Search

This paper investigates household decision-making behaviour in the market for energy-efficient lighting and appliances in Delhi, India to study the energy efficiency gap using the inter-disciplinary framework of behavioural economics. A primary dataset of survey responses and choice experiments is analysed to test whether under-investment in energy-efficient technologies is explained by present-biased preferences. A ‘Multiple Price List’ set is employed to compute the standard discount factor, and the present bias and long-run component of a quasi-hyperbolic specification. Individuals who are more patient and less present-biased are found to be more likely to invest in certain energy-efficient appliances. As expected, time preferences are relevant for larger purchases such as refrigerators but lose some or all of their explanatory power for inexpensive purchases such as light bulbs. Our quantitative study contributes to the existing literature, which is limited to qualitatively identifying the (market failure) barriers for energy efficiency; inter alia , it tests for behavioural failures in individuals' decision-making towards the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment, Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. The experimental results are organized through a standard social reference model, modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money for bargainers. In our model, bargaining is driven by relative standing comparisons between players, occurring in terms of real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) obtained in the game. The norm of equity behind the equalization of real earnings is called local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompass the wealth of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems to be relevantly endorsed by subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]