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Whereas the active role of the state in steering financialization is consensual in advanced economies, the financialization of emerging market economies is usually examined through the prism of dependency: this downplays the domestic political functions of financialization and the agency of the state. With the consolidation of state capitalist regimes in the semi-periphery after the Global Financial Crisis, different interpretations emerged – some linking state capitalism with de-financialization, others with coercive projects deepening it. Preferring a more granular and multi-dimensional approach, I analyse how different facets of financialization might represent political risks or opportunities for state capitalist projects: Based on the Hungarian example, I first explain how the constitution of a 'financial vertical' after 2010 inaugurated a new mode of statecraft. Second, I show how the financial vertical enabled rentier bargains between state and society after 2015 by deepening the financialization of social policy and housing in response to a looming crisis of competitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Dependent development led to economic polarisation in Hungary. • Hungary's authoritarian turn is in part rooted in the revolt of the national capital. • New class alliance between the national capital, TNCs, and nationalist politicians. • The new authoritarian regime is an accumulative state. • The accumulative state is a way to manage the tensions of dependent capitalism. Democracy is in crisis around the globe. Hungary was long heralded as a champion of political and economic liberalization in postsocialist Eastern Europe. However, the country recently emerged as a striking example of the current wave of autocratization. Starting from the premise that political regimes are the results of class compromises, in this paper, I argue that Hungary's authoritarian turn is in part rooted in the reconfiguration of the dominant power bloc and the concomitant change in the state's strategy. The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, I analyze the socio-economic roots of Hungary's authoritarian turn and propose a new, theoretically driven causal narrative challenging and extending existing accounts. Relying on macro-statistics and a new dataset on the economic elite, I describe how the collapse of the class compromise that sustained the post-socialist liberal competition state engendered the revolt of the national bourgeoisie and the rise of the new authoritarian regime of accumulation. Secondly, I offer a new conceptualization regarding the political-economic nature of the new regime: the accumulative state. I empirically identify the political instruments through which the accumulative state props up capital accumulation and the ensuing social conflicts. Instead of portraying Hungary as a divergence from liberal capitalist norms based on a textbook view of markets, I situate authoritarian politics in the logic of capital accumulation. However, I stress that the post-2010 accumulative state serves only short-term capital accumulation and fails to enact long-term structural transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authoritarian capitalist practices are gaining foothold not only in non-democratic states, such as China, but even in countries with strong liberal institutions. From Greece to the US, an increasing number of countries show its symptoms: curtailing democratic contestation in order to stabilise accumulation. Hungary is one of the most puzzling cases. Hungarian elites followed the good governance blueprints of international institutions, implementing liberal political and economic reforms between 1990 and 2010. For long, the country was considered to be a frontrunner of the third wave of democratisation, yet now it is seen as the prime example of the illiberal turn. Orban’s political-economic model, hybrid authoritarian capitalism institutionalised by the accumulative state, has been stable for eight years now. To understand the emergence, stability and potential vulnerability of this regime, this article digs deeper into the contradictions of post-socialist liberal policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to ongoing debates in the transformatology literature, as well as the wider literature on the global neoliberal revolution, on the origins of neoliberalism in Soviet-style economies. Within these debates, the transition to a (free) market economy and liberal democracy in Hungary and elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc has commonly been perceived as an exogenous process, dating to the annus mirabilis of 1989. This article challenges this consensus. Through a case study of the Financial Research Institute (Pénzügykutatási Intézet), the official research institute of the Ministry of Finance, and a programme of radical economic reform, known as ‘Turnabout and Reform’ (Fordulat és Reform), published in 1987 by a group of experts at the institute, the article demonstrates that in the case of Hungary, neoliberalism was not simply an ‘imported project’, which arrived ‘from the West’ on the eve of the formal transition in 1989–1990. Rather, it is argued that it emerged organically in Hungarian society in the 1980s, as a response by domestic economic and political elites to the deepening crisis of the Kádár regime. Hence, the essential aim of the ‘neoliberal turn’ was to reconfigure the Hungarian economy in line with the exigencies of the capitalist world economy, while ensuring that the political transition went as smoothly as possible. As such, while obviously a repudiation of past policy, policymakers in Budapest pursued the similar objectives as central planners under ‘actually existing socialism’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]