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The paper analyzes household portfolio dynamics in Europe, focusing on the period from 2010 to 2017 using data from the European Central Bank's Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS). The study examines the evolution of household portfolios after the 2008 financial crisis, with housing assets found to be one of the key drivers. On the aggregate level, the household portfolio remained stable between 2010 and 2017. Housing importance remained crucial during all the time and drove the majority of portfolio performance for households in 40-99 percentiles of the wealth distribution. With the evolution of household portfolios, age cohorts 45-54, 65 and older strengthen their positions by increasing the share of their owned assets in comparison to other age cohorts, which lost part of their shares. I conclude the paper with some stylized facts showing the relationship between home ownership, the share of portfolio in housing assets and wealth inequality between countries. The stylized facts provide evidence that household portfolios significantly concentrated in housing assets during the analyzed decade. Furthermore, the transition of households from renters to home owners contributed significantly to the changes in wealth inequality that occurred after the 2008 financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study quantifies individuals' responses to inheritance receipt in terms of their retirement, labour supply, and consumption decisions. Doing so is relevant for appraising the potential effects of tax and pension reforms, as well as for the assessment of how inheritances contribute to total wealth and to wealth inequality. I start out by developing a simple version of the life cycle model that explains how individuals trade-off between the different possible responses. I test the model using individual panel data from the Survey on Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe. These data allow accounting for expectations about inheritances and retirement in the analysis. All estimated effects are not significantly different from zero and they indicate absence of large response in terms of labour supply and retirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision about the timing of retirement and actual retirement age is based on financial factors as well as personal characteristics and country-level macro indicators. The goal of this research is to examine the associations between the mentioned factors and actual retirement age while focusing on similarities and differences between European countries. The data came from 34,478 respondents in 20 countries who participated in waves 2, 4 and 5 of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Using Ordinary least squares regression models, we explored associations between actual retirement age and personal as well as the country-level variables. Results reveal that higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP), higher pension spending, being a male, and being self-employed were found to be associated with higher actual retirement age, while being a female, civil servant, having fair or poor health, and secondary education were found to be associated with lower actual retirement age. The effect of net household wealth and GDP were not consistent across countries. The contribution of our study is the ability to make predictions about actual retirement age based on each country' GDP per capita, thus adding the country variables to the individual characteristics and improving our understanding concerning actual retirement age. The different effects of wealth and GDP across countries suggest that policymakers should take into account the specific effect in their country to better assess the implications of different policy measures on the actual retirement age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As baby boomers enter retirement, an increasing portion of the population in Europe will rely on wealth as a source of financial security. We address two research questions: what is the association between family size, i.e. the number of children, and wealth for adults who are preparing for or have entered retirement and does the generosity of family transfers moderate that association? Data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are used to estimate the relationship between family size and the total household net worth of men and women between ages 50–65, born 1939–1967 from 14 European countries. We use logistic and linear regression modelling to investigate the probability of zero or negative wealth and net worth percentile rank. We find that adults with four or more children are more likely to be in debt and have less wealth than childless adults. In contrast, adults with two and three children have more wealth. We provide evidence that the generosity of family transfers ameliorates the negative association between larger family sizes and wealth, but may exacerbate wealth inequality by benefiting two and three child families most. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to increasing care needs and decreasing care potentials, research around informal caregiving gains attention. Relatively new – but of utmost importance – is the role of socioeconomic inequalities in care and wellbeing. Although caregiving can be rewarding, a growing body of research shows that informal caregiving often has negative consequences for individuals' wellbeing. Theoretically, we expect these negative outcomes to be more pronounced among caregivers with lower socioeconomic resources. The current study examines socioeconomic inequalities in the consequences of caregiving inside the household for life satisfaction. We draw on longitudinal data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE waves 2, 4, 5, and 6). We estimated pooled ordinary least squares and fixed-effects regression models to examine the consequences of informal care provision within the household for individuals' life satisfaction, and whether household wealth moderates this relationship, controlling for individuals' sociodemographic and health characteristics. Care provision inside the household was negatively associated with older adults' life satisfaction. The longitudinal analyses accordingly show that the uptake of care led to declines in life satisfaction. Differentiating by socioeconomic background, we find that caregivers with higher socioeconomic resources in terms of wealth generally experienced higher life satisfaction. Our longitudinal analyses on wellbeing declines reveal, however, that these mechanisms did not significantly differ by socioeconomic status of the caregiver. Our findings suggest the need for increased investments in support services for informal caregivers to mitigate caregiving burdens, irrespective of socioeconomic status, and enhance later life wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Measures taken to contain the spread of COVID‐19 affected some workers' capability to work and hence earning more than others. The initial impact may have been mitigated, for instance by relying on savings and assets, but access to these buffers likely varied within and across countries. In this article we estimate COVID‐19 potential earnings losses using the Lockdown Working Ability Index and relate this to households' savings and assets observed in the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey. We find that, without government support, households in the Euro Area could only offset on average half of their losses by relying on liquid assets and almost half would deplete their savings in doing so, although there is significant cross‐country variation. When considering the effect of income support policies, liquid assets cover on average 65 percent of the remaining losses and still 20 percent would exhaust their liquid assets on average in the Euro Area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The authors analyse how the receipt of a wealth transfer (inheritance or gift) affects labour force participation in 14 EU countries. They compare the effect of receiving an inheritance or a gift and investigate different behaviours at the gender level and educational level and for elderly individuals. Design/methodology/approach: The authors use data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey for 14 European countries and adopt an instrumental variable approach. They use information on the type of donor (family and nonfamily) to infer the degree of anticipation of a wealth transfer. Findings: The authors find that unexpected wealth transfers have a negative impact on labour force participation, with a stronger impact for gifts than for inheritances. For gender, they find larger negative impacts for females than for males, which is in line with a weaker attachment to the labour market. Receiving an unexpected wealth transfer may also result in early retirement. Originality/value: The paper offers a novel comparison of the effect of receiving an inheritance or a gift on labour force participation using a unique European dataset. The authors investigate whether males and females react differently to the receipt of a wealth transfer and the existence of different responses at the educational level and for elderly individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social science long identified modernization with territorial integration and functional differentiation, but within territorially-bounded states. Globalization theories at the end of the Cold War projected this to the world level, with the 'borderless world'. This is better conceptualized as a rescaling and selective rebounding of social systems at multiple levels, above, below and across the state system. This has posed again an old question about the relationship of function, community and territory. It is an essentially contested matter and can only be appreciated if we accept that all three elements are constructed and mutually constituted. There can be no neutral and uncontested spatial fix, since the definition of territory and the drawing of boundaries has huge implications for the distribution of wealth and power. Rescaling is above all a political matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of wealth and income on the likelihood of depression among persons aged 50 or higher in four European regions characterised by differences in the standards of living and welfare systems. To address possible effects, data from Wave 6 of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) have been used. Based on a sample of 60,864 persons resident in 16 European countries and a binary indicator of depression, probit and instrumental variable probit models were employed, the latter of which deal with issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. The findings show differences in the prevalence of depression across Europe, favouring the more affluent North/Western countries. Further, there is a difference in the role and the magnitude of the effect of income and wealth across different regions. First, though both measures exhibit a measurable effect, their impact is greater in the poorer Central/Eastern and Southern regions; this divide is more pronounced for wealth. Second, income seems to have a stronger effect compared to wealth in all instances: hence, it would seem that liquidity is more important among Europeans aged 50 or higher than assets. Nevertheless, neither income nor wealth are important among persons aged 65 or higher in Nordic countries which may be partly attributable to a more equitable welfare system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the efficacy of various policy options for curbing the accumulation of illegal wealth and suggest ways to close the increasing wealth inequality gap. Design/methodology/approach: The paper begins with a historical/literary analysis of the place of wealth in American Society and the ambivalent cultural attitudes toward wealth. Different policy approaches that seek to limit wealth inequality and the illegal accumulation of wealth are then examined. Finally, the current policy climate in the USA is reviewed to determine the likelihood of meaningful reform. Findings: In Europe, the BASEL accords show promise for curbing the illegal accumulation of wealth by politically exposed persons. In the USA, tax reform efforts can close the wealth gap, but the current political landscape makes meaningful reform challenging particularly given the increasing use of "dark" money to influence elections. Research limitations/implications: Because financial reform is a moving target in both Europe and the USA, subject to the ebb and flow of political forces, it is difficult to predict what major reforms will be possible. Practical implications: Without meaningful reform, an increase in populist movements can be expected (e.g. Brexit and Trump) with an overall, long-term negative impact on democratic capitalism. Social implications: The wealth gap and the sense that the system is rigged against the common people will result in increasing political turmoil. Originality/value: Combining literary/historical analysis with the analysis of current policy interventions provides a set of tools not usually used in the examination of financial crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present novel estimates of Social Security Wealth (SSW) at the individual level based on the SHARE survey. Our estimates are based on a rigorous methodology taking into account country-specific legislations, the earning history and the longevity prospects of individuals. The key advantage over existing estimates is that our measures of SSW are fully comparable across countries. This allows us to construct indexes of the redistribution enacted by the pension systems in Europe. Finally, we provide descriptive evidence of the relationship between SSW and private wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses a matching method to provide an estimate of the nativity wealth gap among older households in Europe. This approach does not require imposing any functional form on wealth and avoids validity-out-of-the-support assumptions; furthermore, it allows estimation not only of the mean of the wealth gap but also of its distribution for the common-support sub-population. The results show that on average there is a positive and significant wealth gap between natives and migrants. However, the average gap may be misleading as the distribution of the gap reveals that immigrant households in the upper part of the wealth distribution are better off, and those in the lower part of the wealth distribution are worse off, than comparable native households. A heterogeneity analysis shows the importance of origin, age at migration, and citizenship status in reducing the gap. Indeed, households who migrated within Europe, those who moved at younger ages rather than as adults, and those who are citizens of the destination country display a wealth gap that is consistently smaller over the entire distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mitigation of conflicts associated with large carnivore damage to livestock and agriculture is pivotal to their conservation. We evaluate current programs to compensate and prevent large carnivore damage in 27 European countries and the factors related to the economic costs of these programs. Overall, high compensation costs are associated with free-ranging livestock (68% of total costs) and with national economic wealth. Contrary to general belief, the return of large carnivores does not always translate into higher compensation costs. We identify a tendency towards prioritizing compensation over prevention; only a few wealthy countries pay the majority of the money allocated for prevention programs to adapt husbandry practices to the presence of large carnivores. We conclude that programs mainly focused on paying large compensation amounts will often fail to build tolerance towards predators. To mitigate conflicts and optimize the cost-effectiveness of publicly funded measures, responsible agencies should be proactive, focus on prevention-based policies and periodically evaluate the effectiveness of compensation and prevention programs in an adaptive manner. With this purpose and to identify further solutions for conflict mitigation, we call for a pan-European database of damage occurrence, management actions and associated costs. • Wealthy countries tend to spend more to compensate large carnivore damage in Europe. • High compensation and prevention costs are associated with free-ranging livestock. • Large carnivores' return does not always translate into high compensation costs. • Only few European countries subsidize preventive measures on a regular basis. • Compensation alone will often fail to build tolerance towards predators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beyond income, wealth is one of most relevant components among national and international indicators of household finances. Three surveys that include Switzerland have recently integrated questions about wealth and its components. These surveys are the Swiss Household Panel -SHP- (2016), the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions -CH-SILC- (2015), and the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe -SHARE- (2015). Following three important criteria suggested by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), namely relevance, coherence and accuracy, this study systematically compares data on housing and financial wealth. The analysis addresses question wording, the comparison with national accounts and accuracy. Results suggest that SHARE is the most relevant survey in terms of financial wealth and total net worth. CH-SILC is a coherent survey that allows for additional analysis on subjective living conditions, while the SHP is an ecological survey in terms of the number of questions on wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the rise of wealth–income ratios observed in rich economies be found in the case of Greece as well? This paper uses a generalization of a two‐good wealth accumulation equation to estimate the evolution of the national wealth–income ratio, and finds that, similarly to the European evidence, the ratio rises from about 280 percent in the 1970s to about 500 percent on the eve of the current financial crisis. On average, during 1974–96, the saving‐induced wealth growth cancels out the capital losses, whereas in the subsequent decade, 1997–2007, the balance changes considerably when the saving effect vanishes and the prolonged capital gains result in a rising wealth–income ratio. During the recession, income falls faster than wealth. The results remain robust to several alterations of the benchmark framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fourth industrial revolution is different from the previous three. This is because machines and artificial intelligence play a significant role in enhancing productivity and wealth creation, which directly changes and challenges the role of human beings. The fourth industrial revolution will also intensify globalisation. Therefore, technology will become much more significant, because regions and societies that cope positively with the technological impact of the fourth industrial revolution will have a better economic and social future. This article argues that the EU can play an important role in developing an environment appropriate for the fourth industrial revolution, an environment that is vibrant and open to new technologies. Member states would profit from an EU-wide coordinated framework for this area. The EU has to establish new common policies for the market-oriented diffusion and widespread use of new technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Stratum Plus Journal is the property of P.P. Stratum plus and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to investigate the impact of using 2 measures of socio-economic status on the analysis of how informal care and home care use are distributed among older people living in the community. Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe for 14 European countries, we estimate differences in corrected concentration indices for use of informal care and home care, using equivalised household net income and equivalised net worth (as a proxy for wealth). We also calculate horizontal inequity indices using both measures of socio-economic status and accounting for differences in need. The findings show that using wealth as a ranking variable results, as a rule, in a less pro-poor inequality of use for both informal and home care. Once differences in need are controlled for (horizontal inequity), wealth still results in a less pro-poor distribution for informal care, in comparison with income, whereas the opposite is observed for home care. Possible explanations for these differences and research and policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the importance of gifts and bequests ('wealth transfers') across the distribution of household wealth. Unconditional quantile regression applied to harmonized survey data obtained from 11 European countries reveals that households that receive gifts and bequests own considerably more wealth than non-receiving households, all other things being equal. The wealth gap varies hugely along the distribution of net wealth. At the median, the wealth gap reaches about 119,000 euros and increases to 630,000 euros at the 90th percentile. With regard to the 99th percentile, survey data even indicate differences in wealth levels greater than 2.3 million euros. Further analysis finds evidence that the impact of wealth transfers on household wealth follows an inverted U-shaped pattern: gifts and bequests contribute the most to the stock of private wealth in the broad mid-section and less so at the lower and upper ends of the distribution. Overall, the study provides evidence for a strong nexus between inheritance and household wealth that is not limited to the top [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the available evidence on post-war trends in Dutch private wealth inequality using a range of scattered sources. Wealth tax records suggest a substantial decline in inequality to the 1970s and, more tentatively, a gradual rise thereafter. In the post-1990 years, Gini-coefficients of private wealth inequality range from 0.8 to 0.9, which is at the high end of the international comparison. Such high levels of private wealth inequality contrast with relatively low levels of net income inequality; a paradox that the Netherlands share with other Northern European welfare states. We hypothesise that publicly funded life-time income security limits the wealth-formation by ordinary Dutch households, while the redistributive taxes required to finance this system are targeting income rather than wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides historical series on the evolution of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate private wealth in Europe (France, the UK, Germany, Sweden) and the USA over the 1900-2010 period. Until 1910, the inheritance share was very high in Europe (70-80%). It then fell abruptly following the 1914-45 shocks, down to about 30-40% during the 1950-80 period, and is back to 50-60% (and rising) since around 2010. The US pattern also appears to be U-shaped, albeit less marked, and with significant uncertainty regarding recent trends, due to data limitations. We discuss possible interpretations for these long-run patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Comparative Economic Research is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Objective: 1. Examine the relationship between household wealth, social participation and loneliness among older people across Europe. 2. Investigate whether relationships vary by type of social participation (charity/volunteer work, sports/social clubs, educational/training course, and political/community organisations) and gender. 3. Examine whether social participation moderates the association between wealth and loneliness.Methods: Data (N=29,795) were taken from the fifth wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which was collected during 2013 from 14 European countries. Loneliness was measured using the short version of the Revised-University of California, Los Angeles (R-UCLA) Loneliness Scale. We used multilevel logistic models stratified by gender to examine the relationships between variables, with individuals nested within countries.Results: The risk of loneliness was highest in the least wealthy groups and lowest in the wealthiest groups. Frequent social participation was associated with a lower risk of loneliness and moderated the association between household wealth and loneliness, particularly among men. Compared to the wealthiest men who often took part in formal social activities, the least wealthy men who did not participate had greater risk of loneliness (OR=1.91, 95% CI: 1.44 to 2.51). This increased risk was not observed among the least wealthy men who reported frequent participation in formal social activities (OR=1.12, 95% CI: 0.76 to 1.67).Conclusion: Participation in external social activities may help to reduce loneliness among older adults and potentially acts as a buffer against the adverse effects of socioeconomic disadvantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Machiavelli consistently advises that well-ordered republics must 'keep their citizens poor'. Although this maxim recurs throughout the Discourses, Machiavelli never directly elaborates on what this prescription for civic poverty requires. To the limited extent that this maxim has received critical examination, it is commonly regarded as contending that citizens must live in a condition of material austerity. Through an analysis of Machiavelli's writings on the German free cities, this article challenges this interpretation and argues that rather than requiring that citizens live at some particular level of poverty, the maxim instead requires only that citizens maintain certain attitudes towards poverty and wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on economic inequality in early modern Europe is complicated by the lack of appropriate data for reconstructing income or wealth distributions. This article presents a study of income inequality in mid-eighteenth-century Old Castile ( Spain) using the Ensenada Cadastre, a census conducted between 1749 and 1759. The article describes the information provided by this census and then discusses its advantages and disadvantages for reconstructing income profiles and calculating income inequality. This is followed by analysis of a dataset derived from the Cadastre that consists of more than 4,000 observations from Palencia (a province in northern Spain) and contains information on sources of household income, each household head's main occupation, residence location, and other household characteristics. Demographic data from this census is used to weight observations in the sample and thereby minimize selection bias. Findings show that inequality in eighteenth-century Spain was probably substantial despite its relative backwardness; that the relationship between inequality and per capita income was not clear-cut and was probably influenced by measurement of the higher incomes; and that although income inequality was largely driven by uneven land distribution, labour income also contributed to overall inequality-especially in urban centres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to study how wealth affects retirement behavior. I use data from the 2004-2012 Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, covering 10 European countries. Inheritances are used as an exogenous change in wealth to estimate the causal effect of wealth/inheritance receipt on retirement. I apply binary choice models for a sample of persons working in 2004/05 to estimate the effect of inheritance receipt during 2005-2011 on the probability of retirement in 2011/12. By comparing data on expected retirement age at the beginning of the sample period with actual retirement age I am able to control for unobserved factors that might be correlated with wealth and affect retirement decisions. The main findings are: (1) Inheritance receipt is quite common for individuals nearing retirement age (50+). About 20 % of the sample aged 50 and older in 2011/12 live in households that received at least one inheritance between 2005 and 2011. (2) Inheritance receipt significantly increases the probability of retirement and the effect increases with the size of the inheritance. (3) In contrast to what life-cycle theory suggests I do not find any evidence that expected and unexpected inheritances affect adjustments of planned retirement age differently. These results are important for assessing the effect of policies that induce changes in wealth, such as pension reforms, tax reforms or reforms of Social Security, on retirement behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By 2010, 27 to 40 percent of all households in euro countries had inherited or received gifts. This only includes transfers from outside their own household. The present value of these transfers averaged between 85,000 and 274,000 euros, depending on the relevant country. The sum of all inheritances and gifts in western Germany corresponds to one-third of the current net worth of households--and is the highest of all euro countries included in this study. Based on recipient households only, the share in western Germany is 52 percent. In Austria, Belgium, France, and western Germany, individuals from high-income households inherit more frequently and receive much higher amounts than those from low-income households. Since intergenerational income mobility is low, highincome households can build wealth, both from regular income and from substantial capital transfers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a great deal of interest in the data on income and wealth inequality collected by Thomas Piketty. This paper does not question that data; rather, it questions the framework of Piketty's analysis, both theoretically and empirically—namely the alleged upward tendency of the ratio of wealth to national income and the rise of wealth inequality. First, in the mechanism put forward, wealth can only grow as a result of savings, thus ruling out any form of price effect (as in urban land). Second, Piketty’s second law defines an asymptotical trajectory, in which variables grow in parallel, something incompatible with the rise of the ratio between two variables. In addition, Piketty’s model does not match data for the USA. The historical profile of the ratio of wealth/national income is actually the inverted image of the productivity of capital (the ratio of output/firms’ fixed capital). Doubts are also expressed concerning the dramatic fall of the ratio of wealth/national income in Europe around World War I. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Among non-European regions colonized by Europeans, regions that were relatively richer five centuries ago (like Mexico, Peru, and India) tend to be poorer today, while regions that originally were relatively poorer (like the United States, Chile, and Australia) tend now to be richer. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (abbreviated AJR) established the generality of this reversal of fortune. Chanda, Cook, and Putterman (abbreviated CCP) have now reanalyzed it, taking as a unit of analysis populations rather than geographic regions. That is, India's population was Indian 500 y ago and is still overwhelmingly Indian today, whereas the United States' population was Native American 500 years ago but is overwhelmingly Old World (especially European) today. Reversals of fortune disappeared when CCP analyzed populations rather than geographic regions: for instance, the geographic region of the modern United States has become relatively richer since AD 1500, but the predominantly European population now occupying the United States was already relatively rich in AD 1500. Evidently, European colonists carried ingredients of wealth with them. I discuss the biological and cultural baggage transported by European immigrants and associated with wealth. Among that baggage, AJR emphasize institutions, CCP emphasize social capital, and I identify many different elements only loosely coupled to each other. This paper discusses the problem, especially acute in the social sciences, of "operationalizing" intuitive concepts (such as mass, temperature, wealth, and innovation) so that they can be measured. Basic concepts tend to be harder to define, operationalize, and measure in the social sciences than in the laboratory sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows that official statistics substantially underestimate the net foreign asset positions of rich countries because they fail to capture most of the assets held by households in offshore tax havens. Drawing on a unique Swiss data set and exploiting systematic anomalies in countries’ portfolio investment positions, I find that around 8% of the global financial wealth of households is held in tax havens, three-quarters of which goes unrecorded. On the basis of plausible assumptions, accounting for unrecorded assets turns the eurozone, officially the world’s second largest net debtor, into a net creditor. It also reduces the U.S. net debt significantly. The results shed new light on global imbalances and challenge the widespread view that after a decade of poor-to-rich capital flows, external assets are now in poor countries and debts in rich countries. I provide concrete proposals to improve international statistics. JEL Codes: F32, H26, H87. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Survey data on comparisons between teachers in Russia and other countries show that the average Russian schoolteacher places a very high value on security and a very low value on the opportunity to enjoy life and have pleasure. Russia's schoolteachers are more often ahead of other Europeans when it comes to the importance of personal success, wealth, and power, as well as obedience and conformity to traditions, and, in contrast, they tend to lag behind when it comes to their adherence to the values of independence, equality, tolerance, helping people around them, and the protection of the environment. The authors see these orientations as cultural barriers to the successful functioning and development of Russian society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideas about what is 'fair' influence preferences for redistribution. We study the dynamic evolution of different economies in which redistributive policies, perception of fairness, inequality and growth are jointly determined. We show how including beliefs about fairness can keep two otherwise identical countries on different development paths for a very long time. We show how different initial conditions regarding how 'fair' is the same level of inequality can lead to two permanently different steady states. We also explore how bequest taxation can be an efficient way of redistributing wealth to correct 'unfair' past accumulation of inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the existence of regional agglomerations of manufacturing, service and creative industries, the relationship between these industries and the wealth of regions and their industrial structure. Through an analysis of 250 European regions, three important conclusions can be inferred from the results obtained in this paper. The first is that creative industries play an important role in the wealth of a region. The second is that the most creative regions are characterized by having more high-tech manufacturing industries than the rest of the regions although the number of low-tech manufacturing firms is similar. Lastly, the industrial structure of each region has a greater influence on regional wealth than the existence of industrial agglomerations. The importance of this paper resides in the fact that up until now no analysis has demonstrated that creative industries are the most important industries in regional wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Loneliness concerns the subjective evaluation that the number of relationships is smaller than the individual considers desirable or that the intimacy that the individual wishes for has not been realized. The aim of this study was to assess variations in levels of late-life loneliness and its determinants across Europe. Data came from the SHARE surveys, Wave 2 (Börsch-Supan et al., 2008), encompassing adults aged 50 years and over in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (N = 12,248). Loneliness was measured by a single item derived from the CES-D (depression) scale. Using logistic models, the present authors tested several types of explanations for country differences: differences in demographic characteristics, wealth and health, and social networks. Older adults in the southern and central European countries were generally lonelier than their peers in the northern and western European countries. In the southern and central European countries, loneliness was largely attributable to not being married, economic deprivation, and poor health. Frequent contacts with parents and adult children, social participation, and providing support to family members were important in preventing and alleviating loneliness in almost all countries. To combat loneliness among older adults, the findings suggest both (a) generic approaches aimed at improving social embeddedness and (b) country-tailored approaches aimed at improving health and wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of introducing a bequest tax, which is levied on wealth and applied on a transfer of that wealth, in Australia by the Henry Tax Review, tax system review in Australia that aims to guide future tax reforms. It describes Australia's experience with death and gift duties, its existing approach to taxing property and the European experience with a net worth tax.

Copyright of Revista de Fomento Social is the property of ETEA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper advances the proposition that three key technological and logistical systems matured during the fourth and third millennia BC in Late Neolithic/Copper Age Europe: transportation infrastructure, durable goods made of metals, and capital investment in oxen used for traction. As risk rather than uncertainty became the dominant condition under which decisions were made, the convergence of these factors permitted individuals and households to accumulate genuine wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions do European publics use economic versus political criteria when evaluating the democratic capacity of the European Union (EU)? Previous analyses of context effects do not explain how citizens evaluate conflicting information arising from national contexts. We argue that a nation's affluence and governance quality establish the salience of issues and thereby influences the criteria that citizens use when evaluating an attitude object. When applied to the EU, the model predicts that citizens in less affluent nations evaluate the EU mainly on the basis of economic prospects. In more affluent nations, however, the model predicts that publics chiefly rely on political criteria to evaluate the EU's democracy deficit. The results strongly support our argument, pointing to the changed character of the EU since 2004. Theoretically, the macro-salience model suggests ways in which the influence of conflicting national contexts on mass attitudes may be modeled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The accelerating rates of international trade, travel, and transport in the latter half of the twentieth century have led to the progressive mixing of biota from across the world and the number of species introduced to new regions continues to increase. The importance of biogeographic, climatic, economic, and demographic factors as drivers of this trend is increasingly being realized but as yet there is no consensus regarding their relative importance. Whereas little may be done to mitigate the effects of geography and climate on invasions, a wider range of options may exist to moderate the impacts of economic and demographic drivers. Here we use the most recent data available from Europe to partition between macroecological, economic, and demographic variables the variation in alien species richness of bryophytes, fungi, vascular plants, terrestrial insects, aquatic invertebrates, fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. Only national wealth and human population density were statistically significant predictors in the majority of models when analyzed jointly with climate, geography, and land cover. The economic and demographic variables reflect the intensity of human activities and integrate the effect of factors that directly determine the outcome of invasion such as propagule pressure, pathways of introduction, eutrophication, and the intensity of anthropogenic disturbance. The strong influence of economic and demographic variables on the levels of invasion by alien species demonstrates that future solutions to the problem of biological invasions at a national scale lie in mitigating the negative environmental consequences of human activities that generate wealth and by promoting more sustainable population growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the non-monetary indicators of divestment are being used in studying poverty in Europe. It discusses that the focus is on measuring the monetary resources but knowledge of material deprivation helps in capturing poverty and social rejection. Non-monetary indicators are also helpful in the identification of those experiencing poverty and understand how it comes about. These factors are important in case of multidimensionality. Also mentioned are the role of material deprivation indicators that help in making poverty comparisons among countries and studying changes over time.

Although property markets represent a large proportion of total wealth in developed countries, the real-estate derivatives markets are still lagging behind in volume of trading and liquidity. Over the last few years there has been increased activity in developing derivative instruments that can be utilised by asset managers. In this paper, we discuss the problems encountered when using property derivatives for managing European real-estate risk. We also consider a special class of structured interest rate swaps that have embedded real-estate risk and propose a more efficient way to tailor these swaps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the distribution of income and wealth among the generation of Europeans aged 65 and over, using data drawn from the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). It looks at how cross-country comparisons of income, wealth and debt are affected by differences in purchasing power, household size and taxation, and shows that some seemingly wide international differences appear less so when the proper adjustments are made. The article reveals wide differences in income, wealth and indebtedness of elderly households in Europe, and provides background information on social issues such as the adequacy of savings at retirement, and the financial fragility of the elderly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]