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This study examines cross-linguistic influence (CLI) in the acquisition of embedded "wh"-questions in L3 English in German-dominant heritage speakers (HSs) of Italian. Specifically, we investigate whether a higher proficiency in the heritage language Italian increases the potential for CLI from that language. To this end, 21 adult-aged Italian-German early bilinguals and 32 monolingual controls (L1 speakers of Italian, German, or English) completed an acceptability judgement task that tested the acquisition of embedded "wh"-questions in English (while also controlling for the acquisition of the relevant properties in German and Italian). Language dominance was assessed using a yes/no vocabulary test and a proficiency index based on various aspects of self-reported language use and proficiency. Our results suggest that syntactic CLI occurs from both languages and that this is unrelated to overall dominance in German or proficiency in Italian.

The regulation and supervision of financial services in the EU has undergone significant change between 2000 and 2005, when the so-called Lamfalussy framework, the Basel 2 agreement and its transposition into the Capital Requirements Directive were agreed. This research examines the preferences of national financial interest groups in Germany and the UK (the independent variable) in shaping national input and, more precisely, the contributions given by the relevant public authorities to EU and international policy-making processes (the dependent variable). The impact, if any, on the final outputs (the relevant international and EU agreements) is also discussed. It is argued that the level of involvement of each interest group depends on the policy content, namely, whether the policy concerns a broad institutional issue or specific rules, while the degree of interest group influence in policy-making processes depends on domestic institutions, namely state structure, interest representation and political economy institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the literature on European monetary integration Germany and Italy are mostly strongly contrasted. However, this paper argues that there were important similarities between the policy paradigms in these two countries, in particular if a broader historical perspective is adopted. This work analyses the policy paradigms towards European monetary integration in Italy and Germany. Moreover, it contextualises these paradigms into the national institutional setting: while Germany was characterised by power sharing institutions, Italy featured power fragmentation (something which also affected the economic performance of both countries). There were significant differences between the policy paradigms of foreign policy-makers and economic policy-makers. Foreign policy makers, in both countries, under the influence of a European federalist vision, were strongly in favour of European monetary integration. These beliefs of foreign policy decision makers were crucial in charting EMU policy at history-making moments. The pro EMU policy paradigms of foreign policymakers contrasted, during most of the period covered, with the more sceptical beliefs of economic policy makers. In both countries, economic policy-makers, at different moments, had doubts whether enough “convergence” had been reached to make a more stable exchange rate system sustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a three-tier framework for analysing the politics of central bank independence. International factors explain the general trend towards central bank independence. However, they are framed differently by various national systems. At the national level, for heuristic purposes, the analysis can be structured by focusing on ‘suppliers’ and ‘demanders’ of central bank independence. The former are the political authorities, whereas the latter are socioeconomic forces and interest groups, with the central bank positioned in-between. At the micro-institutional level, central banks can be influential economic and political actors situated at the interface between levels of governance. The added value of this integrated framework is appraised using one case study, the Bank of Italy's path to independence, which is compared with the experience of the Bank of England and the Bundesbank. In contrast to many works on central bank independence, the methodology adopted here is qualitative, rather than quantitative, and is grounded in empirical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]