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Abstract: At this stage of European integration and given the high degree of Europe's politicization and salience caused by the recent global financial crisis, representative democracy in the EU can only function if parties mobilize beyond borders. We examine whether European Party Groups (EPG) in the European Parliament (EP) offer distinct policy alternatives and how coherent these are. We use party position data collected by two Voting Advice Applications designed for the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, respectively (EUProfiler and Euandi). We find evidence of competition between EPGs groups on both left right issues and European integration; on the latter issue, there is greater differentiation within the anti‐EU camp. Coherence within EPG exists, though it varies across issues, EPGs and between election years examined: it is greater on European integration than on left–right issues and it is particularly high for right wing eurosceptics though for most parties it deteriorates between 2009 and 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, Commission President Juncker was elected because he was Spitzenkandidat of the winning party in the European elections. Observers agree that the procedure’s impact on the turnout was low, but that it had an effect on the inter-institutional power play. This paper investigates whether the more legitimised Commission President and the European Parliament (EP) had a greater influence on the constitution of the Commission, understood as the selection of Commissioners and the internal organisation. It is based on the classic debate between supranational and intergovernmental approaches. The paper analyses data on Commissioners, press reports and official documents. It concludes that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure had mixed effects. The selection of Commissioners still follows national logics. Member states aim to maximise their interest by sending loyal politicians, who might secure an important portfolio. The selection of Commissioners follows national, rather than European party-politics. Juncker exerted a limited influence on the selection of Commissioners regarding his quest for more female candidates. The President’s power is limited to the influence prescribed by the Treaty, namely the organisation of the Commission and the allocation of portfolios. Here, his close relation to the EP and his legitimacy derived from his role as Spitzenkandidat played a significant role. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The European Parliament promised voters that the 2014 elections would be different. According to its interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty, a vote in these European elections would also be a vote for the President of the Europe's executive, the Commission. To reinforce this link between the European elections and the Commission President, the major political groups each nominated a lead candidate, Spitzenkandidat, for the post. This article examines how this innovation affected the 2014 elections. It concludes that the presidential candidates did not play a major role in the election campaigns, except in a handful of countries, and thus had a limited impact on voter participation and vote choices. However, the European Parliament was very successful in imposing its interpretation of the new modified procedure for electing the Commission President, not shared by all national governments, and this will have important implications for the inter-institutional dynamics in the Union and the future of European democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]