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Copyright of TÜBA-AR: Turkish Academy of Sciences, Journal of Archaeology is the property of Turkish Academy of Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What are the consequences of military strikes against nuclear facilities? In particular, do they 'work' by delaying the target states ability to build the bomb? This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. We analyze strikes that occurred during peacetime and raids that took place in the context of an ongoing interstate war. The findings indicate that strikes are neither as uniformly fruitless as the skeptics would suggest, nor as productive as advocates have claimed. There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent. Yet, this also happens to be when strikes are the least legitimate under international law, meaning that attacking under these conditions is most likely to elicit international censure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the martyr state view of Iran in relation to its nuclear weapons program. Israel's ambassador to the U.S. Michael B. Oren says some Israeli experts believe sacrificing 50% of Iranians may be allowed by leaders to eradicate Israel. The article points out the threat posed by Iran if it is as casualty-tolerant or messianic as the view implies. Radical cleric Ayatollah Khamanei is seen as having the final authority on foreign policy based on Iranian constitution. Also noted is the support of both political factions for the nuclear program.

The article underscores the continuing U. S. and multilateral efforts to control the nuclear program of Iran. It states that efforts by the United States and other countries to terminate Iran's nuclear program appear not to have lessened Iran's determination to go ahead with this program. It also forwards that Iran antecedently had a nuclear weapons program but terminated it in 2003 because of international pressure and scrutiny. Moreover, some International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Israeli officials questioned this arms program of Iran.

The European Union has been the main international actor trying to contain the Iranian nuclear programme. In 2003, for the first time ever, the EU-3 adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran. The current article begins with an analysis of the concept of coercive diplomacy before applying it to the Iranian case. In so doing, the article aims to make an interim assessment of the European (EU-3) effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes Russia's policy towards Iran, particularly on the latter's nuclear weapons program. Contributions of Russia to Iran's nuclear programs; Reasons behind the historical willingness of Russia to help Iran; Economic benefits gained by Russia from its nuclear weapons involvement with Iran; Factors that contributed to the change in Russia's perception about Iran's nuclear intentions; Impact of Russia's connection with Iran on Russia-Europe-U.S. relations.