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Since the fall of Major-General Suharto's "New Order" regime, Indonesia has struggled to deal with its authoritarian legacy. This article argues that in the quarter of a century since his disappearance, the Indonesian poet-activist Wiji Thukul (1963-1998?) has become a martyr for the still unfulfilled progressive ideals of the Reformasi (reform) movement that helped to bring down that regime in 1998. Using the developing body of theory around "secular" or "political" martyrdom, this article examines the process by which this status has been achieved, situating its development alongside the emergence of the Refusing to Forget movement, as well as comparing and contrasting his fate with that of two other candidates for the label of Reformasi martyr: those of the labour activist Marsinah (1969-1993) and the human rights lawyer Munir Said Thalib (1965-2004). It argues that Thukul's role as a martyr has been significant in maintaining progressive public discourse about the human rights abuses of the Suharto period, as well as the continuing illiberalism of the period since the end of the regime, and that Thukul remains relevant to efforts to stimulate and nurture the fragile democratisation project that was initiated in the late New Order period. In particular, the authors see Thukul's brand of grassroots creative practice as playing a central role in his emergence as a progressive icon and in giving his life and work international significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic breakthrough in Indonesia in the late 1990s was made possible through the dynamic interactions between the civil society organisations (CSOs) and its ruling elites. Although some of the former ruling elites were affected by the political transformation, others have evolved and survived as ‘authoritarian diasporas,’ In fact, the former ruling party, Golkar, also survived the change and is considered one of the ‘authoritarian successors parties.’ Based on these two conceptions developed by James Loxton and elite adjustment by Panji Anugrah Permana, this article explores the resilience of authoritarian legacies in post-Reformasi Indonesia, particularly among the authoritarian diaspora and its influences on Indonesia’s democratisation, particularly during the Jokowi years. By examining the three main sectors among the former authoritarian elites in politics, businesses, and the military, this article makes a case for democratic backsliding in Indonesia under the Jokowi administration due to the resurgence and the roles played by the former authoritarian elites in re-capturing politics and political change from the CSOs. The analysis in this article is based on a field study and library research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, appointed two former military generals, Ryamizard Ryacudu (2014–2019) and Prabowo Subianto (2019–present), for the first- and second-term defence minister positions consecutively. The appointment of military officers – either retired or active – as defence ministers has been perceived as a recipe for potential democratic setbacks. Current studies on the quasi-civilian defence minister mainly focused on explaining the logic behind such appointments. On the other hand, our study attempts to test the argument about whether the decision to select former military figures to lead the Ministry of Defence undermines civilian control. This article examines: (1) the institutional arrangement of the defence establishment; (2) the composition of the Indonesian Ministry of Defence's leadership structure; and (3) the leadership activities and key initiatives. The findings are that military officers have indeed dominated the ministry's organisational structure. Nevertheless, such domination did not automatically translate into the deterioration of civilian supremacy as the institutional arrangement limits those quasi-civilian defence ministers' manoeuvres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a qualitative content analysis of the instruction material used by the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta for its mandatory civic education course, which was introduced in the year 2000/2001 in collaboration with US-based The Asia Foundation. Kicked off during the Indonesian democratisation process, the so-called Reformasi (1998-2004), the course aimed at socialising Muslim students into the values and norms of democracy, human and civil rights, and critical thinking. By focusing on the content of the chapter on "Democracy" in the course's original and revised textbook, it is shown that the Islamic academics involved in the creation of the course acted as cosmopolitan brokers between Islamic, Indonesian and Western culture, but in the course of time shifted to promote democracy from an increasingly Islamic and Indonesian perspective, thereby engaging in a practice of localisation. However, the textbooks also featured several biases, inconsistencies and contradictions that mitigated their pedagogic quality and that are critically assessed in this article. Despite these shortcomings, it is argued that due to the course's overall strong pro-democratic commitment and its strategic institutionalisation on campus, the State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, with its academic milieu, must be understood as a pro-democratic actor whose political agency during as well as after Reformasi deserves more scholarly attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The separation of the Indonesian national police (POLRI) from the military (ABRI), now named the TNI, in 1999 led to transfer of domestic security role from the armed forces to POLRI. On one hand, POLRI has a greater role in internal security, particularly in countering terrorism. On the other hand, TNI continually attempts to reassert its dominance in the field of counter-terrorism. Previous studies on the subject place the issue in the context of the early days of democratisation. This paper aims to contribute by counting latest developments, notably the rise of new terrorist groups and recent counter-terrorism legislations. We argue that institutional rivalries between the POLRI and the TNI, and the military's determination to reclaim a greater role in domestic security have become an impediment to achieving successful counterterrorism efforts. This article also examines the development of military reform against the backdrop of the military's disproportionate and growing influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-corruption became one of the top priorities in post-Soeharto Indonesia, with democratisation, market liberalisation and institutional anti-corruption frameworks pursued as means to enhance transparency and accountability in public governance. A core component of these efforts was the establishment of a powerful anti-corruption agency, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article assesses the effectiveness of the KPK, using evidence from two contrasting cases to identify factors that facilitated or impeded its ability to successfully investigate, prosecute and thus contain high-level corruption. The analysis highlights the threats to the KPK posed by resilient networks that were able to reconsolidate and resist anti-corruption efforts in post-Soeharto Indonesia. However, it also identifies countervailing social forces that emerged in the context of democratisation – in particular, an active civil society and a largely free press. While these supportive pressures from civil society could not fully counter the attacks on the KPK, they were able to prevent its marginalisation in the two major cases examined. Overall the KPK's success in addressing high-level corruption is shown to be dependent on the interaction of political dynamics, interests and power relations, with no guarantee that anti-corruption forces will prevail in future cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guided by the literature on public sociology and the entry of civil society actors into the state, this paper analyses the increasing role of Indonesian academics in electoral politics. We assess both the impacts of their involvement on democratic reform, measured via election and policy outcomes, and on the academic profession itself. Academics merit separate study because of their dual status in Indonesia, as both civil servants and civil society members. As civil servants, academics face legislative prohibitions against their involvement in electoral politics, leading them to become involved on a 'don't ask, don't tell' basis. These entry circumstances strongly shape their strategies to exert influence and also exacerbate the costs of their political involvement. Nevertheless, we find no compelling case against the entry into electoral politics. Indonesian academics can claim some success in shaping the outcome of the 2014 presidential election, without incurring commensurate negative effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an accentuation of Indonesian democracy's illiberal characteristics during the course of reformasi. The religious and nativist mobilisation that surrounded the controversial 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections was only one manifestation of the sort of pressures leading to such accentuation. This article surveys the impacts of a stronger recent turn towards illiberalism across diverse areas of policy making in Indonesia, including decentralisation, civil–military relations, economic and foreign policy, as well as in the approaches to recognising past abuses of human rights. We find clear variation in its impacts, produced by differing constellations of old and new forces and what is at stake politically and economically in each arena of competition, as well as the salience of coherently expressed public pressure for reform. In particular, where the state and market have failed to address social injustices, more illiberal models have emerged, some under the guise of populist discourses that nonetheless continue to serve predatory elite interests and shift attention away from the inequalities in society. Such developments could be observed all the way to the 2019 presidential contest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the links between communal violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, at the onset of democratisation in Indonesia and contemporary politico-security dynamics. Poso regained national attention in recent years when East Indonesia Mujahidin jihadis set up a base in the region and declared allegiance to ISIS and joint police-military operations ensued. The article argues that scale and "performance" of the security operations – to weed out a small group of poorly resourced armed men – connects local-national-global dynamics and keeps the threat of terrorism and insecurity at the forefront of public discussion in Indonesia. This has served the interests of those advocating for a greater role for the Indonesian military in domestic affairs through revisions to the Anti-Terrorism Law and for better resourcing for the military. Yet, the evidence suggests there has been little local support for the ideology of the East Indonesia Mujahidin and the risk of widespread engagement or violence is low, especially given that the local discontent which initially drove the conflict has dissipated. Such developments raise questions as to whether Indonesia risks a return to the illiberal past when the military dominated many aspects of civic and political life and in some cases acted with impunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key areas of Indonesian foreign policy have remained largely autonomous of the political struggles associated with democratisation and a subsequent illiberal turn, even as they have changed the way foreign policy is formulated. Indonesia's South China Sea diplomacy has been one such area of autonomy. Although the issue has gained great public salience, as the most prominent foreign policy challenge for the current Joko Widodo administration, the government has maintained a striking continuity in its approach dating to the authoritarian Suharto era. Such continuity persists because the strategic challenge facing Indonesia has endured: throughout Indonesia's modern history, the government has sought to assert the nation's rights to territory and resources against more powerful states. The government's current policy settings have also preserved a status quo that serves a range of Indonesian interests sufficiently well to prevent the emergence of a coherent coalition of interests to push for a new approach, in what is a technical policy area dominated by foreign ministry experts. As such, although the Joko Widodo administration has exhibited greater overt nationalism in its handling of the issue, Indonesia's broader illiberal turn has not been transformative of the government's diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the hopeful dreams of the 2011 "Arab spring" have given way to anti-democratic repression in most Arab-majority nations, the question of Islam and democracy in Indonesia has been thrust to the centre of policy and research attention once more. With some 260 million people, 87 per cent of whom are Muslim, Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority society in the world and the third-largest democracy. Analysts disagree as to whether Indonesia offers an example of a successful democratic transition in a Muslim-majority country. This debate serves as the background to this article's revisiting of a book written almost 20 years ago, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. The article opens with a discussion of the personal and theoretical preoccupations that informed the approach adopted in Civil Islam. It then addresses the broader question of the degree to which the promise of the 1998 transition has been fulfilled. The article ends by examining Civil Islam's core conclusions in light of recent developments in Indonesia. These include a "conservative turn" in Islamist circles committed to the creation of a religiously differentiated citizenship. The results of the April 2019 elections suggest, however, that the supporters of a religiously inclusive Islam have by no means been vanquished. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After almost two decades of praise for Indonesia's democratic achievements, a scholarly consensus has begun to emerge that Indonesian democracy is in regression. In this article, we consider the sources of that regression. Drawing upon the comparative literature on democratic decline, we propose that Indonesia is an illiberal democracy, and argue that a constellation of structural, agential and popular forces has led to an incremental deterioration in democratic quality. We first reaffirm arguments that trace the origins of contemporary democratic weakness to the nature of Indonesia's transition, and the incorporation of anti-democratic elites into the governing structures of its democracy. We then show how Indonesia's two most recent presidents each eroded democratic norms and institutions in pursuit of political security. Finally, we cast a critical eye on the widely shared view that Indonesia's population is a bulwark of democratic strength. While most Indonesians support democracy as an abstract concept, [End Page 255] significant parts of the population show limited support for the protections, checks and freedoms that underpin a liberal democracy. We suggest there is a significant constituency for illiberalism in Indonesia, and point to the presence of a conducive electoral environment for further democratic erosion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 Indonesian presidential elections indicate that ideology played an important role in voting behaviour, as aggregate subnational results seem to mirror the mid-1950s, when Indonesian politics was organised around ideological and partisan groups known as aliran. However, the extent to which these macro-level patterns are rooted in real ideological divisions among Indonesian voters is an open question. This article analyses an original survey specifically designed to measure aliran identities, ideological orientations and political preferences of ordinary Indonesians. Findings indicate that aliran identities are still present and associated with party choice but only loosely connected with political ideology. Most notably, however, political Islam is associated with important political attitudes and behaviours. Islamist Indonesians are less likely to support liberal understandings of democracy, more likely to see economic issues as policy priorities and more likely to support economic redistribution and regional autonomy. This suggests that ideology should receive greater attention in the study of Indonesian politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: This article develops an explanation for why democratisation processes sometimes fail to foster effective civil service reform. Using ethnographic fieldwork on the evolving relationship between civil servants and politicians in Lampung, a rural backwater in the southern tip in Sumatra, this paper attributes the ineffectiveness of bureaucratic reform measures in Indonesia to the way in which elections trigger competition over control over state resources. I argue that a merit‐based bureaucracy is particularly difficult to institute when a local bureaucracy enjoys strong discretionary control over the distribution of state resources. During Suharto's authoritarian regime, this control rested largely in the hands of bureaucrats. This authoritarian legacy generates strong incentives for politicians to prefer loyal bureaucrats over capable ones. Politicians need to use bureaucratic appointments as a means to obtain campaign support and to develop control over state resources. In developing these arguments, this paper offers an approach to incorporate informal and clientelistic dimensions of politics more explicitly into analyses of processes of bureaucratic reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Indonesia, local government is endowed with important policy prerogatives and local politics is key to advance social welfare. The literature on Indonesian local politics has convincingly exposed serious limitations in local democratic practices, and it has questioned the ability of local democracy to promote genuine political change. This work, however, predominantly focuses on elite politics and specific forms of accountability based on patronage and clientelism. In this paper, we study democratic accountability in Indonesia from a different perspective. Drawing from the comparative literature on voting behavior, we hypothesize that Indonesian voters evaluate local politicians for their performance, and that they vote to reward or punish them for what they do in office. The analysis of three original surveys conducted in the cities of Medan, Samarinda and Surabaya offers partial support for this argument. While there is a positive relationship between evaluations of local government performance and support for incumbents, the strength of this link varies substantially across individuals and cities. The results shed new light on voter-politician linkages in Indonesia, suggesting that forms of accountability different from clientelism may emerge in this large and diverse country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the role played by purnawirawan (retired military officers) in political party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The role of purnawirawan remains a critical research gap in the literature on democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia, particularly in studies which focus on civilian--military relations. The article finds that purnawirawan have had a significant impact on the creation of a new type of party--one which combines militarycentred leadership and civilian-controlled management. This new arrangement has enabled these former military officers to protect their interests. This study contributes to the existing literature on the impact of military reform on the increasing numbers of purnawirawan turning to civilian politics in order to maintain influence via electoral political contestation in the context of democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years a debate has emerged about the conditions under which justiciable legal frameworks facilitate the fulfilment of socioeconomic rights. This debate has pitted institutionalist perspectives that emphasise the progressive potential of democratisation against structuralist perspectives that emphasise the constraints imposed by relationships of power and interest. This paper considers the debate in light of Indonesia’s recent experience. It suggests that we need to examine how institutional and structural factors interac twithin particular contexts to shape socioeconomic rights fulfilment, not examine these factors in isolation. It also considers the strategic implications of this argument for rights proponents. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper presents a new interpretation of peace-building in contested transitional states. The peace-building literature is dominated by analysis of international liberal processes and policies, their costs and benefits. To understand non-liberal processes of peace-building, especially those conducted by national governments, new concepts have emerged. The paper employs the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ to analyse the logic of illiberal peace-building processes in transitional states. In contrast to a normative liberal analysis, this approach interprets violent democratising states as they are, rather than as they ought to be. It also assesses the role that illiberal political institutions, such as those of neo-patrimonialism, can play in reducing violence. In the light of overall government policy and two comparative sub-national cases taken from the Indonesian transition, the paper discusses how illiberal peace-building reduced violence during political transition, and when and why it failed. The discussion has relevance for wider understanding of the comparative politics of democratisation and peace-building in contested states. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Indonesia is an almost ideal case study to test a variety of explanatory propositions for the rise and fall of military regimes. Over the course of 50 years, Indonesia has witnessed a military takeover, the consolidation of praetorian rule, the toppling of a military-backed autocrat and the marginalisation of the armed forces from politics after democracy took hold. The analysis of these four periods delivers important insights into the conditions under which countries fall victim to military coups and subsequently fail or succeed in their efforts of redemocratisation. While historical, governmental, economic, international and military-internal factors are all at play, it is arguably the quality of civilian governance that has the greatest impact on a state's prospects of preventing military interventionism. In turn, the strength of civilian governments depends to a large extent on the existence of a solid democratic consensus against military rule; as the Indonesian case shows, the absence of such intra-civilian agreements delivers ample opportunities to military officers to meddle in political affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the role played by Indonesian capitalists in the country's new democratic political system. It takes as its starting point the analysis presented by Richard Robison in his influential 1986 book, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. Robison saw the authoritarian state as central to capitalist class formation, viewing it as midwife and protector of an emergent business class. Though democratisation was not his primary concern, this analysis made him pessimistic about the prospects of democratic change. Over the intervening years, Indonesia has not only undergone democratisation; its capitalist class has also changed significantly. The article notes elements of continuity in the nature of Indonesian capital (including the continuing weight of politically vulnerable ethnic Chinese business interests) as well as change (including the taking of political office by businesspeople and the strengthening of provincial business). Overall, there is now much greater independence of private capital vis-à-vis the state, even if business-state relations are still characterised by patterns that developed during authoritarian rule, including the clientelist and predatory behaviours that have been the subject of much analysis in post-Suharto Indonesia. A focus on the capitalist class and its enmeshment in state power, in the style pioneered by Robison, thus helps explain continuity between Indonesia's authoritarian past and its new democratic order, especially the continuing ubiquity of corruption and patronage. However, such a focus is less useful in accounting for political change, especially democratisation itself. To explain democratisation we need to broaden our class analytical optic to bring into focus the actions and interests of lower and middle class forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a systematic review of the literature of oligarchy in Indonesia, which offers a distinctive interpretation of political change in Indonesia. The article argues that this literature is significant in two important ways. First, it invites ongoing rethinking of the ways in which authoritarian regimes fall. In the mainstream literature of democratisation, the fall of authoritarian regimes is often portrayed as the triumph of pro-democratic civil society mobilisation. Whereas many Indonesianists embrace this mainstream account in explaining the fall of the Suharto regime, the oligarchy literature suggests that its fall was driven not so much by the rise of civil society forces as by tensions between Suharto and oligarchs, in which the former was abandoned by the latter. Second, the oligarchy literature also compels a reappraisal of the nature of Indonesia's new democracy. Unlike the mainstream account of democratisation, which holds an optimistic view that the country is in the 'consolidation' stage towards a liberal democracy, the oligarchy literature sees political transition in Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Indonesia's democratic state capacity-building in terms of transformations in West Timor, particularly around manganese mining. It is structured on the basis of three complementary sets of arguments. Firstly, democratic capacity-building is essentially a power-driven process as it seeks to re-arrange the way in which power is distributed. This process is shaped by the relative capabilities of a variety of societal interests struggling to dominate the control of state power at multiple sites of a highly competitive ‘field of power’. Secondly, Indonesia's democratic decentralisation experience has produced uneven results, both between and within provinces. This is largely because the dynamic of the reform process is determined by the relative capabilities of competing social forces to engage in the political landscape and influence revenue generation and resource management policies. Thirdly, manganese mining, which has recently emerged as a quick method of revenue generation in resource-poor West Timor, provides an important case study that reflects the structural dynamics of state (in)capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratisation has brought checks and balances, and new state agencies, to Indonesian politics. Checks and balances and greater responsiveness to the public have also been sought in the appointment processes for the senior management of these new bodies. This paper examines the merits of the new appointment processes, in particular sequential selection, through a case study of the leadership selection process for the Corruption Eradication Commission. It reviews the process stipulated by law and its implementation in 2003, 2007 and 2010. The study argues that, while the short-listing of candidates by the selection committee aims at unprecedented openness and meritocracy, the process used has been tedious and has given insufficient weight to candidates’ track records. Despite criticism that the final selection was pre-determined, the paper concludes that the overall selection process has upheld the principle of checks and balances between the executive and the legislature and ensured diversity of political support. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Indonesia's fledgling democracy was just three years into defining its constitutional structure when the 9/11 attacks took place in the United States. It was less affected by the acts themselves than by the 'war on terror' that they provoked. Militant Islamic groups, already active, sometimes violently, were invigorated by widespread opposition to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. A series of violent attacks on western targets at the same time put strong international and domestic pressure on the newly established democracy to act, sometimes in ways that ran counter to its reform agenda. Indonesia's unique configuration of legislative and executive powers continues to evolve, but seems - for now - to have been relatively unaffected by these pressures. Rather, as the country increasingly recognised terrorism as a problem deserving political attention, it turned not to tighter central controls or a strengthened president but to the reinvigoration of the nation's already formidable military. At question in Indonesia is less the evolving balance of power between the executive and the legislature than their combined ability to govern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spread of democratic ideas from the late 1980s, along with the development of the democratisation movement, contributed to the quantitative growth of environmental non- governmental organisations (ENGOs) in Indonesia. In addition, the democratisation of formal institutions after the late 1990s facilitated ENGO activities. Importantly, democratisation has also contributed to the qualitative development of ENGOs. Democratic ideas ‘re-framed’ environmental issues, politicising ENGO activities, even before the end of the Suharto regime. Since the late 1990s, democratic ideas have further shifted ENGO strategies to conform more with democratic values and institutions, while stimulating efforts to enhance accountability and representation within ENGOs. It is argued that these developments may enhance the quality of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the dynamics and outcomes of Indonesia's first-ever direct local executive elections in a case study of the gubernatorial election in the Riau Archipelago. Specifically, the essay examines the election process, identifies the major issues before, during and after the elections, and assesses voters' participation. The essay then examines the ways direct local executive elections have affected the dynamics of local politics in the country. Overall, this essay aims to further develop our understanding of political dynamics in the Riau Archipelago and grasp the practical significance of local political change in Indonesia more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policies of decentralisation and democratisation since the end of the New Order of Indonesia in 1998 have seen a major shift of economic and political attention to the regions and widespread clamouring from local communities for more power in decision making and control over local resources. This regionalisation has led to a resurgence in interest in ‘tradition’ and a shift in the understanding of ‘culture’ as it was formed during the New Order. This article looks at contestations over the use of traditional culture in the regency of Manggarai (in Flores Island, Eastern Indonesia) and how, while political elites retain an image of culture similar to the New Order, local communities struggle to reform tradition in their own way and to regain local governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the fall of Suharto's autocratic regime in May 1998, Indonesia has gone through a delicate process of democratisation. At the same time Indonesia is also confronted with the problem of nation-building. The question is: how can a democratic Indonesia unite itself? By using the theoretical relationship between the issue of democratisation and national identity, the paper tries to show the dilemma of nation-building in the post-Suharto Indonesia, especially with regard to the resolving of conflict in Aceh. On the one hand, the Indonesian leaders are required to show their commitment to democratic principles in ending the conflict and, on the other hand, they cannot rule out the possibility of using military means in keeping the nation united. An effective control by the civilian leaders over the military is essential for the peaceful solution of Aceh conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]