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The term 'competition' is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU's very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations. The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission's annual reports on competition (1971-2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in 'hard' contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in 'softer' contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent - selection of enforcement priorities). While the 'hard' contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the 'soft' contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories. Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Since the 1990s, the EU's influence over national health care policy has been limited to European internal market law or social policy coordination mechanisms. The introduction of EU competition law into health care is more recent and underdeveloped; however, its introduction would potentially be much more far-reaching and disruptive. Methods: Three EUcompetition law(state-aid) cases are used and comprise both Court of Justice and European Commission decisions. One is from Ireland, one is from the Netherlands, and the third is from Belgium. Findings: The Belgian (Iris-H) case sees EU institutions scrutinize a clearly "social" (nonmarket) health care model with EU competition law for the first time. This is a highly significant development. It is clear, however, that the European Commission is more reluctant to use EU competition law to scrutinize health care systems than the European courts are. Conclusions: This intent on the part of EU institutions will have to be assessed in future cases, as considerable uncertainty about its shape and outer contours remains. However, EU competition law, and the EU's state-aid investigation apparatus, encroaching into the national health care systems for the first time is highly significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]