussions of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on both sides, which It reflects the course of events and then shows us the transformations in political paths, specifically the positions of the active Palestinian, Israeli, Arab and international forces and their future impact on the Palestinian people and the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Hamas-led attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023, Hezbollah and Israel engaged in a worrying and dangerous military escalation along Lebanon’s southern border. For months, exchanging cross-border attacks has resulted in hundreds of casualties, including civilians, large-scale destruction of property, and displacement in South Lebanon. It also raised the prospect of conflict spilling over into Lebanese territory and escalating into full-scale war. Although conflict on Lebanon's southern border is seen as an armed struggle between Hezbollah and Israel, it is actually a result of historical process backing the 1920s. The border line was first drawn by the British and French in 1923 as the Lebanese-Palestinian border but transformed a de facto Lebanese-Israeli border after the 1949 Armistice Agreement. The demarcation line has provided a basis for conflict, including armed clashes, occupations, and territorial disputes, from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War to the present. This study examines political and military struggles, occupations, territorial disputes, changes in the legal status of the border, and claims over the border in the century-long period. In this context, this study aims to identify the main factors leading to conflict on Lebanon's southern border. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The renowned historian Moshe Zimmermann published the book "Never Peace? Israel at a Crossroads" in response to the conflict along the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel. He sheds light on Israel's history since the Six-Day War in 1967 and emphasizes the need to find ways out of the cycle of violence. Zimmermann criticizes both the Israeli government and the Palestinian side, and despite resistance, continues to advocate for a two-state solution. [Extracted from the article]

The UN Resolution 181 (II) of 1947 was the first step taken by the UN to solve the Palestinian problem. The resolution was adopted due to the Palestinian problem and the revelations about the Holocaust. The UN General Assembly decided to establish a special committee, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), to examine the situation on the ground and develop proposals for a solution. The committee unanimously voted for the abolition of the British mandate, and seven members supported the partition of Palestine. The future of Palestine was of political and strategic importance to Great Britain and other major powers. The United Nations, in Resolution 181 (II) on November 29, 1947, supported the partition of Palestine, with an Arab-Palestinian state to be established on 43% of the territory and a Jewish state on 56% of the area. Jerusalem was to be placed under international administration. The planned demarcation of borders led to conflicts between Jewish and Arab militias, which escalated in April 1948 and resulted in the first Arab-Israeli war. Israel emerged victorious from this war, and the 1949 armistice lines became the internationally recognized borders of Israel. The chances for an Arab-Palestinian state were undermined by the Israeli occupation of territories and their incorporation into Jordan. Resolution 181 (II) still serves as the legal basis for the state of Israel and the Palestinian claim to their own state. [Extracted from the article]

The article uses Israel's volatile jurisdictional dynamics of the past two decades concerning access to religious community justice, as a telling case for examining the way legal pluralism is deployed along the public–private divide. The Israeli case exhibits a complex combination of an ostensibly liberal democratic regime, a commitment to a particularistic ethno-national political project, structural entanglements of state and religion against the backdrop of an unsettled constitutional order, and an historically diffuse mode of often-illiberal normative ordering within its diverse religious communities. All this provides a rich backdrop for various strategies by communal and institutional elites seeking to consolidate power, legitimacy, and authenticity in their often mutually-reliant jurisdictional projects. The article explores several salient episodes from Israel's religious jurisdiction dynamics, focusing for purposes of analytical clarity on the case of Jewish orthodox legality. The analysis uncovers the main strategies stakeholders resort to, and shows how agency flows in different ways, with the choices of each player affecting the possibilities of the others. The institution at the arguable top of the system—the Supreme Court—is shown to be often devoid of effective means of elucidating, let along imposing, a coherent vision for a fragmented jurisdictional field. Conceptually, the judicial forum is revealed as the locus of an ongoing, uneasy engagement among normative imaginaries in a sometimes-competitive, sometimes-collaborative negotiation over coherence, tolerance, authority, and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the nation state – and specifically the tension between affirming solidarity among nation-state compatriots and respecting national minorities' rights in order to preserve diversity and secure their autonomy – has been on the global agenda over the last two centuries, especially in Europe. In recent years, two cases, in Catalonia and in Israel – different in many respects but similar in others – serve as inspiring test cases for analysing questions of national identities and state cohesion. Both of these cases portray the dilemmas surrounding national identity in an allegedly dichotomic fashion, thus requiring a choice between independence and secession or unionism and assimilation. This article suggests that a dichotomic perspective is not compelling and that solidarity and autonomy are not necessarily contradictory. It explores the connection between solidarity and autonomy and applies the analysis to the case studies of Catalonia and Israel separately, given the unique characteristics of each case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Surra Man Raa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The question of Amos' peasant origin has shaped the debate about his role in economic exploitation by the ruling elites, leaving the disputes of institutional authorities in ancient Israel barely discussed in his book. The internal historical context shows the opening of borders and the fluidity of identities resulting from the Israeli diplomatic relations that began in the 9th century in the period of the Omride dynasty. On the one hand, this led to economic development in Samaria, the capital; on the other hand, it resulted in the impoverishment of productive social groups in the rural sector due to the high taxation of land and production. In the regional context, the beginning of the provincialization process in the south of the Levant, operated by the Neo-Assyrian empire, added to the border conflicts between North Israel ("Northern Kingdom") and Aram-Damascus, which reflected in the economy and aggravated the Israeli political crisis. Put into perspective, the prophetic corpus projects a political worldview: the king's decisions must contemplate the benefits to small producers and traders excluded from the large trade routes. Methodologically, we will carry out a comparative historiographical study, as we will analyze biblical and extra-biblical sources contemporary to the prophetic literary representations of the Book of Amos. Our study intends to conclude that Amos' performance and what he represents historically are initially linked to this international political-economic situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social norms are mixtures of extralegal and legal principles. The International Court of Justice‟ in The Hague‟s (ICJ) adjudication subtracts normative structures from different sources, moral, ethical, religious etc. dogmas amplifying its case law. The failing Israel-Palestine reconciliation that results from “power asymmetries” and “supreme emergency exception”, illustrates how absence of concomitant social norms fosters extremists destined to wage war. War is not the answer to the two-state talks‟ collapse but civilized methods of dispute settlement. Neither negotiations nor “Gods divine plan” for Jews has solved the Israel-Palestine boundary conflict. Prayers, pronouncements etc. may ease tensions, but has failed to bring peace. Since territorial demarcation is a secular event, religious leaders should request ICJ adjudication. Other peaceful mechanisms, i.a. ICJ-justification, is however imminent. The courts frames are well-known legal and extralegal principles i.a. religious morals incorporated into general principles of law. Thus, i.a. the World Council of Religious Leaders (WCRL) should trust that ICJ not only propels “world peace” but also the “work of the United Nations (UN) in our common quest for peace”. Such attainments assume Council‟s diplomatic pressure on Security Council (SC). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will discuss Israeli machinations to covet substantial areas of the Lebanese maritime exclusive economic zone, while knowing full well that international law has sided with Lebanon in this matter. The conflict between Israel and Lebanon will be discussed in the context of the relations among regional states and the conflict of East Mediterranean states over maritime oil and gas fields. Main questions that arise in this regard are as follows: First, is it a matter of oil and gas reserves over and above its share that Israel is seeking to capture or does the controversy have to do with regional domination or both? Second, what is the significance of the US envoys' visits in early 2018 to Beirut, presumably to resolve the disagreement between Lebanon and Israel? Third, have those visits defused the situation between the two states involved or added fuel to the fire? Fourth, what is the significance of Israel's occupation of parts of Lebanon's territory to the issue of offshore oil and gas and how might it relate to the cement wall that Israel has been constructing partially in Lebanese territories? Fifth, what is the probability of an Israeli attack on Lebanon that could quickly transform into a regional conflict? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on Russia's alleged controlling influence of Crimean Peninsula. The author states that the West relearns the origin of sovereignty in Crimea after years of collusion with territorial sieges, land grabs, and geopolitical tension on Ukraine. Also discussed are historical record of decades of territorial disputes and occupancies in Palestine in late 1940's until 1967 by Israel, Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, Western Sahara and East Timor, Indonesia in 1975.

Abstract: What is the role of citizenship in a protest? How are civilian rights used as a source of power to craft socio-spatial strategies of dissent? I argue that the growing civilian consciousness of the “power to” (i.e. capacity to act) and of the border as public space is enhancing civil participation and new dissent strategies through which participants consciously and sophisticatedly use their citizenship as a tool, offering different conceptualizations of borders. This paper examines the role of citizenship in the design and performance of dissent focusing on two groups of Israeli activists, Machsom Watch and Anarchists against the Wall. Using their Israeli citizenship as a source of power, these groups apply different strategies of dissent while challenging the discriminating practices of control in occupied Palestinian territories. These case studies demonstrate a growing civilian consciousness of the mutable nature of borders as designed by state power. Analyzing the ways actors consciously and sophisticatedly use citizenship as a tool in their dissent, which is aimed at supporting indigenous noncitizens, I argue that Machsom Watch and Anarchists against the Wall enact and promote different models of citizenship and understandings of borders, in Israel/Palestine. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article offers the author's insights on the U.S. policy for the full withdrawal of Israel to the 1949 armistice lines called the 1967 lines in Palestine. It says that the U.S. declaratory policy can affect the dispute negotiation between Israeli and Palestinian. He argues that the U.S. position on Resolution 242 of the United Nations (UN) Security Council has been misinterpreted because successive U.S. administrations have showed flexibility on the withdrawal of Israel in the 1967 lines.

The Israeli state apparatus mandates differentiated IDs to Palestinian citizens of Israel, Palestinian non-citizens in East Jerusalem, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The bureaucracy of Palestinian ID cards since 1948 has rendered Palestinians more legible for the security interests of Israel while simultaneously discriminating Palestinians from Jews as unequal citizens and non-citizens. The ID card regime, and less so the permit regime, limits Palestinian geographic movement and economic mobility while simultaneously permitting freer Jewish-Israeli flows and mobilities. ID cards demonstrate the power of the Israeli regime to produce distinct people and bind them to specific territories (such as the Palestinians), while allowing others (Jewish-Israelis) to ‘trespass’ over those same boundaries. Through ID cards borders are erected between Jewish and Arab people, not Israeli and Palestinian territory. The ID card regime puts into question the nature and territorial boundaries of ‘Israel’, and the geopolitical existence of the ‘Palestinian Territories.’ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Israel's rights are being consistently negated through misleading interpretations of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The resolution does not request Israel to withdraw from all the territories captured in the 1967 Six-Day War and does not recognize that the Palestinian refugees have a right to return to Israel. The Security Council laid down several principles that should lead to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among these principles are an Israeli with drawn from territories occupied in 1967 to new secure and recognized boundaries, to be established by agreement, and the need for a just settlement of the refugee problem, without any reference to a right of return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sceptical of the ideational and non-regional terms ruling the post-1993 one-state/two-state (1S2S) exchange about the Palestine/Israel question, this article is in two parts. Part I demonstrates that no Israeli-Jewish constituency exists to support a viable two-state solution while concurrently arguing that the breathtaking one-state vision—in the form of a secular-democratic or bi-national state—is equally unlikely to materialise. The sole empirical/material process taking place in the territory comprising mandatory Palestine is Israel's one-state solution, i.e. the ceaseless consolidation of Israeli-Jewish domination over the entire territory. Part II posits that—contrary to the prevailing case—the study of the 1S2S conundrum cannot take place in a universe parallel to the broader study of regional dynamics. I argue that confrontation involving Israel, Iran and their Gazan/Lebanese/American allies/proxies is likely to pre-date/supersede any substantive consideration of a resolution in the territory conceptualised as a secluded island in 1S2S scholarship. It is erroneous to dismiss the possibility that—as happened in 1948 and 1967—an intense Israeli/Iranian regional confrontation can manufacture a Nakbaic conjuncture (resulting in fewer Arabs present in the already fully Israeli-controlled territory of Mandatory Palestine). Such a development could defer far enough the possibility for so-called real solutions to emerge—foremost those prescribed by liberal 1S2S scholars—and simultaneously advance the Israeli version of a one-state solution. It is hoped that colleagues will identify paths to arrive at the utter demolition of this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article extends the formal logic of Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence to account for three political actors with asymmetric capabilities. In contrast to Kalyvas’ theory, the authors’ computer simulation suggests that (1) selective violence by the stronger actor will be concentrated in areas where weaker actors exercise control; (2) the relative level of selective violence used by weaker actors will be lower because of a reduced capacity to induce civilian collaboration; and (3) areas of parity among the three actors will exhibit low levels of selective violence perpetrated primarily by the strongest actor. Results from a logistic regression, using empirical data on Israel and two rival Palestinian factions from 2006 to 2008, are consistent with these predictions: Israel was more likely to use selective violence in areas largely controlled by Palestinian factions; zones of incomplete Israeli control were not prone to selective violence; and zones of mixed control witnessed moderate levels of selective violence, mainly by Israel. Nonetheless, Palestinian violence remained consistent with Kalyvas’ predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Within the last 2000 years the land demarcated by the Mediterranean Sea to the west and the Jordan Valley to the east has been one of the most disputed territories in history. World powers have redrawn its boundaries numerous times. Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 within British Mandate Palestine, Palestinians and Israelis have disagreed over the national identity of the land that they both inhabit. The struggles have extended from the battlefields to the classrooms. In the process, different national and ethnic groups have used various sciences, ranging from archeology to history and geography, to prove territorial claims based on their historical presence in the region. But how have various Israeli social and political groups used maps to solidify claims over the territory? In this paper we bring together science studies and critical cartography in order to investigate cartographic representations as socially embedded practices and address how visual rhetoric intersects with knowledge claims in cartography. Before the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Israeli government and the Jewish National Fund produced maps of Israel that established a Hebrew topography of the land. After 1967, Israel’s expanded territorial control made the demarcation of its borders ever more controversial. Consequently, various Israeli interest groups and political parties increasingly used various cartographic techniques to forge territorial spaces, demarcate disputed boundaries, and inscribe particular national, political, and ethnic identities onto the land. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Aside from open conflicts within Israel-Palestine, the neighborhood of Florentin is a key-space where to observe and decipher how globalization impacts on the daily-life scale and banal forms of identification and territorial appropriation. Situated south of the Tel Aviv Jaffa agglomeration, and standing in between the two historical entities, the neighborhood of Florentin also offers a fertile analytic ground for a better understanding and different narrative of Tel Aviv itself as well as the contemporary Israeli society in some of its complexity and diversity. Here, graffiti and other traces left in the streets and on the walls of Florentin by successive waves of population constitute the thread to follow for deep-reading the place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the territorial pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The author mentions that Palestinians have dealt with the responsibility of occupation and lack a state while Israelis have been burdened by existential dangers and corrosive influence of being occupier. He adds that the split in Palestinian government has taken away the hope of its citizens of a useful representation in their administration.

The article discusses several approaches to manage the geopolitical issues between Israel and Palestine. It says that borders involving annexation of the West Bank, defensible borders of Israel, and blurred borders related to a bi-national state are among the alternatives to combat the territorial conflict between Israel and Palestine. It explores the potential impact of various forces such as the Palestinian Authority and Israeli leadership on the realization of a bi-national state's blurred borders.

An essay is presented on the conflict management for the Israeli-Palestinian territorial conflict. It notes that several studies have been affected by the stories of Palestinian and Israeli practitioners and uneven access to sources of knowledge. It offers a commentary on the three papers in the 2010 issue of the journal "Eurasian Geography and Economics" (EGE) and argues that the papers show the movement beyond conventional narratives to form alternative approaches for conflict resolution.

Many belligerents in ethno-territorial conflicts claim they have an absolute right to contested space, operate on a zero-sum basis, and use maximalist negotiation strategies. This article draws on ongoing fieldwork that examines ethno-territorial conflict and focuses on the transition from rights-based to needs-based negotiations over sites of worship, parading routes, and national borders. These three sites represent different scales and expressions of spatial conflict, including accommodations for Jewish and Muslim worshipers in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron/al-Khalil, West Bank, the terms and conditions agreed to for sectarian parading in the town of Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland, and the return and subsequent lease of land on the Israeli-Jordanian border. In each case, negotiated arrangements allow for the belligerents to meet their minimal territorial needs, even as the broader dynamics of the conflict persist. Central to these arrangements is a shared recognition that space is a mutable resource and that needs-based negotiation can allow sharing of contested territory at a variety of scales. The article draws from analogous dynamics in international river treaty negotiations, specifically the riparian model developed by the authors in earlier work. We conclude by enumerating the contributions geographers can make to theories of conflict and peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paired projects Land without Earth and Corporeal Memory (1999-2000) took place along the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian border zones and focused on border lines, territory, border crossing and corporeal memory. Juxtaposing the situation of body and land, when both are affected and damaged by a state of emergency, Civic Performance Art process concentrated on ways of making present the absence - of stolen earth and of amputated body parts. At stake in the projects was a representation of exposure, an essential part of a state of emergency, as something which becomes visible through the invisible, the lack or disappearance of what had been once a whole, a body. The discussion reappraises Agamben's concepts of 'state of emergency', 'homo sacer' and 'sovereign power' in the local context of bio-political entities in the Middle East, and takes these notions into the dramatised and material reality of land and body via the Hebrew-based triad 'blood-man-earth' (dam-adam-adama). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the issues related to the claims of Israeli and Palestinian on Jerusalem. It mentions the attempt to bridge the differences between the Israel and Palestinian positions in the city at the end of the Camp David summit in July 2000. Among the proposals to gap such differences are the division of the Old City, recognition of Palestinian reign over the Haram ash-Sharif, suspension of party's sovereignty of the place for an indefinite time. Details related to international treaties and on the claims of the countries on Jerusalem are also discussed.

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Cooperation over transboundary environmental resources, water in particular, has been analyzed from various perspectives. Each study identifies the problems of cooperation differently and suggests different mechanisms to enhance it. Yet, the role of ambiguity, particularly significant in treaty design to resolve environmental disputes, has thus far been overlooked. Such a focus is warranted, since many international agreements regulating the use of natural resources are ambiguous in their schedule of resource delivery during crisis events or in their cost-sharing arrangements and may even include contradictory resource-allocation principles while remaining vague on how to settle the contradictions. This study aims to examine why, when, and how ambiguity is applied in agreements pertaining to natural resources, and water in particular. The lsraeli-Jordanian peace agreement, which includes an annex on water-use regulation, is used as a case study, it was found that, under asymmetric power relations, when both sovereignty costs and uncertainty are high, several types of deliberate ambiguity were intentionally incorporated into the treaty. Some ambiguities allowed each side to present the treaty differently at home, thereby defusing domestic opposition, while others provided leeway to adjust the resource allocation during a future crisis without the need to renegotiate the treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the economic dimension of Israeli policy towards the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. The article argues that since 1967, both before and after the Oslo process, Israeli policy was directed at preventing the ‘Two,’ i.e. the division of the land into two states and two economic (and political) sovereign entities, while also negating the ‘One,’ i.e. the establishment of a single political and economic entity. Although Israeli policy repudiated both the ‘Two’ and the ‘One,’ it changed character and formulations from time to time. Thus, Israeli policies will be examined with all their twists, turns, and reversals, discussing their repercussions on Israel and especially on the Palestinian economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the complex political nature surrounding the use of Gaza Beach by Israelis and Palestinians. The article examines the differences between two Palestinian Intifadas that attempted to take control of the Israeli occupied beach, one between 1987-1993 and the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-). The article explores the reasons behind this process of polarization and seeks to create an understanding of Palestinian subjectivity beyond narrow parameters of militancy and victimhood.

Discusses the Soviet and Western policies in the years leading up to the water dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Influence of the policies on the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict; Citations of the countries threatening both Great Britain's position and Western interests in the Middle East; Contribution of the water dispute in the Six Day War.