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We analyze the long-run imbalances of finance-dominated capitalism underlying the present crisis, which began in 2007, with a focus on developments in the United States and Germany. We argue that beyond inefficient regulation of the financial sector, the severeness of the present crisis has been mainly caused by increasing inequalities of income distribution and rising imbalances in the world economy associated with finance-dominated capitalism. From this it follows that in the near and not so near future, the United States will no longer be able to act as the driving force for world demand. In order to avoid a period of deflationary stagnation in major parts of the world economy, we finally propose the policy package of a global Keynesian New Deal that should consist of (1) reregulation of the financial sector, (2) reorientation of macroeconomic policies along (post) Keynesian lines, and (3) reconstruction of international macroeconomic policy coordination, in particular on the European level, and a new world financial order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the effects of interest rate variations on the rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profit in a simple post-Kaleckian distribution and growth model. This model gives rise to different potential accumulation regimes depending on the values of the parameters in the investment, saving and distribution function. Estimating these core behavioural equations for the US and Germany in the period 1960–2007, we find significant and robust effects of interest payments with the expected sign in each of the equations. Our estimation results imply, both for the US and for Germany, that the effects of changes in the real long-term rate of interest on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profits, are characterised by the ‘normal regime’: rising long-term real rates of interest cause falling rates of capacity utilisation, capital accumulation and profits, as well as redistribution at the expense of labour income and hence an increasing profit share in both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany has experienced a period of extreme nominal and real wage moderation since the mid-1990s. Contrary to the expectations of liberal economists, this has failed to improve Germany's mediocre economic performance. However, Germany is now running substantial current account surpluses. One possible explanation for Germany's disappointing performance is found in Kaleckian theory, which highlights that the domestic demand effect of a decline in the wage share will typically be contractionary, whereas net exports will increase (Blecker 1989). The size of the foreign demand effect will critically depend on the degree of openness of the economy. This paper aims at estimating empirically the demand side of a Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) type model for Germany. The paper builds on the estimation strategy of Stockhammer, Onaran, and Ederer (2009) and Hein and Vogel (2008, 2009). The main contribution lies in a careful analysis of the effects of globalization. Since Germany is a large open economy by now it is a particularly interesting case study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the relationship between functional income distribution and economic growth in France and Germany from 1960 until 2005. The analysis is based on a demand-driven distribution and growth model for an open economy inspired by Bhaduri & Marglin (1990), which allows for profit- or wage-led growth. First, we apply a single equation approach, estimating the effects of redistribution on the demand aggregates and summing up these effects in order to obtain the total effect of redistribution on GDP growth. Since interactions between the demand aggregates are omitted from this approach, we also apply a simulation approach taking into account these interactions. In the single equation approach we find that growth in France was wage-led, whereas the effect in Germany was undetermined. The results of the simulation approach, however, suggest that the wage-led nature of growth in France becomes even more pronounced when considering the interactions between the demand aggregates, while in Germany the simulations show a tendency towards wage-led growth in the longer run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the relationship between functional income distribution and economic growth in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA from 1960 until 2005. The analysis is based on a demand-driven distribution and growth model for an open economy inspired by Bhaduri and Marglin, which allows for either profit- or wage-led growth. We find that growth in France, Germany, the UK and the USA has been wage-led, whereas Austria and the Netherlands have been profit-led. In the case of Austria a domestically wage-led economy changes to profit-led when including the effect of distribution on external trade. The Netherlands, however, are already profit-led without external trade. Our results so far only partially confirm Bhaduri and Marglin's theoretical conclusion that wage-led growth becomes less feasible when the effects of distribution on foreign trade are taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors fundamentally question the claims that institutional sclerosis explains the present economic stagnation in Germany. Instead, they argue that the combined effects of restrictive monetary policies, restrictive and sometimes pro-cyclical fiscal policies, and overly moderate wage policies in Germany since the mid-1990s explain the stagnation. Finally, they recommend more expansive fiscal and monetary policies in the short run, and conditions that allow for real wage growth in Germany based on long-run national productivity growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the institutional sclerosis view of the German crisis according to which rigid labour markets and generous welfare state institutions have driven Germany into its position as 'Europe's sick man'. In general, the view is not convincing, because the underlying hypotheses about the effects of labour market regulation and welfare state institutions on employment and growth cannot unambiguously be derived from modern labour market theory and are at least partially at odds with accepted empirical findings. In particular, the explanation is unconvincing, because in international comparison Germany's labour market and welfare state institutions are simply not as sclerotic as often supposed. In most of the aggregate indicators for structural rigidities Germany is not worse than the average OECD or EU country. Moreover, there is a macroeconomic explanation focusing on the combined effects of restrictive and pro-cyclical monetary, fiscal and wage policies in Germany that is broadly consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and is supported by empirical data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]