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Background: The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (A(H1N1)pdm09) influenza A virus (IAV) has replaced the previous seasonal H1N1 strain in humans and continues to circulate worldwide. The comparative performance of inactivated A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza vaccines remains of considerable interest. The objective of this study was to evaluate the efficacy of two licensed A(H1N1)pdm09 inactivated vaccines (AS03B adjuvanted split virion Pandemrix from GlaxoSmithKline and referred here as (V1) and non‐adjuvanted whole virion Celvapan from Baxter and referred here as (V2)) in ferrets as a pre‐clinical model for human disease intervention. Methods: Naïve ferrets were divided into two groups (V1 and V2) and immunised intramuscularly with two different A/California/07/2009‐derived inactivated vaccines, V1 administered in a single dose and V2 administered in 2 doses separated by 21 days. Six weeks after the first immunisation, vaccinated animals and a non‐vaccinated control (NVC) group were intra‐nasally challenged with 106.5 TCID50 of the isolate A/England/195/2009 A(H1N1)pdm09 with 99.1% amino acid identity to the vaccine strain. Clinical signs, lung histopathology, viral quantification and antibody responses were evaluated. Results and Conclusions: Results revealed important qualitative differences in the performance of both inactivated vaccines in relation to protection against challenge with a comparable virus in a naive animal (ferret) model of human disease. Vaccine V1 limited and controlled viral shedding and reduced lower respiratory tract infection. In contrast, vaccine V2 did not control infection and animals showed sustained viral shedding and delayed lower respiratory infection, resulting in pulmonary lesions, suggesting lower efficacy of V2 vaccine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reverse zoonotic transmission events of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) have been described since the start of the pandemic, and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) designated the detection of SARS-CoV-2 in animals a reportable disease. Eighteen domestic and zoo animals in Great Britain and Jersey were tested by APHA for SARS-CoV-2 during 2020-2023. One domestic cat ( Felis catus ), three domestic dogs ( Canis lupus familiaris ), and three Amur tigers ( Panthera tigris altaica ) from a zoo were confirmed positive during 2020-2021 and reported to the WOAH. All seven positive animals were linked with known SARS-CoV-2 positive human contacts. Characterisation of the SARS-CoV-2 variants by genome sequencing indicated that the cat was infected with an early SARS-CoV-2 lineage. The three dogs and three tigers were infected with the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant of concern (B.1.617.2). The role of non-human species in the onward transmission and emergence of new variants of SARS-CoV-2 remain poorly defined. Continued surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in relevant domestic and captive animal species with high levels of human contact is important to monitor transmission at the human-animal interface and to assess their role as potential animal reservoirs.

Low pathogenicity (LP) avian influenza viruses (AIVs) have a natural reservoir in wild birds. These cause few (if any) overt clinical signs, but include H5 and H7 LPAIVs, which are notifiable in poultry. In the European Union, notifiable avian disease (NAD) demands laboratory confirmation with prompt statutory interventions to prevent dissemination of infection to multiple farms. Crucially, for H5 and H7 LPAIVs, movement restrictions and culling limit the further risk of mutation to the corresponding highly pathogenic (HP) H5 and H7 AIVs in gallinaceous poultry. An H7N7 LPAIV outbreak occurred during February 2015 at a broiler breeder chicken premise in England. Full genome sequencing suggested an avian origin closely related to contemporary European H7 LPAIV wild bird strains with no correlates for human adaptation. However, a high similarity of PB2, PB1, and NA genes with H10N7 viruses from European seals during 2014 was observed. An H5N1 LPAIV outbreak during January 2016 affecting broiler breeder chickens in Scotland resulted in rapid within-farm spread. An interesting feature from this case was that although viral tropism occurred in heart and kidney endothelial cells, suggesting HPAIV infection, the H5N1 virus had the molecular cleavage site signature of an LPAIV belonging to an indigenous European H5 lineage. There was no genetic evidence for human adaptation or antiviral drug resistance. The source of the infection was also likely to be via indirect contact with wild birds mediated via fomite spread from the nearby environment. Both LPAIV outbreaks were preceded by local flooding events that attracted wild waterfowl to the premises. Prompt detection of both outbreaks highlighted the value of the "testing to exclude" scheme launched in the United Kingdom for commercial gallinaceous poultry in 2014 as an early warning surveillance mechanism for NAD.

Genetic sequences of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N8) virus in England have high homology to those detected in mainland Europe and Asia during 2014. Genetic characterization suggests this virus is an avian-adapted virus without specific affinity for zoonoses. Spatio-temporal detections of H5N8 imply a role for wild birds in virus spread.

Periodic rabies booster injections are recommended for persons who are at continued risk of rabies exposures, but literature on booster intervals is not comprehensive. We recruited bat workers who received rabies vaccinations between September 2002 and March 2003 either as a primary rabies vaccination course (primary group) or rabies booster vaccination (secondary group). From September 2004, those bat workers in the primary group had two blood tests to determine their rabies antibody level; one immediately prior to their first booster vaccination and one approximately one month after the booster vaccination. Bat workers in the secondary group had one blood test, approximately two years after their last booster vaccination. Overall, 185 bat workers participated in the study: 145 in the primary group, 40 in the secondary group. Sixteen (11.1%) in the primary group were below the minimum recognized rabies antibody level of 0.5 IU/ml prior to their first booster vaccination; all were above this level one-month after their booster. All bat workers in the secondary group had a rabies antibody level above 0.5 IU/ml. In the primary group, age of the bat worker at primary immunization and rabies vaccine type were significantly associated with antibody response to the rabies booster. We recommend that the first rabies booster vaccination is given one year after the primary course and subsequent boosters are given every three to five years thereafter.