Search

The purpose of the study presented in this paper was to estimate, using secondary sources of data, the cost and effectiveness of three programs to combat vitamin A deficiency in Guatemala-the national sugar fortification program, a targeted capsules distribution program and the promotion of home food production combined with nutrition education and to draw conclusions concerning priorities for Guatemala. Data on the costs and coverage were collected from implementing agencies in Guatemala. Coverage data were converted into a common set of impact indicators. Sensitivity analyses were conducted on variables whose precise value was uncertain. Potential impacts of improvements in program performance operations were also explored. The analysis found the cost per high-risk person achieving adequate vitamin A to be US $0.98 for fortification, US $1.68-1.86 for capsule distribution and US $3.10-4.16 for food production/education. Fortification is the most efficient option if vitamin A levels in sugar are maintained at reasonable levels. Where fortified sugar is not consumed and vitamin A deficiency is highly prevalent, small-scale, targeted, complementary interventions such as capsules and food production education may be appropriate for sustained broader impacts.

Until the mid-1960s, the market-based, dependent-development-conditioned structure of Latin American health systems reflected the skewed distribution of wealth in the region: most (including government) health resources were found in curative care medicine and were concentrated in the capital cities, where they primarily served the needs of the elite. But for many countries of the area, the 1964 PAHO-led efforts to introduce health planning, intended as a first step in rationalizing the health sector, marked a fundamental turning point in the structural development of their delivery systems. Since then, this commitment has been reaffirmed in the Latin American Ministers of Health's 1973 adoption of the primary care approach as the cornerstone of their national health plans, and their ongoing endorsement and pursuit of "Health For All by 2000." Guatemala, however, was and remains an exception. Guatemalan technocrats have proven unable to plan effectively. But, far more fundamentally, the Guatemalan oligarchy has proven unwilling to appropriate the resources necessary to effect change. The reforms that have been made have been the products of bilateral and multilateral agencies, which have conceptualized, promoted, designed, built, and underwritten them. Those changes have not altered the fundamental structure of the system, but instead have been tacked onto it, and exemplify what may be termed "additive reform." Evidence suggests that without the continued sponsorship, support, and guidance of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, even these "reforms" will prove evanescent.