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Sovereignism is at the crux of the current wave of radical right-wing populism. Populist parties advocate 'taking back control' and generally do so in the name of the 'people', pledging to restore economic well-being. This article argues that populism and sovereignism are inherently connected in radical right-wing populism politics through a set of values that emphasize popular and national sovereignty. To test the empirical validity of our proposition, we focus on two established European radical right-wing populist parties, namely the Rassemblement National in France and the Swiss People's Party and use data from an original survey. We find that while Rassemblement National and Swiss People's Party voters diverge in general economic orientations, they share similar economic populist sovereignist values that significantly shape electoral support for those parties. These findings suggest that economic populist sovereignism may represent an important driver of support for the radical right-wing populism, alongside other correlates of radical right-wing populism voting, such as perceived immigration threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between immigration and populist radical right (PRR) support, based on an analysis of the contextual effects of immigrant presence on Front National vote in France in 2017. Using a unique set of survey data geolocalising respondents at the subcommunal level, it finds evidence for the existence of a curvilinear "halo effect," with substantial increases in the probability of PRR vote in areas surrounding communities with significantly higher-than-average immigrant populations, and independent of other socio-economic context, as well as individual socio-demographic characteristics. Most importantly, a path analysis confirms the presence of individual attitudinal mediators of this halo effect on PRR vote, thus testing the foundation of the halo, namely that the contextual effects of immigrant presence act on attitudes which drive PRR support. These findings provide a significant step forward in understanding the mechanisms linking subjective experience of immigration with voting for the populist radical right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Front National (FN) has made an impressive come back into France's electoral politics since 2012. Adopting a supply-side approach, this article places the electoral rejuvenation of the FN in the context of the global crisis and looks at how the party has adapted programmatically to socio-economic demands emerging from this context. On the basis of manifesto data analysis, we find that despite having recently broadened its economic programme, the FN maintains a niche status in the party system. Our findings show, however, that the party has significantly shifted its economic platform, moving from a predominantly right-wing to a left-wing location since the mid-1980s. This move is characterized by an increase in egalitarian and nationalist economic policies, espousing also a populist framework. The reconfiguration of the FN suggests that the party may have moved to a pivotal position in recent years by converging around the economic preferences of the median voter. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic policy shift by the FN, and consider possible implications of our findings for understanding current populist radical right electoral dynamics in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates our structural model forecasting the Extreme-Right vote in France since the mid-1970s and reflects upon its performance in 2012. We discuss the implications of the stability of the national-level specification of the model, as well as the limitations imposed by the availability and definition of some of the macro indicators used as predictors. Although empirically accurate in 2012, there are a number of unknowns in the model's likely fortunes for future elections, in particular, whether the 'Marine effect' observable in 2012 will translate into core party support, and the extent to which a party 'normalisation' strategy will affect its 2017 performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forecasting the Extreme Right vote in French elections is one of the few 'third-party' forecasts that has attracted attention in a forecasting literature focusing generally on incumbent performance and winners. Despite being a 'hard case' because of third-party status, unstable polling estimates and relatively few data points, previous models have provided relatively strong forecasts of the performance of the Front National (FN) and its erstwhile leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The recent succession of Le Pen by his daughter, Marine, and her apparent popularity pose a significant challenge to these models, however. In this article, we consider our previous model's prediction of her likely score in the first round of the presidentials, comparing this to standard forecasting benchmarks, and look at possible adjustments to account for the speculated 'Marine effect'. We then compare this with other vote indicators including the results of an experimental expert judgment survey, finding that there is currently little evidence for a likely runaway success for the new FN leader in April 2012. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article identifies an issue model forecasting Extreme Right results in France between 1984 and 2007. Building upon the VP-function literature, this article looks at developing a model of electoral support for the Front National and Jean-Marie Le Pen, based upon the key political issues that are seen as motivating votes for this party: unemployment, crime and immigration. Controlling for political context through election type and opposition popularity, we find that the vote is linked to variation in macro-indicators of these issues and that consequently the Extreme Right vote in France is far from unpredictable, as some analyses have previously suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview and characterisation of the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty by a majority of voters in France's referendum held on 29 May 2005. Whilst pointing to the salience of political discontent with the incumbent right-wing government and some elements of the longstanding crisis in French national party politics, the analysis places the emphasis on the central role played by social issues in the referendum, the transposition at the European level of the mechanism of the evaluation by voters of traditional parties' performances and responsiveness to the country's social malaise and the unilateral termination by a majority of left-wing voters of the ‘social welfare and economic growth’ confidence pact that they had made with their national political elites on the occasion of the Maastricht referendum in 1992. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its initial electoral successes in the mid-1980s, the Front National (FN) has played a key role in the French political system, channelling discontent from a number of heterogeneous sources and significantly affecting the moderate right's electoral returns at both local and national level. While the institutional framework has consistently prevented the FN from winning parliamentary representation at the national level, this systemic ostracism together with the moderate right's steadfast refusal to consider cooperation and Jean-Marie Le Pen's reciprocal vilification has given the party the status of an isolated actor encapsulating social and political concerns in France. While the 2002 presidential success was exaggerated by the political opportunity structure of this election, the stability of the core FN electorate suggests the party can remain implanted in the long term despite lacking hope of executive or legislative participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]