1. The political economy of rationing health care in England and the US: the 'accidental logics' of political settlements.
- Author
-
Bevan G and Brown LD
- Subjects
- Acute Disease, Chronic Disease, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Delivery of Health Care organization & administration, Delivery of Health Care standards, England, Health Care Rationing organization & administration, Health Expenditures statistics & numerical data, Health Services for the Aged organization & administration, Humans, Medicaid economics, Medicaid organization & administration, Medicare economics, Medicare organization & administration, Politics, State Medicine organization & administration, Terminal Care organization & administration, Terminal Care standards, United States, Delivery of Health Care economics, Health Care Rationing economics, Health Policy economics, Health Services for the Aged economics, State Medicine economics, Terminal Care economics
- Abstract
This article considers how the 'accidental logics' of political settlements for the English National Health Service (NHS) and the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in the United States have resulted in different institutional arrangements and different implicit social contracts for rationing, which we define to be the denial of health care that is beneficial but is deemed to be too costly. This article argues that rationing is designed into the English NHS and designed out of US Medicare; and compares rationing for the elderly in the United States and in England for acute care, care at the end of life, and chronic care.
- Published
- 2014
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