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Studies show educated citizens are more likely to vote in elections but few papers look at the relationship in developing countries and even fewer analyze whether the relationship is causal. I examine whether education increases voter turnout and makes better-informed voters in Indonesia using an exogenous variation in education induced by an extension of Indonesia's school term length, which fits a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. The longer school year increases education, but I do not find education increases voter turnout; it does not seem to affect voters' views of political candidates' religion, ethnicity, or gender when they vote either.

This qualitative research aims to describe the strategies applied by female parliamentary candidates to develop empathy values to gain constituent support in the legislative general election in 2014. Research subjects comprise 12 female members of parliament from seven regencies/cities in South Kalimantan who were chosen from different regencies/cities and different political parties. The research findings showed that in developing empathy values, female candidates were able to gain sufficient votes to be members of parliament. The strategies applied were as follows: first, the use of political marketing strategies that covered mapping or segmentation, positioning, and campaigns then monitoring and social capital strategies; second, socialization of empathy developing values conducted internally by meeting the constituents directly (door to door), whether individually or in groups; and third, utilizing their good social capital in relating to and working with other people. The social capital referred to covers: ability to build a network, build confidence, and attach themselves to Islamic values.

This study examined the practice of extensive commodification of Islamic piety by political actors during the Indonesian presidential election 2019. By identifying the posting of contestants between 23 September 2018 and 16 April 2019 and analyzing using the multimodality technique, this research found four forms of extensive commodification of Islamic piety. They are extensive commodification of piety-based developmentalism, social-oriented personal piety, Islamism-based nationalism, and welfare-state-based Islamism. This research concludes that Islamic piety became a political instrument. The religion of Islam is not only a system of beliefs and religious practices but also a political commodity, which political actors commodify during political contestation. The commodification of Islamic piety functions to increase the value exchange or marketability of political candidates. Any candidates are political symbols or commodities among Indonesian voters. The production of instrumental piety messages in political communication results from the intricate interplay between Indonesia's demographic structure, voter psychography, and patron-client culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Talking about 2024 is of course talking about the political year in Indonesia. 2024 is the year when legislative candidates and of course presidential and vice presidential candidates will begin to fight. Currently, one of the presidential candidates from the party that is the current government party is Anies Baswedan. Based on what has been regulated in political ethics and election ethics, it is certainly not allowed to campaign by presidential candidates before the campaign period is carried out, but what happened was the emergence of social media content from Anies Baswedan containing campaigns with disguised signs and also camouflaged content so that what the public eye sees presented in cyberspace is only the content of his daily activities. This study aims to determine how Anies Baswedan's political branding simulation in preparation for the 2024 Presidential Election. This research uses simulation analysis on Jean Baudrillarde's theory based on big data analysis on Tiktok social media through content related to Anies' candidacy as a 2024 Presidential candidate. The focus of the research is the arrangement and meaning of #aniesPresiden2024 signs and messages on mainstream social media received by the digital community and then forming a simulation of Anies Baswedan's political branding which is the result of the digital communication process towards Anies' political representation as a 2024 presidential candidate. The results of this study found that tiktok social media has a huge influence on the political branding of anies baswedan, digital society widely receives and consumes information related to the intellectual sign of anies baswedan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine how pragmatism has created rational choice behavior in candidate selection. Pragmatism has resulted in single candidates for local heads, which makes local democracy uncompetitive. The research method used is an explanatory approach that aims to explain how pragmatism as a rational choice behavior in the local government head election. Data were collected, compiled and analyzed using Nvivo 12 Plus software. The results showed that political parties as political institutions are very pragmatic in the selection of candidates for local heads. The incumbents utilized the support of almost all political parties based on clientelistic and programmatic relations. This has led the candidate selection process to prioritize pragmatic aspects, especially financial support, acceptability, and electability of candidates. The candidate selection process no longer determines ideological values at the official candidate selection process. Financial support for candidates has the highest priority for political parties in determining their endorsements in regional head elections. Meanwhile, the acceptability aspect refers to the dominant acceptance of all elites, cadres, and the mass base of supporters of the selected candidate. Electability is also a priority, although it is considered that electability trends are dynamic and able to change based on the level of competition. The behavior of political party elite actors and local head candidates eventually forms a rational choice pattern that makes local democracy backsliding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focused on the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) election in South Sumatra, Indonesia, and examined the creation of hyper-reality in the social media campaigns of female legislative candidates (caleg). Furthermore, it specifically concentrated on the use of social media platforms. A mixed-methodology approach was used, which combined content analysis of social media posts with semi-structured interviews involving twelve informants. This study also aimed to determine how female DPD candidates project their image on social media and the effect on voters. The results showed that female DPD candidates presented themselves on social media in a manner consistent with sociocultural expectations of the role women are expected to play in politics. They portrayed themselves as individuals who can maintain a healthy balance between professional and personal lives, who are educated, devout and have connections with influential people and the general public. It was also shown that voters are still influenced by hyper-realistic depictions of political candidates shared on social media, even though they can differentiate between photographs shared on social media and actual reality. This demonstrated the significant impact of social media on shaping public opinion and the conduct of political actors. This result will contribute to the expanding academic literature on hyper-reality, politics and social media. It will also shed light on the creation of hyper-reality in the political campaigns of women seeking legislative office. This study emphasized the importance of social media as a strategic tool in contemporary politics and how hyper-reality constructions may influence voters' perceptions and behaviour in the context of DPD elections in South Sumatra. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rational choice institutionalism approach provides insight into political parties' personal and institutional preferences in determining their strategic and technical-operational decisions. Institutional and personal preferences in political parties have shaped rational choices in selecting regional head candidates. Political party preferences provide rational choices based on the values they believe have shaped political responses to individuals and institutions. This study will examine selecting mayor and deputy mayor candidates in regional head elections. This study maps the preferences of political parties in determining their rational choices. The qualitative research method involves field interviews, online media analysis, and the examination of social media data. The data processing includes content analysis conducted using NVivo 12 Plus software. The study results indicate that political parties as political institutions are very centralized and pragmatic in determining the results of selecting regional head candidates. There are variations in the types of preferences of political parties in the candidates, namely systemic, practical, and normative preferences. Internal regulations support systemic preferences, practical preferences are determined by party procedures, directors, and selection criteria, and normative preferences are based on political parties' ideology, values, and goals. Normative preferences will only become mainstream in the candidacy of political parties if party ideology strengthens and the candidate selection mechanism is transformed into a democracy-based selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to study the massive and systematic extent of money politics in the 2017 elections of the Bireuen District. This study used a qualitative method with the participant-observer approach. Data were collected through FGD at Al-Muslim University in Bireuen and in-depth interviews with the relevant parties. The practice of moneypolitics in the Bireuen election was very immaculate and well-coordinated. It started by collecting the photocopies of ID and family registry cards and ended with distributing the money before and after the voting. The campaign teams in each village helped to assist this process to the villagers. The study found five major causes of money politics in the Bireuen District. First, the public confidence in the political elections has declined. Second, the political orientation of the community was pragmatic. Third, several candidates had the same power in the election; thus, they had no other choices but to give away money to the public in the hope of being elected. Fourth, the prevention of money politics in the local elections of the Bireuen regent was somewhat weak. The elections supervisory committee does not have the authority to punish the political money perpetrators but could only give recommendations to the District Independent Elections Commission (KIP). These recommendations are subject to being processed or neglected. Lastly, the regulation of money politics was also weak in the Bireuen regional election. This massive money politics in Bireuen could be prevented by establishing a concept and formulating policies in the form of qanun (Islamic bylaws) in Aceh. The qanun could cancel or disqualify the regent candidates if they are proven to have committed money politics based on convincing and legally binding evidence. The political parties could also be deprived of their political rights to carry the regional head candidates for a term of office. Aceh, through its self-government, has a special authority to produce regulations that do not contradict the higher regulation in Indonesia. The function of the qanun is to break the chain and the money politics system by imposing punishment on the regent candidates and political parties. This research has never been investigated before, especially the regulation potential to break the chains of money politics by establishing a qanun to be applied in Aceh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this article, we provide evidence suggesting that almost half (44 per cent) of female candidates elected to Indonesia's national parliament in 2019 were members of political dynasties. Providing detailed data on the backgrounds of these candidates, including by party and region, we argue that several factors have contributed to their rise. Parties are increasingly motivated – especially in the context of a 4 per cent parliamentary threshold – to nominate candidates who can boost their party's fortune by attracting a big personal vote. Members of political dynasties (especially those related to regional government heads and other politicians entrenched in local power structures) have access to financial resources and local political networks – increasingly important to political success in Indonesia's clientelistic electoral system. We show that the rise of these dynastic women candidates is not eliminating gender bias within parties, but is instead marginalising many qualified female party candidates, including incumbents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several decades, an increasing number of Indonesian women have worn the Islamic headscarf, or hijab. This phenomenon has been the subject of considerable scholarly analysis, with most analysts seeing it as one sign of growing Islamisation in the country. Relatively few studies, however, have considered the extraordinary variation in hijab styles or analysed how they are used in electoral politics. Through a close study of women candidates running for legislative seats in the Cilacap district in Indonesia's 2019 election, this article analyses the political meaning of the style of hijab chosen by candidates as part of their political imaging. In particular, the article distinguishes between ideological and instrumental uses of the hijab, noting that while some candidates wore particular styles of hijab in order to convey a broad ideological vision about the future of Indonesia, others were far more instrumental in their use, tailoring their hijab style to increase their electoral chances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What can be done to encourage people to condemn intimate partner violence? Looking at Indonesia, I combine electoral data with a large-scale health survey and find that the narrow victory of a female candidate—as opposed to a male candidate—in local council elections leads to a decrease in the share of female constituents who agree that a husband is justified in assaulting his wife. I observe similar results for male constituents, although some estimates are not statistically significant. These results improve our understanding of the role of descriptive representation as a cause, rather than simply a consequence, of changing attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature on election violence has focused on how violence suppresses voter participation or shapes their preferences. Yet, there are other targets of election violence beyond voters who have so far received little attention: candidates and government agencies. By intimidating rival candidates into dropping out of the race, political hopefuls can literally reduce the number of competitors and increase their likelihood of winning. Likewise, aspiring candidates can target government agencies perceived to be responsible for holding elections to push for electorally beneficial decisions. In this paper, we introduce a new typology of electoral violence and utilize new data of election violence that occur around executive elections in Indonesia from 2005 through 2012. The types of violence we identified differ in these ways: a) Of all cases of electoral violence observed in this article, most incidents were targeted towards candidates and government bodies; b) candidates are generally targeted before elections, whereas voter-targeting incidents are spread out evenly before and after elections and government-targeted violence tends to occur afterwards; c) pre-election violence is concentrated in formerly separatist areas, but post-election violence is more common in districts with prior ethnocommunal violence. These distinctions stress the importance of examining when and why different strategies are adopted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential for gender quotas to increase women’s parliamentary representation has been the subject of intense scholarly interest around the world. Although, at a global level, quotas are believed to have contributed to a steady increase in women’s share of parliamentary seats, there is significant variation across regions and countries. The conventional wisdom holds that cultural factors are the major constraint on the gender quota’s potential to deliver more seats to women candidates. The Indonesian experience suggests otherwise. Although cultural factors remain a barrier to Indonesian women’s entry to elected office, cultural factors do not explain the rise and fall in women’s descriptive (numerical) representation in parliament over the past two electoral cycles. Findings from this study suggest that institutional factors, notably changes to the voting system and the consequences for campaign funding, present a more formidable challenge to women’s advance in Indonesia’s party and parliamentary politics. These findings should be of interest to students of gender quotas, affirmative action for women in politics and contemporary Indonesia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vote buying and patronage distribution have become widespread in Indonesian elections. Yet, it is also evident that some candidates use programmatic strategies to compete. Drawing on the case of the 2017 election in Kulon Progo district, Yogyakarta Special Region, and using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, this article seeks to explain why the incumbent opted out of vote buying and similar clientelistic strategies and why voters supported his programmatic approach. We show that the incumbent prepared vote buying as a fallback strategy but did not activate it. He was able to make this choice because he faced little competition and had invested politically in programmatic policies, though he was also assisted by his ability to manipulate his proximity with the Yogyakarta Sultanate for electoral purposes. This article shows that Indonesian voters can be highly appreciative of programmatic approaches, rather than simply being the "ballot-sellers" they are often assumed to be in the literature on money politics and patronage. In this case, moreover, programmatic success produced a less competitive election that in turn created the possibility for the incumbent candidate to opt out of clientelism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines brokerage activity and "vote buying" in the 2017 Pati district election, where the incumbent seeking re-election was the only candidate on the ballot. Although running unopposed, Indonesian election laws still require unopposed candidates to win the majority of votes cast in order to win. Despite facing a weak opposition that was under-funded and largely limited to the use of social media, the unopposed incumbent in Pati nonetheless built a large and expensive campaign organization and vigorously campaigned for votes. Some of the incumbent's supporters gave money directly to voters in the days before the election. Our study finds that a complex interaction between strategic political considerations and cultural factors explains the apparent paradox of why a popular and unopposed incumbent who was virtually assured victory would engage in an active campaign similar in size and scope to one found in a regular election involving multiple candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines clientelistic politics during a local election in a fishing community in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Numerous studies have identified Indonesia's fishing communities as locations of hierarchical social relations characterized by patron-client relations connecting boat owners and other traders with fishers, in which the latter are frequently deeply indebted to the former. Through a study of the 2017 local election in Takalar district, this article demonstrates that these social patterns are readily transferred to the political sphere, giving rise to a form of traditional brokerage in which coastal patrons act on behalf of candidates to direct their clients' voting behaviour. At the same time, coastal villages also saw significant patrimonial brokerage, in which the key actors were state officials, and political brokerage in which candidates formed campaign teams involving miscellaneous political and social networks and local community leaders. Distribution of patronage, in the form of money, goods and favours, was widespread. This article thus illustrates the complexity and competitiveness of contemporary clientelistic politics in Indonesia, including in a community in which traditional forms of clientelism are deeply entrenched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains a new trend in Indonesian local politics: the rise of uncontested elections. We explore this trend by way of detailed examinations of two such elections in February 2017: the district head election in Pati, Central Java; and the mayoral election in fayapura, Papua. In doing so, we consider explanations that have been advanced elsewhere, including those that focus on "scare-off effects" and incumbency advantages. Though such approaches are relevant, we show that there was a contrast between our two cases: in Pad, the strength of the incumbent and his wealthy running mate dissuaded rival candidates and parties from competing: in fayapura, two other candidates wanted to run, and even secured backing from local party branches, but their candidacies were annulled after legal challenges. If the first pathway showed a process of broad-based elite bargaining producing a "win-win solution", in fayapura the pathway involved a zero-sum-game contest between rival elites. Despite these differences, in both cases there was competition between local elites, but it happened prior to the election. Overall, we argue the rise of uncontested elections points to growing elite entrenchment in local politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The personal vote literature proceeds from the assumption that personalism has an independent effect on policy outcomes. Institutions appear as exogenous variables that structure incentives for personalism, and the personalism of electoral competition effects legislator behavior once in office. This paper finds that existing state spending and prevailing patterns of policy implementation can have an independent effect on the personalism of political competition. When political fortunes depend on the personal vote, and candidates can promise to deliver clientelistic benefits to voters, both voters and candidates have an incentive to enter an enduring patron-client relationship. The clientelistic appeal, however, is only credible if voters expect the winning candidate will have goods to deliver once in office. The empirical section leverages cross-district variance in electoral personalism in Indonesia. It connects preference voting rates to pre-existing patterns of sub-national state spending. In electoral districts where the state played a dominant role in the economy, voters and candidates tended to form the type of patron-client bonds that resulted in high levels of preference voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research in many countries shows that where voters and campaign workers are motivated by material rewards, the brokerage networks delivering those rewards can be highly unstable. Brokers often exercise considerable autonomy, shifting between candidates, disobeying their directives, or stealing the cash or goods they are supposed to pass on to voters. What determines whether brokers betray their ca ndidates in such ways? This article answers this question by focusing on elections in Indonesia, where candidates construct ad-hoc “success teams” to organize brokers and mobilize voters. In proposing a model to explain broker behavior, the author proposes the division of team members into three categories:activist brokers,who support a candidate based on a political, ethnic, religious, or other commitment;clientelist brokers,who desire long-term relations with the candidate or with more senior brokers, with the goal of receiving future rewards; andopportunist brokers,who seek short-term material gains during the course of a campaign. Two problems of broker loyalty are then discussed, specifically:predation,where brokers misappropriate resources intended for voters or lower-level team members, anddefection,where they desert one candidate in favor of another. Explaining the incidence of these phenomena, the author examines two key factors: the material endowments of candidates and broker evaluations of their prospects of electoral victory. Well-resourced candidates with poor prospects are most likely to experience predation, whereas less materially endowed candidates will experience defection. The article concludes by addressing the implications for studies of clientelism and brokerage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Between the 1999 and 2009 elections the proportion of national female legislators in Indonesia, the world''s largest Muslim majority democracy, more than doubled. While this substantial increase may partly be explained by the recent imposition of a gender quota and placement mandate that have forced parties to increase the number of female candidates, quotas cannot fully explain the strong performance of women in the 2009 elections. First, many parties placed women higher on their lists than the laws required; second, voters appeared to over vote for women in some districts. Although incumbency''s typical effect is to inhibit female electoral success by advantaging traditional (male) competitors, I argue that women benefited largely from an alternative effect: female incumbency can improve female candidate placement and electability by demonstrating female capacity and capability. Female newcomers benefited strongly from the presence of female incumbents in their own and bordering districts, thus suggesting a positive diffusion effect of female incumbency. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article presents information about Indonesia's elections, candidates, and voters since longtime President Suharto was ousted in 1998. Since 1998, there have been three legislative elections and two by popular vote for the presidency. In the past two elections the people voted directly for a presidential ticket that includes both presidential and vice presidential candidates who usually come from different parties. Since Suharto, political parties have expanded from three parties allowed under his regime to nine that participated in the 2009 elections.

The article focuses on Qanun of Aceh, Indonesia Number 3 Year 2008 on Local Political Parties which participate in elections for members of the People's Representative Council of Aceh (DPRA) and the People's Representative Council in the Cities/Regencies (DPRK). The conditions and mechanisms for the involvement of local political parties in general elections are discussed. It cites several requirements that must be fulfilled to become prospective candidates for members of the DPRA and DRPK from local political parties.

The article focuses on Qanun 3/2008 on Local Political Parties, a local regulation in Aceh, Indonesia that requires election candidates to satisfy a Qur'an recitation test to be eligible to contest an election. It notes that the Qur'an recitation requirement raises questions concerning the scope of special autonomy in the province and the extent of its authority to pass syariah law. Under Qanun 3/2008, a religious requirement that must be met by prospective candidates is that they must be God-fearing people who obey the teachings of their religion.

The article explores the implications of the growing importance of opinion polling for consolidating democracy in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It highlights the significant role of opinion polls in post-Socharto politics, in relation to the goal to meet the electorate's expectations, hopes and demands. To better understand the role played by public polling, the author provides an overview on the electoral politics in the country's various regimes. It also explores the liberalization of Indonesia's political system after 1998 and the corresponding upturn in pollsters' activity. The repercussions of the country's polling activity for the accountability, stability and institutionalization of the political system are accounted.

This essay examines the dynamics and outcomes of Indonesia's first-ever direct local executive elections in a case study of the gubernatorial election in the Riau Archipelago. Specifically, the essay examines the election process, identifies the major issues before, during and after the elections, and assesses voters' participation. The essay then examines the ways direct local executive elections have affected the dynamics of local politics in the country. Overall, this essay aims to further develop our understanding of political dynamics in the Riau Archipelago and grasp the practical significance of local political change in Indonesia more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]