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Chinese investment in Africa has captured the interest of both academia and the wider policy world, with some postulating that Chinese firms have the potential to bring about a structural transformation of the continent. Some scholars have even gone as far as to claim that Africa may be turned into the 'next factory of the world'. By focusing on spillover effects – arguably the most sought-after of foreign direct investment effects – this article seeks to challenge such celebratory assumptions. Drawing on over 80 interviews with Zambian institutions and Chinese firms, supplemented by surveys carried out in these firms, we provide empirical evidence showing that Chinese investment brings little in terms of linkage formation and spillover effects, and those rare linkages that do exist relate to low-technology inputs that offer little hope for long-awaited industrial upgrading. Rather than blaming Chinese investors, however, we turn our attention to the question of institutional capacity, arguing that Zambia has largely failed when it comes to building adequate local supply capacity. This leads us to conclude that the chances of Chinese investment leading to structural transformation are limited and that this will remain the case unless industrial policy plays a more transformative role in fostering linkages and facilitating spillovers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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China's material interests are in a stable global order, given the immense benefits that Beijing has enjoyed under extant conditions. Although some accounts seek to portray China as a revisionist power, this is not consistent with the interests of China's growing economy or its transnational elites. Rather, Beijing requires that the status quo remains, at least when it comes to the basic economic underpinnings of the global system. Given some of the contradictions within the Chinese economy, a calm global order whereby China seeks to resolve its problems is critical for Beijing. Thus China can be expected to continue to support and contribute to the global capitalist system, rather than seek to change it in any meaningful fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to integrate Africa into an ambitious Chinese-constructed infrastructure network. The terms of this integration however deepen Africa's dependent position and perpetuate its terms of (mal)integration into the global political economy. These terms, which are characterised by external domination and socially-injurious and extraverted modes of accumulation, are likely to be exacerbated by the BRI's focus on facilitating extraction from the African continent while importing huge amounts from China. While the BRI aims to resolve contradictions within China's own economy, the latent dynamics within the BRI vision may result in an entrenched African dependency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Chinese arms sales to Africa have increased in recent years. In a region beset by conflict and unstable regimes, and where arms sales are a significant and positive predictor of an increased probability of political violence, this is inherently problematic. The sale of weaponry to a regime in Khartoum caught up in an alleged “genocide” in Darfur, the awkward appearance in 2008 of a Chinese ship loaded with weapons bound for Mugabe's Zimbabwe off the coast of eastern Africa, and the recent exposure in 2011 that Chinese arms companies offered to sell around $200 million worth of arms to Muammar Gaddafi's regime are emblematic of an issue in Africa's political violence that needs analysis. This article seeks to discuss the rationale behind China's arms sales to Africa and the effect that they have had on political violence in recipient countries. It also provides an analysis of the supply-and-demand circumstances of Chinese arms transfers to Africa, Beijing's attempts to control such transfers, and evidence that Chinese policies on proliferation are (slowly) evolving. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite endeavoring to construct an image as a contributor to a "harmonious world," China faces criticism for bringing neocolonialism back to Africa. This case study of Uganda offers a quantitative and qualitative basis for examining how young Ugandans understand and interpret "China" and "the Chinese." It also suggests how these perceptions could be applied to Sino-African relations in general and the Beijing-Kampala relationship in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has, in the past decade or so, emerged as an important contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, with Chinese peacekeepers serving in places as diverse as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sudan. Indeed, China currently sends more peacekeeping troops abroad than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is a major development in Sino-African relations. China's stance on peace operations is closely tied to its attitude on state sovereignty and this limits the type of interventions that Beijing is prepared to sanction vis-a-vis its role in peacekeeping missions. Yet it appears that Chinese policy in this regard is evolving. This study discusses why and how China's role in peacekeeping in Africa has played out and the likely directions this is to take in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In seeking to cultivate external relations with African countries, China has long stressed its commonly shared roots with African nations as a developing country rather than a Western state, and as such the symbolic attraction of China clearly reverberates with many African elites who seem to look on China as a positive development model. However, it should be noted that this has not been embraced solely by dictatorial or authoritarian regimes but in fact China's approach to non-interference has struck a chord even with those democratically elected leaders in Africa. While such practices clearly benefit African elites, it is remains doubtful that they do so for ordinary Africans, although sustained analysis suggests that the potential exists, albeit hampered by the modalities of governance on the continent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government and its companies have dramatically increased their presence in Africa in the last decade. There has been much media interest and commentary on the impacts of this engagement on governance in Africa, as it is often seen to be strengthening authoritarian states, such Sudan and Zimbabwe.1 However, Chinese actors are also engaging with more democratic states and spaces, such as Zambia. This article seeks to explore the impacts of increased Chinese engagement with Africa on governance through a comparative case study of two contrasting cases: Sudan and Zambia, using the concept of flexigemony. Contrary to popular perception, behaviour by Chinese actors has sometimes been a moderating force in Sudan, while provoking violence in Zambia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the expansion of Chinese political and business interests in Africa with China becoming Africa's largest bilateral trading partner with the value of China's trade with Africa increasing from 4 billion U.S. dollars in 1996 to 200 billion U.S. dollars in 2014. It cites a restructure by the present regime in Beijing, China to an economy that will be based more on domestic consumption than on investment. It notes a decrease in Africa's exports to China by 38% in 2015.

Popular perceptions of China and its global role are often shaped by two words: 'made in'. Yet this vision of China that focuses primarily on Beijing as a coming economic superpower is relatively new, and it is not that long ago that two other words tended to dominate debates on and discourses of China: 'human rights'. To be sure, real interest in human rights in China was never the only issue in other states' relations with China, nor consistently pursued throughout the years (Nathan, 1994). Nor did human rights totally subsequently disappear from the political agenda. Nevertheless, the rhetorical importance of human rights - perhaps best epitomised by the narrow defeat of resolutions condemning Chinese policy in 1995 at the Human Rights Council in Geneva — stands in stark contrast to the relative silence thereafter as the bottom line of most states' relations with Beijing took on ever greater economic dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's political and economic activities in Africa are increasing at an exponential rate. Equally, they are attracting criticism, chiefly over Beijing's no-strings-attached stance on human rights and governance. It is clear that many African states that enjoy Chinese support not only trample on civil and political rights (as per Western ideas of human rights), but also subvert their citizens' economic and social rights (as per China's discourse on human rights). If whilst adhering to the principle of non-interference, Chinese activities actually make things worse for some in Africa, then Beijing's argument that basic socioeconomic rights are more important for the poor than abstract political rights is potentially problematic. This is because there is a danger that Beijing's engagement in Africa might be exploited by autocrats on the continent for their own, well-understood, reasons. Doing no harm, rather than a studied disinterest, needs to be part of China's overall African policy, something that Beijing is bound to recognize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's expansion into Africa has attracted a great deal of criticism, particularly regarding its implications for human rights on the continent. However, the nub of the problem is found within Africa itself, within the neo-patrimonial regimes that dominate the continent. Obviously, there is justifiable disquiet that Beijing's Africa policies may undermine political and economic reform on the continent. Nevertheless, the reasons for Africa's current predicament are complex and erecting a potential scapegoat to blame for Africa's woes makes little sense. Before critiquing China's role in Africa vis-à-vis governance and human rights, analysts need to understand both China's particular human rights discourse and the nature of most African states, for it is here that the real problem lies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nigeria has become one of China's most important trading partners. China is investing heavily in Nigeria in both commercial and political terms. This article analyses the relationship between China and Nigeria and suggests ways it might develop in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the next five years, Chinese trade with Africa is predicted to reach $100 billion per year. Much of this springs from China's growing expansion into Africa's oil markets. It is argued that Chinese oil diplomacy in Africa has two main goals: in the short-term to secure oil supplies to help feed growing domestic demand back in China; and in the long-term, to position China as a global player in the international oil market. Yet at the same time, this oil safari is being accompanied by an explicit stance that emphasizes state sovereignty and 'non-interference' in domestic affairs and is wholly disinterested in transparency or human rights. Consequently, Beijing has increasingly been accused of turning a blind eye to autocracy and corruption. China is also threatening to undercut efforts by the African Union and its western partners to make government and business more accountable. While China is providing investment where little was previously forthcoming, concerns about Beijing's engagement with Africa's oil industries need to be resolved, not least by African leaders themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-à-vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Intrusion of the Sino-Soviet in the liberation struggle during the mid-1960s; Refusal of the Soviet Union to provide assistance to the Pan-Africanist Congress; Involvement of Beijing in the diplomatic struggle against Pretoria.

Focuses on the foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC's) and Africa in the 1990s. In-depth look at trade between China and Africa during the 1980s; Details on China's aid to Africa during the 1980s; Examination of China's economic dealings with Africa.

The diplomatic struggle between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has been a consistent feature of the African landscape since the continent first embarked on the evolution to independence. For Taipei, Africa offers an area of operations for its attempts to break out of the diplomatic isolation forced upon it by Beijing. On its part, the PRC is determined not to allow Taipei international breathing space, for in its view such a raised profile would undermine its own legitimacy as the ruler of the Chinese people, and raise doubts regarding its unofficial claim to be the "leader" of the Third World. Furthermore, African nations have provided a large support constituency for China in its clashes with the West over human rights and democratization. Beijing can ill-afford to dispense with such support at international forums. vet Taipei has refused to submit to Chinese pressure and continues to have a presence in Africa. With this in mind, the diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC on the African continent is likely to continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beijing's involvement in Angola in the mid-1970s as a testing ground for the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) position toward the superpowers was a disaster for its foreign policy in southern Africa. As it ended up on the vide of the United States and regional pariah South Africa. Chinese policy was commonly perceived as lacking an awareness of African intricacies and of being opportunistic. As a result, Beijing was excluded from Angola by a government bitter at the PRC's support for the rivals in its civil war. Only after skillful diplomacy and a change in attitude by Angola toward its ties with Moscow, combined with China's pragmatic foreign policy, was Beijing able to establish linkages with Luanda. Since then, Sino-Angolan relations have become comparatively strong and are likely to develop further as China views Angola as a potentially wealthy and strategic nation slowly emerging from a paralyzing civil war [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]