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Does the EU's Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative contribute to global justice? Complementing work that considers distributive justice, in this paper we adopt the central tenets of the republican theory of non-domination as a regulative ideal for justice in international relations. We evaluate the extent to which the EU's AfT initiative results from reduced political domination in international trade negotiations, and if that then mitigates economic dependency between European and African states. We first provide a qualitative account of the processes that led to the establishment and subsequent development of AfT. We then consider the extent to which the AfT has promoted the reliance of African states on European foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to FDI from other regions (including and especially from within Africa itself) using subnational, project-level, data. Our findings suggest that EU AfT does not reinforce dominating forms of dependency in the international arena, at least when measured by the source of the FDI that it attracts, while AfT is itself an outcome of somewhat less dominating power relations in trade negotiations between wealthier and poorer states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Algorithmic collusion has the potential to transform future markets, leading to higher prices and consumer harm. And yet, algorithmic collusion may remain undetected and unchallenged, in particular, when it is used to facilitate conscious parallelism. The risks posed by such undetected collusion have been debated within antitrust circles in Europe, the US, and beyond. Some economists, however, downplay algorithmic tacit collusion as unlikely, if not impossible. "Keep calm and carry on," they argue, as future prices will remain competitive. This paper explores the rise of algorithmic tacit collusion and responds to those who downplay it, by pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion is not only possible but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Română de Drept European is the property of Wolters Kluwer Romania and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This review analyses the current regulatory procedures for plant biostimulants, both at an EU level and beyond the EU, and explores the future regulation of these substances in the EU. Plant biostimulants are defined as products that stimulate plant nutritional processes regardless of the product's nutrient content, with the sole aim of improving one or more of the following characteristics of the plant and the plant rhizosphere or phyllosphere: the efficiency of nutrient use, tolerance to abiotic stresses, crop quality traits, availability of confined nutrients in the soil and rhizosphere, humification and degradation of organic compounds in the soil. This definition is reported in the proposals for new rules to regulate making CE-marked fertiliser products available on the market. This regulation, which includes a plant biostimulants category, will repeal the existing Fertilisers Regulation (EC) No. 2003/2003. This category of compounds is also used in non-European countries. Currently, as there are different market conditions and different national regulation requirements for plant biostimulants in different countries, the non-harmonised regulatory processes can lead to unfair competition between operators. The assessment of plant biostimulants should be harmonised as far as possible, to avoid fragmentation and ensure a level, reliable playing field. It is essential that a common market is created for these substances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates development and protection of economic competition in Kosovo focusing on the analysis of the level of competition in the Gjilan region. The paper deals with the legislative aspect of competition, the sensitive sectors (banks, insurance, gas stations and pharmacies) where the competitions is damaged and finally are presented the measures on improvement based on the EU practices. Like other economies in transition, the economy in Kosovo the activity for protection of competition is faced with many challenges. Moreover, these challenges result from the fact that Kosovo was the last country in South-eastern Europe to start implementing the principles of a free market economy after 1999. Through a case study, it is attempted to give a realistic picture of the level of competition development, where competition is undermined, general business knowledge about the functioning and enforcement of the law on competition protection, and concrete measures to be taken in order for competition to function based on the rules of the market economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the degrowth movement's main ideas, policy proposals, and examples of noncapitalist organizations and socially embedded economic networks compatible with degrowth ideas, namely, the Catalan Integral Cooperatives in Spain and Solidarity Economy Networks in Italy. It also explores degrowth's relevance to developing countries that have lower levels of material living standards compared to the European countries where it originated. The main argument of this article is that degrowth has significant potential to advance progressive socioecological transformation. Its advocates have also implemented some interesting alternative economic practices, such as nonmonetary exchanges and recreations of the commons, which prioritize socioecological sustainability over profit maximization. However, the degrowth movement has so far paid little attention to the structural hierarchy of the global political economy and hence has not made sufficient suggestions about how to address uneven development within and between countries, which will likely hinder progressive and ecologically sustainable transitions across the globe. Unfair global trade practices and concentrated control over advanced technologies are contentious points that might prevent widespread support for degrowth ideas in developing countries. Some developing countries and subnational local groups also face more constraints than others if they want to scale-up noncapitalist initiatives that are compatible with the degrowth vision, not to mention that some might lack financial means to drive transformative change. These issues cut across the spheres of production, consumption, trade, and finance, which suggests that structural reforms of the global political economy are called for to address unequal relations between developed and developing countries and also inequality within countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regulation 1/2003 does not explicitly address the question whether national competition authorities (NCAs) have the power to prosecute and sanction infringements of Article 101 TFEU beyond their own national borders. This has allowed wide differences to exist between NCAs in respect of the territorial scope of their fines imposed under Article 101. A legal assessment reveals that there is much uncertainty as to the legality of NCAs taking into account foreign effects in sanctioning cross-border cartels. Many of the legal arguments used to either support or object to the right for NCAs to do so are unsatisfactory, at least in the context of the current legal framework. As such a right can significantly enhance the effectiveness of decentralized enforcement of Article 101, it may well be desirable to further explore this new frontier of extraterritorial cartel enforcement within the Union. However, it is submitted that this will require legislative action, so that legal certainty can be provided in accordance with the common views of Member States. Either as part of the new ECN+ Directive or through an amendment of the Regulation, the necessary procedural rules and safeguards can be put in place to give NCAs the right to fine foreign effects in a way that ensures effective enforcement and proportionate sanctioning while still allowing for sufficient prosecutorial discretion at the national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Millions of European internet users access online platforms where their personal data is being collected, processed, analysed or sold. The existence of some of the largest online platforms is entirely based on data driven business models. In the European Union, the protection of personal data is considered a fundamental right. Under Article 8(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, compliance with data protection rules should be subject to control by an independent authority. In the EU, enforcement of privacy rules almost solely takes place by the national data protection authorities. They typically apply sector-specific rules, based on the EU Data Protection Directive. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission is the primary enforcer of consumers’ (online) privacy interests. The agency’s competence is not based on the protection of fundamental rights, but on the basis that maintenance of a competitive, fairmarketplace will provide the right choices for consumers to take. In this Article the US legal framework will be discussed and compared to the EU legal framework, which forms our finding that in the EU rules on unfair commercial practices could be enforced in a similar manner to protect people’s privacy. In the EU, the many frictions concerning the market/consumer-oriented use of personal data form a good reason to actually deal with these frictions in a market/consumer legal framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 9 July 2014 the European Commission published the White Paper 'Towards more effective EU merger control'. The White Paper takes stock of the working of the EU Merger Regulation 10 years after the last reform in 2004. It evaluates what degree of coherence and convergence has been achieved in the application of merger control rules and practices at the EU and at Member State level. The White Paper supports recent suggestions to move towards a 'European Merger Area', in which the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs) apply the same rules to mergers and acquisitions, but does not make concrete proposals in that respect. However, the White Paper proposes amendments to the Merger Regulation in two main areas. First, in order to address an enforcement gap in EU competition law with respect to acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings, the Commission should have the possibility to review certain minority stake transactions creating a 'competitively significant link' between the acquirer and the target, without however making all acquisitions of minority shareholdings subject to the prior notification obligation. Second, the system for referring merger cases between the Commission and NCAs should be streamlined in order to reduce the administrative burden on companies and better ensure that cases are being dealt with by the best placed competition authority. Additional proposals made by the White Paper relate to removing joint ventures established outside the European Economic Area (EEA) and with no effect on EEA markets from the scope of the Merger Regulation and alleviating notification obligations for certain categories of unproblematic mergers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bucharest University Annals - Law Series is the property of CH Beck Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses several legal developments involving a database sui generis (DSG) right and meta search engines (MSEs), focusing on the Court of Justice of the European Union's ruling in the case Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media BV which deals with European Union (EU) law and the infringement of a DSG right by dedicated MSEs. A database maker's potential right to regulate the information market is mentioned, along with EU unfair competition law and European copyright and procedure laws.

The European regulatory institution has the tasks to protect fair competition and equal opportunities for all companies in the European telecommunications industry and to protect the welfare of the consumers. This regulator is responsible for the adherence of telecommunications companies to competition rules. It can oblige companies to change their behavior and follow the new rules of the game, and it can also sanction telecommunications companies which have abused their market power. These telecommunications companies can decide to comply with the decision or they can response actively to the decision of a sanction. These decisions and responses are part of their corporate political strategies. This study aims to explore and provide more conclusive empirical evidence with regard to the corporate political strategies used by telecommunications companies to influence issues and decisions in their political and regulatory environment. This study analyzes how five large former state owned companies in the European telecommunications industry responded to the decisions of the European regulator, the European Competition Commission, on regulatory issues. The evidence shows that when the European regulator decided to sanction the companies with a fine for a regulatory issue, the companies responded with a recalcitrant corporate political strategy. However, when the regulator obliged the companies to adapt or change their behavior, then the companies responded with a responsive corporate political strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the European Union and the Common Agricultural Policy have made considerable changes in policy related to the dairy sector. After two successive dairy crises in 2009 and 2012, the dairy sector in Belgium was weakened considerably. The Belgian fair-trade milk enterprise, Fairebel, was created by dairy farmers a few months after the 2009 European milk crisis, seeking to develop their alternative, supported, owned by and for traditional dairy farmers. This case study brings into question fair trade' as a concept and practice in terms of trade between enterprises in Europe, and the surprise effects of interaction when analysed at both European and regional scales. The study concludes that the best innovation processes are not necessarily radical, and that tinkering - or bricolage - is the path taken by many innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates patent licensing in vertically disaggregated industries, where patent holders may license to upstream producers only, downstream producers only, or to both upstream and downstream producers. We consider whether consumer welfare will be greater if the patent holder's ability to license multiple parties along a production chain is restricted. We also analyse whether a policy that restricts licensing to upstream manufacturers constitutes appropriate public policy. These questions have significant policy implications. Under the legal doctrine of first sale, or patent exhaustion, a patent holder's ability to license multiple parties along a production chain is restricted. How and when such restrictions should be applied is a controversial issue, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's granting certiorari in the Quanta case. Some commentators have even argued that refusing to license to upstream component manufacturers may constitute an abuse of dominance and thus infringe the competition laws. We find that under ideal circumstances how royalty rates are split along the production chain has no real consequence for social welfare. Even when we depart from ideal conditions, however, we still find no economic justification for restrictions of the patent holders' ability to license multiple parties or to license to downstream producers only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is meant to clarify the content and the meaning of legal norms devoted to the protection of databases. The author presents and subjects to analysis the points of view of prestigious authors and his own relative to the legal nature of the rights arising from the creation of databases. This paper examines the elements of the legal relationship arising from the database creation: the subjects, the object and the content of the relationship, emphasizing the particularities and the specificity that shape its identity. However, the topic discussed is connected to the European case-law in the matter, precisely to highlight the manner in which it is raised the question of the relationship between the protection of databases in the area of copyright and through the sui-generis right of the creators of these intellectual creations. The author analyses databases in order to underline the fact that they are man-made creations, with an important role in the economic and social life and are more and more frequently exposed to unfair competition. Moreover, the article also offers starting points for specialists called to study thoroughly less known aspects of the legal protection of databases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To prevent the use of competitive practices in the global market by strong economic agents, states have tried to take a series of legislative measures, rules that are true AD or codes. The most important international convention for the suppression of unfair competition in the international market have been developed under the auspices of GATT and include a number of anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties designed to counteract the effects of practicing dumping prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the economic and competition policies in Europe, highlighting the impact of merger control decisions in the industry. It describes competition as a self-organised, decentralised coordination process that coordinates suppliers and customers on markets through price signals that reflect changing scarcities. It notes that the impact of merger control decisions should be to protect and maintain competition by preventing the emergence of anti-competitive mergers. and stresses that merger control decisions should impose a low degree of interventionism into markets by preventing anti-competitive collaboration of enterprise ownership.

This paper critically examines the discourse surrounding fair trade mainstreaming, and discusses the potential avenues for the future of the social movement. The authors have a unique insight into the fair trade market having a combined experience of over 30 years in practice and 15 as fair trade scholars. The paper highlights a number of benefits of mainstreaming, not least the continued growth of the global fair trade market (tipped to top $7bn in 2012). However, the paper also highlights the negative consequences of mainstreaming on the long-term viability of fair trade as a credible ethical standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The degree of divergence between U.S. and European case law on the proper legal treatment of loyalty rebates is larger than in almost any other field of international antitrust law. Whereas U.S. jurisprudence has traditionally considered loyalty rebates to be a procompetitive business practice, the Court of Justice of the European Union has repeatedly held that loyalty rebates are an illegal means of distorting competition. This article challenges the Community Courts' conviction that loyalty rebates do not constitute competition on the merits and claims the opposite. The adoption of loyalty rebates is a direct consequence and a vital expression of the competitive process. The need for different forms of loyalty rebates naturally emerges from the diverse market conditions that prevail in different industries, which explains the widespread use of diverse loyalty rebates in business practice. It is the heterogeneity of commercial pressures that dominant firms are facing that determines the competitive structure and size of their rebates. By suppressing competition in rebates, orthodox legal doctrine in Europe has distorted the competitive process in a variety of global markets, and thereby caused significant harm to competition and consumers. Since loyalty rebates are an efficient and healthy form of competition, plaintiffs and competition authorities that allege anticompetitive foreclosure as a result of loyalty rebates should generally carry the burden of proving the existence of a restriction of competition. The Court's prevailing interpretation of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by contrast, is bound to punish successful innovators and to protect less effective rivals from the inconveniences of the competitive process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Notwithstanding assertions of greater harmonization and convergence between U.S. and EU competition law, recent case law has identified significant differences in those jurisdictions' approaches to the regulation of a price or margin squeeze. In the United States after linkLine, the likelihood of a successful claim has been significantly diminished, particularly if there has been no prior course of voluntary dealing and no downstream predatory pricing. In contrast, in a series of decisions in liberalized telecommunications markets, the EU courts, in applying an “as efficient competitor test,” have focused on the preservation of competitive rivalry as “equality of opportunity.” This significantly broadens the potential liability for a margin squeeze in the European Union and reconstitutes EU competition law as a form of de facto regulation in liberalized markets. Faced with the uncertainty of this standard, the dominant firm has an incentive to avoid liability by raising its retail prices to the detriment of consumers. This article evaluates this divergence in the approach to the regulation of a price or margin squeeze in the United States and the European Union and traces these approaches to differing conceptions of dominant firm regulation, which in turn have informed different understandings of the regulation of a refusal to supply and the intersection of competition law with sector-specific regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

English expression know-how has been known and used for the first time in U.S. since the early twentieth century and has been used in Europe in 1967. Congress of the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property, held in Mexico City in 1972, know-how has been defined as "the knowledge and experience of technical, commercial, administrative, financial or otherwise are applicable practical to operate a business or a profession execution ". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the role of voidness in the infringement of the Article 101 under the treaty on the functioning of the European Union on the related contracts with respect to the cartel agreement and the cartel markets in the European communities and Europe. The cartel activities are considered as harmful infringements of the competition law due to its impact on the prices and the innovations. Information on the role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities with respect to the decisions and judgments regarding the competition law and the contract law under the cartel agreements is also presented.

In recent decades, Fair Trade (FT) has consolidated as a useful cooperation tool for small producers in the South. However, it has been observed that it gives rise to the risk of a certain degree of dependence on the organisations that market their products in developed countries. To avoid this situation of dependence, the producer organisations need to be able to move forward and develop themselves into more solid and sustainable organisations even in the conventional market outside the protection of FT networks. Therefore, it is evident that there is a clear need for tools that identify the shortcomings of producer organisations. This paper sets out the design of a diagnostic tool that detects the needs and identifies areas for improvement with a view to achieve sustainability in the market, measuring advances in this direction. The tool is adapted to the idiosyncrasies of producers who market under FT rules and has been validated testing its implementation in one FT organisation in Peru. The test has shown the pertinence and usefulness of the tool as well as some weaknesses that have been addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the effectiveness of the existing European competition enforcement policy in handling theoretical and practical issues. Recommended policy improvements like a market-based enforcement theory are discussed to deliver just compensation to victims and maintain market balance. Although deterrence is the objective of the current policy, the fines and damage claims being imposed are still considerably low despite noted increases in the past years, which still lead to non-compliance with the European Union competition law.

The article discusses the relationship of instruments of deception to joint tortfearsorship in passing off in Europe. It interprets the relationship in case law and turns to the decision in the L'Oréal versus Bellure. It argues that the court fails to find instruments of deception in the aforementioned decision. It asserts that the failure is a manifestation of the court's attitude towards the fairness of the market behaviour.

The article discusses the perceived gap between the American and European single firm conduct (SFC) policy. It mentions that among the ways to bridge the gap of the competition law of both states include establishing bilateral discussion in commonly accepted economic terms, creating consensus approaches to particular practice and working toward a common understanding of balancing tests. It states that such actions can lead to greater consistency between the U.S. and Europe's enforcement policy.

This paper aims to analyze and discuss the common force operating for convergence of competition appraisal, the economic development benefits of competition policy, the growing use of economics in European competition law enforcement, and the risks and transaction costs of investing in and operating a business. The paper generates insights about economic competition across the borders of the New Europe, the role of government in promoting competitive rivalry, the importance of competition and competition (antitrust) law-policy in reducing market dominance, and the use of economics in competition law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fair trade (FT) organizations have been quite early taken as examples of social enterprises (SE) and have contributed to the shaping of the SE concept. The goal of this article is to examine more deeply, both at a conceptual and at an empirical level, to what extent FT organizations can be considered as social enterprises. First, we introduce different theoretical frameworks of SE and examine FT in the context of each of these frameworks. In a second step, we use an empirical study on fair trade social enterprises (FTSEs) across four European countries to illustrate and deepen the links between FT and SE, focusing on the goals and the governance structures of FTSEs. It appears that all FTSEs combine in some way economic, social and sometimes also political goals. FTSEs are thus in line with the "hybrid goal" nature of SEs. FTSEs' governance is also quite specific and often innovative in terms of organizational architecture and stakeholders' involvement. Some FTSEs are closer to the European - participatory - approach to social enterprise, while others are closer to US - individual - approaches. Finally, the governance structures of FTSEs seem to reflect quite well their mix of goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether, and if so how, the modelling of joint action in social philosophy - principally in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman - might assist in understanding and applying the concept of concerted practices in European competition law. More specifically, the paper focuses on a well-known difficulty in the application of that concept, namely, distinguishing between concerted practice and rational or intelligent adaptation in oligopolistic markets. The paper argues that although Bratman's model of joint action is more psychologically plausible and phenomenologically resonant, its less demanding character also makes it less useful than Gilbert's in our understanding of the legal concept of concerted practice and in dealing with the above difficulty. The paper proceeds in two parts: first, a discussion of the concept of concerted practices in European competition law; and second, a discussion of Gilbert and Bratman's models of joint action, including a comparative assessment of their ability to provide an evidentiary target and an evidentiary platform for concerted practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the application of European Union (EU) competition law to the activities within the nuclear sectors. It provides information on the legal issues faced by European competition authorities in the nuclear sector with the goal of assisting the practitioners in the application of economic principles. Also included are the standards which are related to anti-competitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position, merger control, and state aid.

The article focuses on the modernization of interpretation and application of the European Union's (EU) competition regulations by the European Commission (EC) in Europe. It notes the review of the Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) as well as its approach to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings under Article 102. It examines the steps undertaken by the organization to improve the regulation, as well as its initial formalistic approach in determining why the reform was necessary. An overview of the background and provisions of the Article 101 is provided.

The article discusses the concept of open standards in the context of public policy and competition law perspectives in Europe. It cites the development of two interrelated policies by the European Commission (EC) such as the modernization of the European Union's (EU) International and Communication Technologies (ICT) as well as the upgrade of the guidance on the application of competition law to standards setting. It mentions the EC's requirement to use open standards concept in the regulations to ensure openness and transparency once they will be implemented.

The article explains the provisions of Lisbon Treaty relating to competition policy and its corresponding interpretation of the Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in Europe. It states that TFEU justifies the effects-based approach for the anti-competitive practices with the most harmful to the final consumers under the consumer welfare. It also highlights the interpretation of undistorted competition between the EU free and fair and unfair competition rules.

This article analyses the unfairness concept from the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD). It considers why the nature and level of protection is particularly important given the range of coverage of the regime and the Europeanisation agenda. It argues that the UCPD concept provides the potential for a relatively protective approach to consumer decision making. At the same time, it emphasizes that realisation of this potential is partly dependent on recognizing the limits of transparency as a protective tool and in understanding the “professional diligence” and “average consumer” concepts in particular ways. It is further suggested that the protective potential of the regime is not necessarily undermined by the “average consumer” concept or by the “informed decision-making” paradigm of the general unfairness clause. Indeed, the general clause may be capable of extending the protective effects to some extent. Finally, it is suggested that regulators may have a key role to play in maximizing both the level of protection and the prospects for a genuinely common European approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has for the first time issued a document expressing its official position on the enforcement of Article 102TFEU which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position on the Common Market. The Commission Guidance on enforcement priorities in applying Article 102TFEU to exclusionary abuses (adopted in December 2008) has ended a review of about four years. Given the increased enforcement of Article 102TFEU at the European level and the fact that many national provisions in the EU on unilateral conduct are modelled after Article 102TFEU, how the Commission intends to enforce Article 102TFEU is crucial for the application of competition law and the undertakings subject to it under European and/or national laws. The review period was preceded by severe criticisms of the Commission's approach to Article 102TFEU for protecting competitors instead of competition and for being insufficiently grounded in modern economic thinking. At the heart of the review and the discussions surrounding it lay the question of the objective of Article 102TFEU. Some, including the Directorate General for Competition claimed the objective to be ‘consumer welfare’, whereas some argued that ‘consumer welfare’ cannot be adopted as the objective at the expense of the protection of the competitive process. This article critically reviews the Commission Guidance, with an eye to assessing the ultimate objective of and the test of harm under Article 102TFEU. After discussing whether the Guidance indeed sets priorities, it examines the general approach of the Guidance to exclusionary conduct. It points out that despite there being some welcome novelties in the Guidance, there are also suggestions therein whose legitimacy and legality are questionable. Reflecting on the Guidance as a soft-law instrument, the article argues that although regarding the objective of Article 102TFEU, the Commission's apparent tendency towards ‘consumer welfare’ is not unlawful, the reform of Article 102TFEU to bring it more in line with modern economic and legal thinking seems to be far from complete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides several non legislative actions and legislative acts directly or indirectly associated with contract law, which were implemented at European level between July 1, 2009 and December 2009. The European Commission initiated a public consultation which looks at options for enhancing access to corporate information and co-operation between business registers. The agency also released guidelines about the application of the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices that offers consumer protection from several unfair trading methods.

The article analyses the evolution of European competition policy. It is argued that the content, form, and scope of competition regulation has undergone a major transformation over the past fifty years, which is related to broader socio-economic developments. Until the mid-1980s, competition policy formed part of the institutional nexus of the postwar order of 'embedded liberalism', underpinned by a Fordist accumulation regime and Keynesian welfare institutions. It exemplified strong neo-mercantilist and protectionist traits, allowing for significant distortions of competition, whenever justified for general reasons of industrial and social policy. Since the mid-1980s, gradually, a neoliberal 'competition only' vision came to dominate, giving rise to a more market-based competition regime, in which private rather than public actors prevail, and which seeks to create an ever-bigger 'level playing field' of free markets. This transformation is linked to the broader context of the disruption of the postwar social order and the rise of neoliberalism. A public-private alliance of transnational actors, consisting of the European Commission's DG Competition and transnational business elite networks, were the driving forces behind the 'neoliberalisation' of competition policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 26th March 2009, Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, stressed in her speech that her task is to reject the argument that going soft on competition enforcement is the right approach to helping bring an end to the recession. It is clear that the Commission will continue to apply its competition law to undertakings and impose fines for violations irrespective of the situation. This stance could potentially place a greater burden on private-sector companies, which have been struggling to deal with the recent economic crisis. In the era of globalization, it is becoming more and more difficult to isolate the effects of conduct committed by international companies, such that restrictions on competition affecting the EU internal market may very well originate outside the Community. As a result, limits on the application of EU competition law is subject to serious dispute in terms of the extraterritorial application of competition law. In this paper, I shall explain the problems and the impact of the extraterritorial application of EU competition law; mainly the extraterritorial application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with reference of decisions of the Commission and judgments handed down by European courts. As a background to discuss the problems of extraterritorial application of EU competition law, I refer to the theory of jurisdiction from the perspective of public international law including the effects doctrine which is the most controversial theory regarding to the extraterritorial applications of the competition law in general. As an example which shocked Japanese companies affected by the Commission's decision I will mention the recent decision in a case relating to a gas insulated switchgear cartel. Finally, I will discuss measures that can be implemented in order to resolve problems regarding the extraterritorial application of EU competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information. We show that screening liable from non-liable defendants requires the Court to restrict the rules governing admissible evidence. We study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement and prove that increasing damages is better than reducing costs of initiating suits. We also find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for defendants found non-liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of Article 6(3) of Rome II in the forging of a Community system of private enforcement of antitrust law and the implications of the rule enshrined in Article 6(3) of Rome II for party autonomy in Europe. It states that the Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation will reduce the range of divergence in national solutions by harmonising conflict of laws. Moreover, Article 6(3) foresees the concurrent and distributive application of all relevant national laws. Furthermore, the escape clause of public policy enshrined in the Rome II Regulation must be given with proper attention.

The article focuses on the views of the two countervailing buyer power, the Irish Competition Authority and the High Court about the Kerry/Breeo merger in Europe. It discovers that the two grocery retailers failed to perform enough countervailing buyer power under the Competition Act 2002. It also investigates the other major aspects of the guidelines for retailer merger including the concept of countervailing buyer power, several observations of the merger, findings of the Authority and the High Court as well as the various implications related to merger control.

The article discusses the controversial issues on exclusionary act abuses treatment in Europe. The retroactive rebates are founded as one of the various exclusionary act abuses for which distinct rules are just defined. Loyalty-inducing retroactive rebates may both contain anti-competitive and pro-competitive interests, according to European Commission (EC). According to the author, there are various things to work out to facilitate the underlying controversy between distinct legal values and the effective application of economics to competition policy.

The article discusses the relevance between consumer and antitrust law in Europe. Authors highlight the positive and negative effects of commercial law in businesses and in the economy. It overviews the implementation of antitrust and commercial law as primary tools of determining consumer failures and explores how behavioral economics may facilitate identifying consumer failures and create efficient remedies for consumer protection. Lastly, it also examine the role of behavioral economics (BE) plays in controlling consumer failures within antitrust and consumer law.

The article asses the anti-cartel enforcement policy of the European Commission in consideration with the theories developed in the context of penal theory underpin Commission anti-cartel enforcement in Europe. It states that the use of pick-and-mix approach as a punishment rationales is unhelpful, thus desert approach must serve as the primary rationale in cartel cases. Moreover, the rehabilitation approach will constitute as an alternative secondary rationale, if the deterrence approach is seen to have failed.

The article offers information on how economic analysis and enforcement experience support the idea that cartel activity must be viewed as a serious crime and must be punished with serious sanctions on business enterprises and individuals in Europe. It states that banning cartel activity is a cornerstone of competition law since it is the antithesis of unrestrained interaction of competitive forces. Moreover, deterring cartel activity requires substantial fines levied on the business enterprise and prison sentences for culpable executives.

The article discusses the provisions of Article 5 of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation ("TTBER") in Europe. It also presents an analysis if these provisions are anticompetitive. It particularly focuses on the case involving MedImmune and Genentech filed in the US Supreme Court in trying to identify whether there is likely impact for no challenge clauses in Europe. Article 5 of the TTBER refers to grant-backs and no challenge clauses.