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Non-international armed conflict between States and organised armed groups is a reality of warfare. Since the emergence of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this form of conflict has been regulated by international humanitarian law. However, a subset of this category known as 'transnational armed conflict' has seen aggressive proliferation over recent decades as groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have taken advantage of the internet and other technologies to expand their reach beyond national frontiers and strike States around the world. This phenomenon has left the geographical extent of international humanitarian law – which has historically relied on State boundaries to determine its ambit – unclear. This article examines the main options for delimiting the geographical reach of the regime in transnational armed conflict. It considers approaches based on international boundaries; 'hot battlefields'; 'global application' and 'territorial control' before ultimately concluding that a method based on 'military presence' would be the most suitable standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will briefly present a number of international human rights law considerations related to the topic of citizenship stripping of foreign fighters, that is: "individuals, driven mainly by ideology, religion and/or kinship, who leave their country of origin or their country of habitual residence to join a party engaged in an armed conflict", most notably the conflict in Syria and Iraq. After that, the article will focus on considerations in the context of international humanitarian law, which have been less frequently the subject of academic debate. This contribution concludes that citizenship stripping is not only highly problematic under international human rights law, but also from the perspective of international humanitarian law. The measure – which is likely to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – violates Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions, but it also undermines accountability for international humanitarian law violations already committed and can engender new violations through the non-removal of the suspect from the conflict zone. One of the few positive sides of the connection between the measure and international humanitarian law is that even if nationality is deprived, this will not have an effect on the international humanitarian law obligation to treat that deprived person humanely. In that sense, international humanitarian law provides a welcome – albeit temporary – safety net of decent treatment for people who have become victims of countries' refusal to take responsibility for their own citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflicts has gained increasing political momentum and visibility over the last two decades. Syria, Iraq and Mali, among others, have witnessed the intentional destruction of their cultural heritage by non-State armed groups (NSAGs) that have invoked Islamic law and principles to legitimize their actions. The response of the international community has predominantly focused on the material aspect, to the detriment of the significant impact on the associated intangible manifestation of cultural heritage in local communities. This article argues that several Islamic legal rules and principles may, more adequately than international humanitarian law, safeguard the intangible dimension of cultural heritage in certain contemporary armed conflicts in Muslim contexts. It aims to demonstrate the importance of drawing from multiple legal traditions in order to enhance the protection of intangible cultural heritage in armed conflicts and to strengthen engagement with the relevant NSAGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The displacement of civilians during a protracted war is a difficult issue that deserves our attention, and Iraq is unfortunately an emblematic example of this phenomenon. Based on the literature produced by humanitarian organizations and academia, this article aims at analyzing what triggers displacement in protracted conflict, highlighting the role of international humanitarian law (IHL) violations. It discusses how Iraq has been struggling with acts of violence, hostilities and IHL violations that have generated displacement and human suffering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The author discusses the evolution of the war on terror concept beginning from its inception following the events of September 11, 2001 to the present. He is critical of the inappropriate use of the concept for the special operations of the U.S. in Afghanistan and, to some extent, in Iraq. An analysis of the possible conclusions of the said operations based on modern international law and interests of Russian foreign policy is offered.

The creation of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in December 2003 by Iraqi authorities who were at the time under the legal occupation of the Coalition Provisional Authority marked the emergence of a new form of internationalized domestic tribunals. The Iraqis succeeded in incorporating the full range of modern crimes into their domestic codes alongside some carefully selected domestic offenses, while amending domestic procedural law in some key ways to align the process with established international law related to the provision of full and fair trials. The subsequent investigations and the beginning of trial proceedings generated major debates about the legitimacy of such a domestic forum within the context of human rights norms and the law of occupation. In particular, there was a major strand of thought from outside Iraq that the most legitimate and appropriate forum would have been an international process under the authority of the United Nations. This article examines the arguments made by the Iraqis who demanded a domestic process based on their inquisitorial model, setting them in the broader context of the emerging trends in international criminal law. Through a detailed and unique analysis of the provisions of human rights law and underlying Iraqi procedural law, it criticizes the arguments made by some that assume the illegitimacy of the tribunal under established international norms. The article provides the most detailed explanation of the law of occupation as it emerged following World War II to conclude that the establishment of the Tribunal as an independent court, and its subsequent validation by sovereign Iraqi domestic authorities, was completely valid and proper. The overarching theme of the article is that the imposition of artificial standards and the complete revocation of the preexisting Iraqi judicial structures would have created a process deemed wholly illegitimate by the Iraqi people and judiciary that would have undermined the establishment of the rule of law in Iraq. The author's personal interactions with the judges serve to support the conclusion that the Tribunal is capable of serving as the doorway through which the detailed body of international criminal law is introduced to the broader Arabic speaking world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The level of non-combatant casualties in modern Western warfare is determined in large part by the way in which policymakers apportion risk between soldiers and civilians. In the U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, a “kinetic” strategy and a muscular doctrine of force protection have lowered the threshold for the use of violence and, in many cases, transferred risk from soldiers to civilians. Particularly in areas deemed hostile, aggressive tactics make up for a shortage of soldiers on the ground and direct violence toward non-combatants. This is not the fog of war: even unintended civilian casualties flow predictably from policy choices. Perceptions of risk increasingly govern U.S. interpretations of its humanitarian obligations under international law, threatening to dilute the doctrine of proportionality and reverse the customary and legal relationship between combatants and non-combatants. Only late in the war has the U.S. administration recalibrated risks and launched a more orthodox counterinsurgency strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]