Search

This article poses the question of why, after having consistently pursued an isolationist strategy of avoiding security ties with partners other than the US, and having followed the US in opposing regional security multilateralism, did Japan suddenly reverse course and get out in front of the US with its first post-war regional security initiative. This article addresses this question by tracing the internal debates, policy process and motivations that drove Japan to reverse its position, a process that transformed Japan into the leading champion of regional security multilateralism in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why, in July 1991, did Japan suddenly reverse years of opposition to regional security multilateralism in East Asia, and propose a multilateral security dialogue? This study argues that two factors largely account for the so-called Nakayama proposal. First, after the Gulf War and in the midst of Soviet collapse, Japan concluded that it would have to play a larger international security role. Second, Japan realized that as a consequence it would need to expand its efforts to reassure Asian countries mistrustful of Japanese military power as a result of historical experience. Japanese policy-makers thus came to conceive of a multilateral security dialogue as a means for reassuring Asian countries about its plan to send troops overseas to participate in United Nations peacekeeping. Secondary factors contributing to Japan's decision to promote security multilateralism include the declining Soviet threat, fear of American withdrawal, and competition from other countries with differing conceptions of what form security multilateralism should assume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]