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China and the United States (US) have established respective cultural institutions in each other, namely the Confucius Institute and the American Cultural Centre. While they differ in the establishment background and management model, in their counterpart countries' view, both Confucius Institutes and American Cultural Centres serve the function of public diplomacy as a 'quasi-diplomatic agency', attracting extensive political attention. When comparing the history of their developments in the US and China, a similar trend of 'rise-to-fall' and 'positivity-to-negativity' can be observed. The stagnation of American Cultural Centres in China and the crisis of Confucius Institutes in the US both originate from the same source — political pressure. The development paths of both institutions are closely related to the development and transformation of Sino–US political relations. In this process, China's attitude is relatively moderate in an attempt to maintain the continuous development of a friendly bilateral relation, while the US is anxious about China's rising status as its economic and strategic competitor, thereby adjusting its China policy and imposing rigid political controls over Confucius Institutes. Affected by the Sino–US trade dispute and the COVID-19 pandemic, Sino–US relations deteriorate further; accordingly, the future outlook of Confucius Institutes in the US is worrying. However, with abundant uncertainties, the future of the Confucius Institute remains to be further studied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether religious site density around a firm's headquarters is related to corporate default risk in China. We find that public firms surrounded by a higher number of Buddhist and Taoist temples are associated with lower default risk. In contrast to the widely documented impact of Western religiosity on corporate behavior, our mechanism tests indicate that lower default risk related to religious site density is primarily driven by better corporate governance and not by a surge in corporate conservatism. Finally, we find that this default risk lowering effect is more pronounced when firms also possess greater political resources. • Firms surrounded by more religious temples have lower expected default risk. • The relation is driven by corporate governance and not by corporate conservatism. • The relation depends on the degree of political exposure experienced by the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the effects China's government policies on geography and political ecology of pandemic disease outbreaks such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and H1N1 on the past two decades. It relates the concerns that emerged with the policies which highlight the unexpected side-effects in location, incidence, and pandemics as well as its impact on the progression of disease outbreaks. The suggestion that state policies prompted the severity of pandemic diseases in the country is also stated.

This study examines how state subsidies to firms affect corporate investment efficiency. Using archival data from a sample of Chinese listed firms over the 2007–2015 period, we find that government subsidies have a negative effect on firms' investment efficiency, and this negative effect is more pronounced for firms that are less financially constrained. Further analyses suggest that government subsidies are positively associated with firms' over-investment, although they alleviate under-investment. Our findings are robust to a series of tests to alleviate concerns about potential endogeneity and self-selection bias. • We ask if financial subsidies received from the state affect investment efficiency. • A negative effect is found that is more pronounced for less financially constrained firms. • Subsidies do alleviate under-investment. • But subsidies are positively associated with over-investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]