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The Iranian nuclear programme is a controversial issue that has had domestic, regional and international effects. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology has divided the Middle East region and international community. Turkey has been at the centre of the Iranian nuclear debate and has sought to play a 'mediating role' in this issue. This article will apply a Historical Sociological (HS) framework to analyse Turkey-Iran relations considering the Iranian Nuclear Issue. It will explore the period from 2002 until the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015 and will provide an analysis of the historical, domestic and regional/international developments in the nuclear issue and how this has affected Turkish-Iranian relations. By highlighting the continuities and constraints each actor has faced, this article will demonstrate how the interaction of structure versus agency, geographical determinants and historical analysis all help provide a comprehensive understanding of the constraining and enabling factors in Turkish-Iranian relations. By applying Historical Sociology and 'Cuspness' to Turkish-Iranian relations in the Iranian Nuclear Issue, this article provides the reasons of 'how' and 'why' the relationship is complex, and how Turkey and Iran can maintain pragmatic relations yet be constrained by these factors at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the reasons why the U.S. was unable to persuade Turkey to host U.S. troops headed for Iraq. Negotiations over the U.S. use of Turkish territory in aid of the U.S. campaign; Creation of safe heavens that allowed the return of Iraqi Kurds who had fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey and Iran; Public rumors about secret U.S. plans for a Kurdish state.

Copyright of Journal of Tikrit University for Humanities is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

An important component of Turkey's 'pivotal regional power' status was its nonpermanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2009-11. By focusing on two cases - the 2010 flotilla incident and the Iranian nuclearization - this study examines (1) Turkey's regional and global leadership role at the UN Security Council and (2) how the 'rhythmic diplomacy' principle of Turkey's foreign policy is exercised internationally. This paper also demonstrates that Turkey's policy of cooperation with other pivotal states signals possible future alliances among rising middle powers that might challenge western preferences on important issues. This study is timely as Turkey is seeking, again, non-permanent membership in the Security Council for the 2015-16 term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları is the property of Turk Dunyasi Arastirmalari Vakfi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims at discussing the shift in Turkey's approach towards NATO, especially after the end of the Cold War, in order to provide a deeper understanding on the very characteristic of the security cooperation between Turkey and the West in the post-Cold War era. The reasons that made Turkey more critical and questioning towards the Alliance in the last two decades will also be analyzed through the concepts of "security" and "identity", as divergences have become much more common than convergences between Turkey and the West for some time. Notwithstanding Turkey's critical attitude within the Alliance, troublesome issues ranging from Iran's nuclear program to Syrian Civil War, from sectarian politics in Iraq to Kurdish assertiveness in Turkey's vicinity, forced Turkey to reevaluate its stance towards NATO and the vitality of it for Turkey's security and foreign policy goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey and Iran are on opposite sides of a bloody civil war in Syria. But competition is not novel to these countries, and the intensity of their current rivalry may be exaggerated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During its final two centuries, the Ottoman Empire failed to introduce an “exit strategy” from the Middle East. On account of this uneasy disengagement, Republican Turkey turned back and followed an anti-revisionist policy toward the region. In the 1920s, the revolutionary leadership of the Turkish Republic focused on internal reformation and modernization programs, which made a structural transformation in domestic politics and systemic change that further forced Turkish governments not to pursue an active policy in the region. During the Cold War, Turkey's Middle East policy was not viewed as friendly toward the Middle East while there was a strong security ties with Iran, especially in Central Treaty Organization. However, Turkey followed a more aggressive and coercive entrance strategy toward the region by the end of the Cold War. The Justice and Development Party has made a shift and attempted to exercise soft power policies to normalize its relations with Arab nations and Iran by improving societal and economic interdependence relations. In order to understand the new activism in Turkish–Iranian relations, it is necessary to provide a historical context of the changing dynamic of regional politics by analyzing threat perceptions and security alignments from the perspective of developing Turkish–Iran relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Middle East Yearbook / Ortadoğu Yıllığı is the property of Bilgi Kultur Dernegi (Knowledge & Culture Association) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article identifies potential points of conflict between Turkey and Iran that may lead to more intense disagreements. It also examines the question of whether an Iranian-Turkish axis capable of threatening Israel is likely to arise. The weaknesses of such an axis are considered. It reports on the progress of Iran's nuclear program, Ankara's relations with the Arab Gulf states, the energy issues affecting Turkey's relations with Iran.

Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to the neighboring Iran on the dates of February 13-16, 2011. A congested delegation including Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cevdet Yilmaz, State Minister and Co-Chariman of Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission, a number of deputies, the governors of the border provinces, a number academicians and journalists and more than 100 businessmen accompanied him in this visit. The visit was quite important both in terms of showing the progress that has been made in Turkey-Iran relations and also in terms of indicating the \"limits\" of the relations between the two countries. In this article the progress that has been made in Turkey-Iran relations and the course of bilateral relations will be dealt with by considering the activities of Gül in Iran throughout the visit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past years, Turkey was able to readjust the relations it maintains to the states of its neighbourhood. Approaching regional security - be it on the Balkans, be it in the Middle East, be it in Central Asia - can no longer afford to disregard the strategic role being played by Turkey. However, Ankara's declining relationship to the West raises serious doubt whether the country will really be able to position itself as a reliable partner on the global stage. The structural alienation between Tel Aviv and Ankara or Turkey's hidden agenda on Iran, deliberately overriding US and European interests, illustrate the country's emancipation from Western considerations. In the end, Turkey might be able to maintain a policy of regional leadership, especially in its Middle Eastern neighbourhood, however, such an approach goes to the disadvantage of its Western anchoring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Turkey's improved relations with the Gulf states in recent years reflect Ankara's refusal to allow Washington to use its territory to invade Iraq in 2003, Turkey's promotion of regional trade, and the decline of traditional Cold War security alliances in the Middle East. Ankara and Gulf states have increasingly seen each as viable alternatives to their traditional strategic partners--the European Union for Turkey and the United States for Gulf governments. Nonetheless, one should not overstate the importance of this alliance: Turkey and the Gulf disagree about Iran's nuclear program and other regional issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the fourth round of sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 9, 2010. Turkey, along with Brazil, voted in opposition to sanctions while Lebanon abstained from the vote. Turkey and Brazil's votes were particularly critical because they demonstrated a lack of unity within the international community. The rationale behind Brazil and Turkey's votes derived from the fact that the nuclear swap deal signed by Iran is, so far, the only concrete deal. It represents the only legal basis that the international community can build upon and hold Iran accountable. Although both countries' "no" votes were consistent with their diplomatic efforts, many analysts are criticizing Turkey in particular for not voting with its traditionally strong allies such as the US. Turkey's vote against the new round of sanctions represents an important milestone not because Turkey is abandoning its long-time allies but because Turkey is learning to make its own foreign policy calculations and decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to analyze the latest uranium-swamp deal signed between Iran, Turkey and Brazil in the context of Turkish foreign policy. In doing so, the paper first discusses whether this deal will contribute to the solution of the crisis between Iran and the West. Then an attempt is made at understanding to what extent singing of the deal accords with the nature of transformation in Turkish foreign policy. Afterwards, the paper tries to examine the potential impact of the deal on Turkey's relations with the key western actors. Finally, the paper contextualizes the deal within the framework of the changes taking place in global balance of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Turkey had remained indifferent towards the Iranian nuclear program for a long time, due to the ensuing conflicts raised between Iran and the West the nuclear issue has become one of the hot-topics in Turkey's relations with the United States, the Western countries and Iran. Because of its concerns deriving from regional implications of the Western efforts such as seeking heavy sanctions including military strikes to constrain Iran's nuclear program, Turkey has increasingly interested in mediation efforts between the conflicting parties. On May 17, as result of Turkey's mediation efforts together with Brazil, Iran agreed to swap some part of its low enriched uranium with uranium fuel that would be supplied by the Vienna Group. This article reviews Turkey's position regarding the Iranian nuclear program, its mediation efforts, and the uranium swap agreement. Finally, it briefly analyzes UN Security Council Resolution 1929 that added new sanctions on Iran and its possible repercussions on Turkey- Iran relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ayad Allawi recently held top-level meetings in Turkey, and also made a speech at the Rixos Hotel, Ankara on April 27, 2010 as a guest of ORSAM. His speech was significant because it helps us to understand the post-election atmosphere in Iraq and the policies of the Iraqiyya Alliance. At first glance, Allawi didn't appear to say anything different in his speech at ORSAM, but when we read between the lines, we can see the hidden meanings that he refrains from expressing explicitly. Allawi's deep concerns about the re-count of the votes, his demand to call in the UNSC, his thoughts about the return of the former Baathist technocrats, his approach to starting governmental negotiations without any prerequisites, his suggestions about the resolution of the Kurdish issue and the application of the Mosul model for Kirkuk, his objections to Iran's interference and his approach towards relations with Turkey must be examined carefully. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international community is worried about the security implications of Iran's nuclear activities. Although it has been argued that Iran is very close to make a nuclear bomb, the results of the latest official reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and some American intelligence institutions demonstrate that Iran is not reluctant to consider the concerns of the international community in its decisions. One of the main policies of great powers is to cooperate with regional actors, like Turkey, to persuade Iran to be more flexible in its nuclear policy and particularly in its uranium enrichment activity. The historical mistrust between Iran and the great powers reinforces the necessity of having other regional actors act as mediators and countries like Turkey can play an important role in this context. The governing AKP's mediation policy in the regional level is a catalyst to Turkey's attempts to mediate between Iran and the 5+1 Group, although mediation can have its own difficulties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

istanbul—The effort to forge new forms of non-Western modernity in the Muslim world has pushed Iran into sometimes bloody civil strife while Turkey swirls with persistent rumors of military plots against the Islamist-rooted government. The great historical question is whether, in the years to come, Iran will look more like Turkey, or Turkey like Iran? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the consequences for Turkish national security if Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons. The author predicts that an Iranian nuclear arsenal would give Iran an advantage over Turkey, which could threaten the relative calm that has existed between them since the 1639 Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin. The growing tensions between Turkey and Iran in the 1990s and 2000s are noted, mentioning the conflict between Turkey's commitment to secular principles and Iran's enforcement of Islamic principles such as Sharia law.

Iran is the one of the countries that Ottoman State had political and military relations most in the East from the beginning of the 16th century. In general, in relations that had religious character while Iran used Shiism, Ottoman State struggled to protect itself and other Sunni countries in the region that were under its protection. The peaceful era that the Treaty of Amasya dated 1555 ended later. Especially Shah Abbas' political ambitions and his desire to make advantage of Ottoman State deterioting position due to Celâli uprisings in Anatolia and ottoman Austrian wars gave a new direction to ottoman- Iranian relations. The letter presented in this article provides informations about Ottoman State's sincere attitude toward Iran and uncompromising attitude that Iran showed toward Ottoman State throughout history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Turkey's relations with Iraq, Iran and Syria. These relations are shaped not only by current developments and issues, but also by deeper, structural determinants, which mold Turkish policy towards the Middle East. The first of these determinants, historical memories, has been shaped above all by the events surrounding the Ottoman Empire's final dissolution in the early twentieth century and has left a legacy of territorial grievances, resentments and mutual suspicions which continue to affect Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria.

The article focuses on Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Turkey drew some indirect benefits from the Iranian revolution. The Iranian revolution and Iran's defection from the western camp helped to strengthen Turkey's ties with the U.S. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of a number of independent republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. For Turkey, as for Iran, these religious and cultural links, as well as geographical proximity, have offered opportunities to expand political influence and thereby opened up a new field for rivalry between the two countries.

The article presents information about several papers based on Turkey's foreign relations with several countries including Iran, Iraq and Syria.

The article discusses common issues affecting Turkey's relations with Iraq, Iran and Syria. At the December 1980 meeting of the Turkish-Iraqi Joint Committee on Economics, the two sides agreed to establish a JTC to study matters relating to regional waters, in particular, the Euphrates and Tigris river basins. Turkey's dispute with Syria over water rights, since the early 1980s, in particular, has become closely entwined with a further dispute arising out of Syria's patronage of anti-Turkish terrorist and subversive groups.

Focuses on relations between Turkey and Iran from 2000 to 2001. Discussion on relations between Turkey and Iran before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S.; Examination of the proposed unification of Turkey and Azerbaijan; Details on the alliance between Turkey and Israel.

The article focuses on Iranian responses to the Turkish-Israeli military agreements of 1996. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has positioned itself opposite to American and Israeli interests and policies in the Middle East region. This policy stemmed from the long and interventionist American policies in Iran during the Shah's reign. The revolutionaries of Iran, believing in a pan-Islamic framework, raised the illegitimacy of Arab governments, called for the elimination of the state of Israel, and strongly objected to Turkish anti-Islamic and secular nationalism. Unity of Muslims and the establishment of Islamic states became the driving force of Iranian foreign policy. The article firstly analyzes Iran's perceptions and belief structure of its regional security. It also substantiates Iran's interpretation of American, Israeli and Turkish motives and policies. Finally, Iranian perceptions and responses has been analyzed within the larger framework of Iran's domestic political experience and its elite cognitive structure in the post-revolutionary period.

This article focuses on the bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran from 1997 to 10 June 2000, terminating with the ECO conference held in Tehran. The omni-balancing international relations theory of Steven David is used to explain Turkey's relations with Iran. Six major developments which are influenced by the Kurdish and Islamist questions are used to emphasise significant aspects of the two countries' relations: 1) the 'Tale of the Two Mayors', which refers to how the cases of the Mayor of Istanbul, Receb Tayyib Erdoğan, and the Mayor of Tehran, Golam Hossein Karbaschi, were covered in the press; 2) the Kavakçı affair, which refers to the issue of Merve Kavakçı, the female member of the Turkish parliament who raised a political firestorm by wearing a headscarf (türban) into the Turkish parliament building in April 1999; 3) the July 'student' demonstrations in Iran, particularly in Tehran; 4) the Turkish bombing raid of 17 July 1999; 5) the Hizbullah affair in Turkey; and 6) the arrest of the killers in May 2000, with alleged ties to Iran, of prominent Turks. I suggest that none of the above had a stormy impact on the wider geopolitical , geostrategic and geoeconomic interests of the two countries, especially in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean. I confirm that the omni-balancing international relations theory is an adequate model to explain the bilateral relations between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the Turkish-Iranian relations during the Cold War. The relations between Turkey and Iran during the Cold War until the establishment of the Islamic regime in Tehran in 1979 were quite similar to what they had been since the early thirties. The two countries signed a treaty of friendship and security in Tehran and have established arrangements for concluding arrangements pertaining to commercial, consular, postal and telegraphic matters as well as customs and extradition. Despite the signed treaty of friendship, further unrest in eastern Turkey created a situation in which at times spilled conflict over the border with Iran.

Focuses on relations between Turkey and Iran in the twentieth century, while highlighting the difficulty of keeping Turco-Iranian relations stable. Factors influencing the stability of Turco-Iranian relations; Why Turco-Iranian relations are essential to the stability of the region; Historical details on Turco-Iranian relations.