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In the post‐Cold War context of decreasing military expenditures and arms‐market crisis, France has redefined its defence policy, giving up the model of protected arms production and exports while reasserting its military and strategic ambitions. But does the country still have the means of its ambitions? The analysis of statistical data since 1990 may show that the independent policy of security has been clearly replaced by a real dependency on armaments and strategies, in the context of higher budgetary constraints. Military expenditures now seem to be more an economic burden than a driving force. The study of the defence budget compared with the general state budget shows that military expenditures are often used as variables of economic adjustment and that inertia effects are important. Several aspects of the French defence policy are underlined, notably the weakness of French military research and development, the declining share of capital expenditures in the defence budget and the decreasing investment in the nuclear field. In addition, the French arms industry suffers from a too‐belated restructuring and from the continuing compartimentalization of European markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike its European counterparts, the peace movement in France is not very strong. The reasons for this are many: The Munich Syndrome, a contempt for pacifism confused with cowardice, a desire for national independence in defence, a belief in the global role of France, an absence of genuine defence alternatives acceptable to the majority of French, the role played by the Communist party, the incapability of groups favouring disarmament to agree among themselves on a minimal platform, poor relations between trade unions, the relative weakness of religious influence, and the compromises necessary in the race for power. It is difficult to unravel clearly causes from consequences, but it seems that dominant factors are national independence, a wish to avoid conflicts with an army traumatized by decolonization and lost wars, internal dissension among those who favour disarmament, and the absence of a real alternative despite the scepticism surrounding the question of effective deterrence strategy. The French look to the chief of state for their defence. However, there are discordant voices, although these do not express themselves in pacifist terms. The last years of the 20th century will be marked by technological, strategic asnd social changes which will redistribute some cards, among them defence. The peace movement could profit by these uncertain developments for its reinforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]