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China and Japan are among the world's top space powers, with significant technical competence in both conventional and 'newspace' capabilities. Since the early 1990s, each country has also taken a keen interest in shaping the governance of outer space activities. But they have done so in remarkably different ways, calling into question Asian states' supposed preferences for soft and informal institutions. Japan has led the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, involving both state and nonstate participants, which is guided by a set of principles. China has opted for a high-profile formal intergovernmental design, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, with a Convention and all the trappings of a formal organizational structure. This article assesses the activities of China and Japan in the new space race, discusses how and why the design of their space governance differs, and reflects on prospects for competition and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a speech by Professor Saadia M. Pekkanen, delivered at The Future of Space Governance conference held in Athens, Georgia in October 2019. Topics included the space governance by Japan and China, the governance regimes to prevent conflict and war, and the need to encourage democratization, bolster commercialization, and prevent militarization in outer space.

Investments by Asian Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) continue to be of concern in the global economy. A common perception is that they are managed by state-affiliated entities with geostrategic motives that could somehow prove detrimental to host countries. This paper demonstrates, however, that even the definition, let alone the establishment and investment targets, of Asian SWFs are embroiled in ambiguity within home country politics. Plainly put, ambiguity refers to the absence of clear-cut policy processes, means, and goals. How do we explain the ambiguity surrounding SWFs? Ambiguity is not a cover for deliberate, cohesive, and strategic actions, because SWFs are not under the control of any one set of actors. Rather, perhaps to the discomfort even of home country sovereigns, ambiguity is a messy domestic product of contending political forces that do not allow a marked trend toward any one single policy equilibrium on sovereign investments, whether domestic or foreign. While this reality is perhaps understandable in a democratic polity, it is also equally true of authoritarian ones in the region. In both types of cases, ambiguity is constructed inadvertently by the interactions of state, interstate, and intrastate actors, each with their own interests and expectations about the role of SWFs. Analyzing the cases in Singapore, China, Japan, and other Asian countries, from this unifying perspective suggests that while ambiguity may fuel external anxiety concerning home country intentions, it actually reflects far more domestically salient controversies about SWF activities than is typically appreciated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]