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Many regional and national development questions involve the interaction of external and internal evolutions and can be conceived macroeconomically in balance-of-payments terms. In this light, China's engagement in international trade, outward and inward foreign direct investment, accumulation of reserves, development cooperation, aid and international finance initiatives are examined and related to evolving domestic and international conditions. After joining the Western-centred international economic and political order, while protecting its economic and political sovereignty and defining itself as part of the Global South, China emerged as a very large semi-peripheral upper-middle-income country. In the new millennium China and other emerging economies started to upgrade into higher value-added sectors and to reshape international governance arrangements in ways that reflect the civilisational values and colonial and semi-colonial experience of the Global South. Although these steps do challenge the unequal and unfair 'liberal rules-based order' and US hegemony, they also help create a more equitable and peaceful multipolar world system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a hallmark of China's global rise. While the BRI has unfolded as a global platform focused on bilateral relations, the Chinese government has also tried to expand links between the BRI and international organizations, notably the United Nations. Available evidence about UN–BRI relations suggests, however, that an initial honeymoon phase with mushrooming projects and public endorsements was followed by a sharp decline in engagement. This article argues that a focus on inter-governor legitimation attempts helps understand the rise and fall of UN–BRI relations. Based on publicly available evidence, internal documentation and stakeholder interviews, it shows how legitimation informed motivations on both sides to invest in UN–BRI relations, and how western opposition subsequently led to UN entities reducing their engagement. Empirically, the article contributes to the literature on China's global role, evolving power relations at the UN, and the proliferation of geopolitically motivated flagship initiatives across UN member states. Conceptually, it speaks to the expanding debate about legitimation in world politics through a more systematic engagement with relational legitimation dynamics. A focus on one-sided or mutual legitimation attempts offers a conceptual tool for analysing how interactions among global governors and their audiences unfold, and how international organizations try (and fail) to strengthen their resilience in light of an increasingly polarized membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines 'diasporic geopolitics' as a significant factor in the future of global politics. Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent to which different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies in the form of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing on rising powers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states such as China, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, with diasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states' geopolitical agendas and great power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationally via their diaspora engagement policies. States can treat 'their' diasporas as economic assets that facilitate trade and foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of 'civilisational' politics; and as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussing the implications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Registries are excellent sources of data to address questions that are typically not evaluated in randomized clinical trials, including natural history, disease prevalence, treatment approaches and adverse events, and models of care. Global and regional registries can provide data to identify differences in outcomes and in haemophilia care between countries, economic settings, and regions, while facilitating research and data sharing. In this manuscript, we highlight five bleeding disorder registries: Country registries from Australia and China, Paediatric Network on Haemophilia Management (PedNet) data on children who have received emicizumab, data from the European Haemophilia Safety Surveillance (EUHASS) system, and data on women and girls with haemophilia from the World Federation of Haemophilia (WFH) registries. Data from these and other bleeding disorder registries have been and will continue to be used to advance patient care, understand treatment patterns and adverse reactions, and identify areas of increased need and focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent criticisms by leaders and scholars have raised questions about prospects for survival of the liberal world order as well as the relationship between American hegemony and order. The three books discussed in this essay have similar diagnoses of problems in the liberal order but differ in their prognoses. Yan's Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers offers an alternative model for leadership of the world order – humane authority. Cooley and Nexon's Exit from Hegemony maintains that US hegemony is gone for good and the liberal world order is unraveling due to the rise of great power challengers, changing behavior by smaller states, and anti-liberal transnational movements. Ikenberry's World Safe for Democracy argues that current problems are due to attempted global extension of the liberal order. The liberal order should be restored to its original purpose of providing a protective environment for liberal democracies. All three books emphasize the role of domestic political governance and moral values in contributing to global leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

United States support for Ukraine and preparation for a potential, likely protracted, conflict with China has drawn attention to the fragility of the U.S. defense industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, the American defense industry has optimized for peacetime and low-attrition conflicts, prized efficiency and cost-savings over capacity and flexibility, and incentivized short-run returns over resilience and innovation. While this design may have made sense in a period of undisputed U.S. dominance, the rise of the People's Republic of China as a peer competitor and the emerging demand that the U.S. deter and, if necessary, win one or more protracted conflicts requires that Washington take a more intentional and direct role in shaping the capability, capacity, and resilience of the U.S. defense industrial base. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes Chinese geopolitics from a Chinese perspective. Three characteristics of Chinese geopolitics are highlighted: internal orientation, the desire to rely on the neighboring environment, and the increasing global influence. China aims to establish good neighborly relations in order to overcome its decades-long hostility with Russia. There are territorial conflicts with various countries, but China seeks good neighborly relations without interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. China is strengthening its naval defense capabilities and has a growing global economic and political influence. China actively participates in UN peacekeeping missions and advocates for an international order in which the UN and international law play a central role. [Extracted from the article]

This paper starts from the supposition that civilization is an important concept for thinking about world order, and one that is increasingly coming back into play in world politics. It opens with a close look at the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI): what does it say, what does it imply, about what is it silent, and what are its policy contexts? It offers the theory of Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) as a way of looking at multiple modernities in terms of civilizational pluralism. This is followed by a historical unfolding of UCD since the early 19th century, showing how it has generated both single and multiple modernities cast in civilizational terms. The penultimate section focuses on the risks and opportunities that a world order of civilizational pluralism would create specifically for China. The conclusions summarize the main points of argument, and set out a more detailed global vision of what the GCI might aim to achieve if played well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The geopolitical rise of emerging economies has led to contestations and renegotiations of the boundaries of the developing country status. Established powers put pressure on emerging economies to give up this status and the benefits it comes with in global regimes. In this article, we analyse the (re)negotiation of China's developing country status within the context of US–China geoeconomic competition with respect to two core areas in the global economy—finance and trade. We show that whether private or public actors are responsible for status classification influences the outcomes of contestation over China's status. When private sector actors are central, China is more likely able to defend its developing country status against US pressure. We also find that these processes are mitigated by how decision-making processes are institutionalised. Our two case studies thus illustrate that regulatory processes such as status classification influence the outcomes of geoeconomic competition in international politics. These findings also shed new light on the power of states versus non-state actors within global governance amidst the geoeconomic turn: the public–private divide can serve as an important context factor that influences the probability of the international economic order to cater more towards US or Chinese geoeconomic strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is a response to reflections on an earlier article about China's model of international order. The authors argue that understanding China's model requires identifying the logic and practices that align with China's preferences. They propose a model based on China's domestic character and observations of its international practices. The authors acknowledge that international orders are complex and shaped by various actors, but they argue that the distribution of power and the role of leading states are important in shaping order. They also discuss the possibility of China promoting its preferred norms within the existing order and the potential for an illiberal order to have pluralist characteristics. The authors conclude by discussing the methodological approach they used in their research. [Extracted from the article]

The liberal international order (LIO) is now in a complex crisis. Its legitimacy and sustainability are put to the test with the growth of deglobalization forces, the rise of emerging powers dissatisfied with the LIO designed by the US, and climate change and the global pandemic. The crisis of the LIO is particularly salient in the Indo-Pacific, the epicenter of the US-China strategic competition, and secondary states in this region are increasingly concerned about its geopolitical consequences. However, I argue that secondary states often treated as the pawns of great powers can turn this circumstance to their advantage by adopting various strategies that maximize their leverage. We should take seriously the possibility that secondary states, by which I denote all states that are weaker or smaller than the hegemonic state and the rising power, can shape the contours of the US-China strategic competition and the newly emerging international order in the Indo-Pacific region. Preoccupied with great power politics, the existing literature on order transition has neglected the fact that secondary states can develop and exercise their own agency. Moreover, it remains vague what agency means in IR and how secondary states enact it. Against this backdrop, I propose an analytical framework that unpacks various types of agency along three dimensions—the motivation of agency, the type of mobilized resources, and the availability of partners. It will help us explain how weaker and smaller states participate and make their voice in reshaping international order in the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decline of the liberal international order (LIO) has been swift, with challenges from state actors like China and Russia. Gerlinde Groitl's book examines this assault on the LIO, focusing on the choices made by the leaders of these countries. Groitl argues that China's approach is characterized as "constructive" while Russia's is "destructive." China has actively sought to counter and replace international institutions based on Western values, while Russia attacked the post-Cold War settlement with its invasion of Ukraine. Groitl's neo-classical realist model suggests that the survival of political systems, rather than states themselves, drives international strategies. The book concludes that as long as the attractiveness of Western democracies persists, counter-movements will continue to emerge, necessitating a strategy of "neo-containment." [Extracted from the article]

Systematically understanding the theoretical implications of the planetary boundaries (PB) framework and expanding its application in the theoretical system of sustainable development is strategic for tracking the frontiers of international sustainable development research and extending the paths of China's sustainable development practice. Based on the implications and characteristics of the planetary boundaries framework, this study explores its value contribution in the field of sustainable development research from three aspects: thinking paradigm, evaluation methodology, and global governance. This framework deepens the understanding of the shift of the relationships between economy, society, and the environment from a growth model to an inclusive one through the quantifica-tion of the ' safe operating space' for human activities, exhibiting the characteristic of ' strong constraints.' The integration of quantifi-able boundaries with environmental sustainability assessment methods such as life cycle assessment, footprint family, and input-output analysis further develops the toolkits for sustainable development assessment. Moreover, the integration and application of the framework with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) system enhances the global influence of this theory. The concept of ecological civilization is a new paradigm and manifestation based on the crystallization of local experience, containing solid theoretical and practical foundations. It is an important point of departure for the localization of the PB framework and practice to dialectically understand its logical relationship with the idea of ecological civilization from the concepts, such as only one earth and rational growth, and the differences in the logical action. Based on these, the study puts forward new thoughts to further promote the implementation of China's sustainable development strategy. With the help of the PB framework, we can explore the modernization direction of the harmo-nious coexistence of human beings and nature, improve the basic cognition of this coexistence, and deepen its beneficial collision with China's environmental governance capabilities and modernization of governance system. Multi-dimensional explorations, such as expanding the research scale of SDGs-PB, heterogeneity adjustments, and strengthening data support, are conducive to promoting the organic integration of the PB framework with China's SDGs. We can give full play to the function of this framework as a methodological tool to support the realization of China's 'dual carbon' goals, focusing on the boundary constraints in the economic system of green, low-carbon, and recycling development and the setting of thresholds in the tasks of achieving the ' dual carbon' goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When different entities (actors) accept a certain norm or a particular agreement about normative principles, they are likely to have an overlapping but not necessarily fully shared understanding of the given norm. This article theorises and assesses the strength of such normative overlaps in international politics. It conceptualises normative overlaps as normative congruences across and within political orders. It follows a norm's connection to constitutional layers of political orders (congruences within orders) and the way these constitutional layers of political orders, among which the norm is shared, overlap (congruences across orders). To do so, it builds upon and interconnects the literature on norms, especially norm diffusion, and the English School and constructivist literature on the composition of international order. The theoretical framework is utilised to analyse how China fits into the liberal international society, especially when it comes to human rights (HR) and humanitarian protection. The effect of the normative overlaps in this realm is China's active engagement with the liberal HR regime, however, without deeper convergence or socialisation. The limits of convergence are underpinned by significant differences between the Chinese developmentalist and liberal conceptions of the moral purpose of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China became one of the biggest players in the global extractive resource supply chain, along with increasing extractive resource demand for green industries. Interestingly, over the last two decades, Chinese actors started participating in transnational extractive governance initiatives (TEGI) supporting transparency, a norm for governance-by-disclosure. This article aims to answer the question of what types of Chinese actors engage in what TEGIs regarding transparency. Based on mapping forty-eight TEGIs, this article shows a nuanced pattern of China's involvement in extractives governance beyond a dualistic approach to China in global governance—whether China is a threat or nonthreat. Importantly, China does not act as a unified monolithic actor; rather, different types of actors engage TEGIs distinctively. Chinese corporations are most actively engaging in thin transparency TEGIs lacking stringent verification rules and featuring limited multistakeholder participation. It could potentially accelerate the risk of green washing of those companies and disempower weaker actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'revisionism' has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic 'contestation' and 'challenge'. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to 'deconcentration' and 'delegitimation' of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is 'contesting', not 'challenging' the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, China and Russia decades have adopted accommodation, normalisation and convergence strategies that transformed their cooperation into a comprehensive strategic partnership. Despite having this strategic alignment, several issues still constrain their long-term relations, such as divergent views and assessment of the world order, imbalance in bilateral trade and investment, competition in their respective spheres of influence, Russians' fear of a Chinese immigrant onslaught, ideological cleavages, and asymmetrical power distribution between the two. This study explains the factors behind their convergence and divergences of interests and its implications for their future relations. While utilising content analysis as the research methodology this study hypothesizes that though the two are engaged in strategic and other partnerships, yet the structural differences will inhibit their long-term cordiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China seems to be replacing America as the powerbroker in the Middle East and the Gulf region while U.S.-ally Saudi Arabia seems to be switching sides. But while Riyadh prefers a non-liberal world order, such as the one China promises, Saudi economic interests remain aligned with America and the West, especially with signs indicating that China's economy, and therefore power, have peaked, and are unlikely to replace America's. Saudi Arabia's bilateral trade and investments with China might suggest that relations between the two sides are deepening, but a closer look shows that such ties remain transactional, and therefore non-durable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"China's Law of the Sea: The New Rules of Maritime Order" by Isaac B. Kardon is a comprehensive study of China's influence on the international maritime order, with a focus on the South China Sea disputes. The book examines China's evolving stance towards international law and argues that China engages in extralegal changes to diminish the significance of established maritime laws and norms. Through multiple case studies, the author analyzes China's interpretation of geographic, resource, navigation, and dispute resolution rules, highlighting the divergence between China and other players in the South China Sea disputes. The book concludes that while China contests specific rules, it is unlikely to produce wholesale change to the legal rules of maritime order. The book is recommended for researchers interested in China's strategy towards maritime security and regional order. [Extracted from the article]

How does China view the world? While much has been written about how China's international relations are best seen as intercultural relations that do not exclude the Other, this article examines how self/Other relations are visualized in terms of the human face in China, in particular through iconic images that construct the Chinese self with and against foreigners with large noses. It employs interpretivist methods to consider the interplay of social relations and international relations in order to see how 'external appearance' and 'external relations' inform each other in Chinese theory and practice. It mobilizes the classical Chinese concept 'deep-set eyes and high-bridged nose' to compare iconic Chinese images of noses from the Tang dynasty, the Korean War, and twenty-first century China and Taiwan. This critical juxtaposition shows how foreigners are visualized as both friends and enemies in a hierarchical social system. The article's use of visual International Relations (IR) methods enables us to re-examine foreign affairs as a site of affective politics, and thus appreciate how China's ideological world-view resonates with how its artists, scholars and officials aesthetically view the world. This is a concern for IR scholars because world-views shape how foreign policy-makers frame foreign policy problems—and thus foreign policy solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR literature has become inundated with different descriptions for the future of international order. The coming age is purportedly marked by China's ascendancy, American decline, a leaderless "no-one's world", or multiple competing modernities. Yet the global fight against climate change or shared COVID-19 strategies convey a different image of the world's predicament. The situation appears paradoxical: increasingly tense great-power relations are mixed with ever-strengthening interdependencies. This article contributes to these debates by exploring how global orders as well as regionalism today are increasingly defined by various types of connective functional links between intentional actors at various levels of social organisation. To enable a nuanced analysis, the article introduces an analytical framework composed of six connectivity logics, namely cooperation, copying, cushioning, contestation, containment, and coercion. These play out differently within material, economic, institutional, knowledge, people-to-people, and security spheres. The utility of this article's approach is demonstrated through empirical examples related to the policies of key actors in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was the first multilateral institution to be initiated by the People's Republic of China and is now the world's largest regional organization. This study investigates how the SCO has enlarged its 'circle of friends', which I understand as one of several ways that China attempts to spread its vision of international relations internationally. I focus on two major ways through which the SCO has increased this 'circle', namely membership expansion and cooperation with other regional and international organizations. Drawing on official SCO and Chinese government documents as well as first-hand interview data gathered in China in 2018, the study offers insights into the core mechanisms through which the Chinese-led organization has expanded its 'circle of friends' and discusses these developments against the backdrop of China's ambition to influence the international order through the SCO. The analysis will make evident that the SCO has managed to extend far beyond its founding member states and that this supposedly helps China gain support for its normative views and arguments on the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, China's higher education sector has started to establish special programs to train and support talents to seek career opportunities in the United Nations (UN). To explore these special programs and understand their relationship with China's internationalization strategies and its higher education, we used the center-periphery model as the theoretical framework. We analyzed 53 institutional documents and conducted semi-structured interviews among 5 university staff members and 21 students/recent graduates who were involved in these special programs. The analysis on the special programs implied Chinese higher education's peripheral position in supporting talents to work in the UN. This was reflected by the conforming practice, including accepting current UN recruitment regulations and English's dominance in the UN recruitment practice. However, we also identified alternative dynamics that China and its higher education do not simply obey the center-periphery model and accept their peripheral status. Instead, special programs were established to achieve China's global strategy of moving to the center of international arena via multilateralism and international organizations such as the UN. This study sheds light on further explorations of the state-university relationship in China in the globalization era, especially from the perspective of cultural diplomacy and soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China's path to joining the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), a private international organization founded in Paris in 1920, of which China was a member from 1931–1949 and from 1994 onwards. The article charts the actors and debates behind two meaningful encounters. The first took place while the Nanjing government was raising funds for economic reconstruction, and the ICC aimed to mediate China's fundraising efforts through private multilateral channels. The second was in the 1980s, when the People's Republic was seeking to enter the world trade system. ICC members acted as educators and facilitators of world trade practicalities for the People's Republic, which eventually rejoined the ICC in 1994. The article draws on Chinese, European, and American source material collected from governments, chambers of commerce, and private businessmen to make a twofold contribution. First, it adds nuance to the narrative of China's economic internationalization by identifying an important non-governmental diplomatic channel. Second, it questions the ICC's self-proclaimed identity as a non-political economic organization by showing how the political was indissociable from the economic when it came to China's membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we make sense of China's perceptions of and relationship with the liberal international order (LIO)? The majority of notable works on this topic have been written by foreign scholars who emphasize China's discontent with, or challenges it poses to, the LIO, while Chinese scholars have either focused solely on academic debates or attempted to interpret official foreign policies. This article aims to provide a balanced analysis of China's view of order by examining theoretical thought and policy practices from a Chinese perspective, drawing insights from both Chinese academic writings and government statements. We argue that there exists a perceptual difference between China and the West in understanding the postwar international order, with China emphasizing the functional part of the order and the West regarding it as based on its preferred ideological values. This perceptual difference has caused international suspicion about China's potential intentions to overthrow the LIO. In practice, China's approach has remained pragmatic, interacting dynamically with different subcomponents of the LIO. Although China's recent interactions with the LIO appear more ambitious, internal and external constraints, insufficient capacity, and lack of universally appealing values are preventing the birth of a Chinese version of international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Global Discord: Values and Power in a Fractured World Order" is a comprehensive book that explores the current state of international affairs. Written by Sir Paul Tucker, a former central and international banker, the book delves into the challenges faced by the liberal West in dealing with rising authoritarian powers like China without compromising its principles. Tucker emphasizes the need for global cooperation to address issues such as climate change, pandemics, and weapons proliferation. The book is divided into five parts, covering topics such as the historical overview of the international order, the role of international institutions, and the vulnerabilities of the international economic system. Tucker presents four scenarios for the future of the international system, highlighting the decline in the legitimacy of Western-made rules and the importance of incentives and values compatibility in international arrangements. The book is recommended for practitioners in international monetary and financial regulation, as well as students studying international politics and economics. [Extracted from the article]

China's influence in extractive industry sectors worldwide has expanded in tandem with the rising global demand for the natural resources integral to producing such low carbon products as electric vehicles. Many Chinese-operated mining projects overseas have hence generated broad concern on the ground about their negative environmental and social impacts. Chinese actors, meanwhile, have begun to engage with transnational extractive governance initiatives entailing a transparency norm that requires disclosure of environmental and social risks. China, however, appears to be reshaping this transparency norm through its establishment of the Responsible Cobalt Initiative (RCI)—a China-led "transnational" governance initiative facilitating a Chinese version of that norm, known as "thin" transparency. Based on process-tracing and semi-structured interviews, in applying Acharya's (2018) norm-circulation model, this paper examines what type of Chinese domestic actors act as norm-makers and under what conditions. The study thus refines certain core analytical concepts of the model. The RCI case stands alone in highlighting China's growingly normative role in contesting the transparency norm through transnational interactions among Chinese and international actors in global extractives governance. The result shows China's norm-making as a strategic choice of a local idea-shifter to cope with China's internal and external legitimacy crises and to strengthen its emerging identity as a responsible great power. This study rejects the notion of China as a monolithic actor, rather suggesting a multi-agency and multilevel approach to understanding the complex realities of China's normative leadership in global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The China–Africa relationship has received increased interest over the past few decades as scholars critically examine the challenge that China, in its quest for a closer strategic partnership with Africa, poses to the norms governing the neoliberal world order (NLWO). One crucial aspect of this is international aid, and how Chinese aid to Africa differs from Western aid. This paper argues that Chinese aid reduces the power of traditional aid donors to shape the development route of African countries. This new development finance ultimately breaks the monopoly of Western aid to decide how poor countries in the global 'South' develop. In doing so, the Sino–African aid relationship is challenging the current world order as it offers African states the possibility to decouple (or delink) themselves from the global economy. By challenging assumed neoliberal economic development fundamentals, this relationship, if harnessed correctly by African leaders, can pose longer-term ideological questions around the very set of ideas that underpin development itself, while enabling African states the policy space needed to pursue more sustainable development from an Afro-centric perspective. It is this possibility to delink, due to changing ideological fundamentals concerning economic development, that is the challenge China and Africa pose to the NLWO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a significant actor in global governance, China has become increasingly active in addressing global environmental challenges. However, Chinese fishing practices do not conform with its policies. How do we understand China's apparently incoherent stance? Using the case of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing governance, we explore why China shifted its approach from reluctance to engagement while still allowing the Chinese fleet's IUU fishing activities to some extent. We find that China safeguards its self-interest by shaping domestic and international rules on anti-IUU fishing while pursuing means of legitimising its actions and intangible aspects of power in the oceans. Our findings have far-reaching implications. First, China's notion of environmental responsibility is likely to remain within the scope of its interests and what China can control. Second, China's global environmental approach can be understood as the pursuit of intangible aspects of great power status in addition to its tangible interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking into account the deficit in nuclear security governance, the threat of nuclear terrorism, the global trend of low-carbon transition, and the strategic significance of nuclear security, President Xi Jinping has innovatively proposed the concept of building a community with a shared future for nuclear security. With a goal of constructing an international nuclear security system characterized by fairness, cooperation, and mutual benefit, building such a community is guided by the concept of rational, coordinated and balanced nuclear security, and requires strengthened political investment, national responsibility, international cooperation, and nuclear security culture. This idea demonstrates the Chinese wisdom and Chinese approach to global governance, promotes the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Chinese path to modernization, and serves the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China insists on enhancing its nuclear security capabilities, participating in the international nuclear security system, promoting international cooperation in nuclear security, and eliminating the root causes of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, thus making important contributions to global nuclear security governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China's discursive power, placing it in the broader context of China's increasing assertiveness in the global arena. I argue that exporting the China model farther afield is the key for China to exert its discursive power. The mechanism to do this lies in two essential and decisive auxiliaries that "flank" China's soft discursive power: technological development/innovation and the role of the Chinese private sector. Theoretically, the study adopts a tripartite framework to examine China's discursive power: power facts, shared rules, and social practices, with the help of the "affective sticking points" to analyze China's Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road discourses. Empirically, the article investigates the case of Transsion Holdings, a Chinese giant smart‐device maker in Africa, to study China's discursive influences in Africa. To conclude, I reflect on the role of the private sector and the meaning of "China beyond China." Related Articles: Duggan, Niall. 2020. "China—The Champion of the Developing World: A Study of China's New Development Model and its Role in Changing Global Economic Governance." Politics & Policy 48(5): 836–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12377. Fong, Ware, and Nazmus Sakib. 2021. "A 'Good' Country without Democracy: Can China's Outward FDI Buy a Positive State Image Overseas?" Politics & Policy 49(5): 1146–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12428. Zeng, Jinghan, Tim Stevens, and Yaru Chen. 2017. "China's Solution to Global Cyber Governance: Unpacking the Domestic Discourse of 'Internet Sovereignty." Politics & Policy 45(3): 432–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12202. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on political and historical sources and on the analysis of Chinese presence within international organizations, this article aims at showing the evolution of the Chinese Internet governance model. Namely, this study highlights the Chinese shift from a status of a norm taker to that of a norm maker. This research argues that China began to be engaged in the global governance discussion of the Internet from the first years of its Internet history. Because of its historical relations with China and its impact on domestic Chinese Internet history, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was considered the ideal international organization to govern the global Internet. The present article confirms this through the analysis of Mr. Zhao Houlin's strategies before and after his election as Secretary General of the ITU. Finally, in line with the rationale of the present special issue, this research argues that the Chinese role in the global Internet governance debate does not reverse its status quo of the global Internet governance. Whereas, given China's engagement in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), engagement suggests a collaborative attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that transregional communication mechanisms and the diffusion of narratives are important co-drivers towards autocratization. Offering a look beyond the 'material' in the study of global authoritarianism, it makes two conceptual arguments. It shows show transregional authoritarian practices are often discursively reinforced. Moreover, it demonstrates how narratives and their transregional diffusion are a form of authoritarian image management and a tool for fostering authoritarian stability. Departing from the basic assumption of authoritarian diffusion, the article is guided by two questions: which narratives of supremacy are used by the Chinese government in the context of the pandemic? And how are these narratives received, reproduced and contested in the Gulf? Based on a qualitative analysis of more than 3,000 media outlets (March–May 2020) from China and the Gulf region, the article shows how China strategically promotes authoritarian narratives regarding its international role, by telling stories of supremacy and heroism and by narratively conjuring a new world order. Moreover, it shows how the Chinese narratives are diffused to Iran, Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and depicts the different patterns of reception, reproduction and contestation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights the convergence and divergence between India and the US pertaining to China under the Trump administration. Given Trump's forceful personality and apparent chemistry with Modi, it is tempting to attribute bilateral relations to individual leaders. However, systemic pressures due to shared concerns over China's rise and aggressive behavior played a significant role in keeping relations on track and ultimately deepening them. This led to increasing Indo-US cooperation in the Quad especially after the Galwan Valley cash in June 2020 although India initially feared entrapment. While there was convergence on the broad contours of the threat of a Sino-centric Asia, coming to agreement on specific strategies to prevent it faced its share of challenges with Trump wanting New Delhi to do more to counter China and do it faster. There was also divergence related to India's continuing attachment to strategic autonomy underwritten by a multipolar world order, and Indian and American definitions of the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific and how the priority areas of each differed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines four schools of thought about US strategy in Asia, particularly regarding China. These four viewpoints—here termed the responsible stakeholder, communist collapse, constructive cooperation, and managed competition schools—are determined largely by the answers to two questions. First, to what degree should US policies focus on integrating China into the international order, versus mitigating the consequences of China's rise? Second, should US policy makers seek a specified end state with China, or simply focus on achieving a stable steady state? Based on a detailed analysis of existing commentary, we assert that most debates about US objectives vis-à-vis China revolve around these questions. This essay concludes that US policies are likely to incorporate aspects of all four theories, which will make it difficult—if not impossible—for the United States to adopt any clear and sustained strategy across administrations. Barring a major breakthrough or breakdown in US–China relations, Washington is destined for a muddled debate on China that will make it difficult to achieve strategic consensus. And this strategic confusion on China will have substantial implications for US regional strategy more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia regards the shift in the center of economic gravity to Asia, marked by the rise of China and India following the earlier Asian tigers, as a welcome phenomenon that can benefit its own economic development. However, while celebrating the economic dynamism of the Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia also views with great concern China's assertiveness in pursuing its claims over the whole of the South China Sea, as well as the re-emergence of major power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China as the incumbent and ascending superpower respectively, which can disrupt regional stability and prosperity. With its 'free and active' foreign policy doctrine Indonesia adheres to non-alignment, and as a matter of principle does not take sides in any great power competition. Indonesia's policy in managing regional uncertainty which offers both opportunities for cooperation and threats of conflicts can best be described as hedging plus to ensure both its strategic autonomy and agency. It entails engaging all sides to maximize benefits while mitigating risks at both the national level and through ASEAN. At the same time, as the world's largest archipelagic state straddling the Indian and the Pacific oceans, and the largest member of ASEAN, Indonesia carries out middle-power diplomacy by playing a leading role in promoting ASEAN-centric inclusive and cooperative wider East Asian multilateralism, helping to shape both the institutional and normative pillars of the International Order in the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the UK government's response to international order transition as seen through its recent foreign policy 'tilt' toward the 'Indo-Pacific'. It suggests that in post-Brexit Britain the determinants of foreign policy are increasingly complex involving an attempt to balance domestic policy, manage internal party conflict and establish an "independent" position in international relations in the context of US attempts to build a "grand alliance" against China. Our central argument is that the UK policy shift toward the Indo-Pacific is informed in large part by a changing dominant narrative on China and in particular by perceptions of China as "systemic competitor" in the global political economy. We argue that not only is the "tilt" at this point in time based on rather questionable assumptions regarding the UK's relationship with the 'region' but that 'international order transition' is more complex than is suggested by the new UK policy orientation. Limited in terms of conventional military power, the UK tilt strategy focuses on effecting institutional and normative change and positions the UK as a 'soft power superpower' alongside the United States in the region. In the context of renewed international political and economic crisis the "tilt" expresses the contradictions that lie at the heart of UK foreign policy rather than offering a clearly defined and viable new orientation for "global Britain." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world is changing, and the liberal international order (LIO) is at stake. Scholars and pundits hold different views on whether and how an order transition will take place. We argue that the divergent arguments around LIO are rooted in contested conceptualizations of what an international order is as well as the untheorized measure of what counts as a 'transition' of international order. We propose a synthesized and deductive approach to defining international order with three pillars: power, institutions, and norms. We argue that a significant order transition will take place when at least two pillars of the order are fundamentally challenged and eventually changed. Applying this deductive, three-pillar conceptual framework of international order, we preliminarily examine how US-China competition has impacted the current LIO in the Indo Pacific. We conclude that the multi-pillar feature of the international order technically strengthens the sustainability and resilience of the current LIO. Even though China's rise might change the power distribution in the system—the power pillar of the order, the mere power shift between China and the United States will not lead to a significant order transition if the other two pillars of the order remain intact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 2015, China began to promote eco-sustainability in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through not only vision statements but also specific guidelines and governance initiatives. What has driven these policy changes? Bringing together theories of norm localization, norm subsidiarity, and policy deliberation, we argue that China's move toward green BRI began as a norm localization process where environmental norms emerged in the open policy space created by China's top leaders carrying the ambition to make the BRI a new global governance model. After adopting a broad norm on environmental stewardship, state bureaucracies found opportunities to create procedural and operational rules. A novel procedural rule-making methodology emphasizing inclusive dialogue with host countries has emerged, driven by top leaders' pursuit of international leadership and preexisting local norms guiding South–South cooperation. With operational rules, different actors follow their preferences to localize existing international standards or develop new ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper explains the changing global world order under the leadership of China. The qualitative method with secondary sources describes the Chinese struggle for peace and interdependence in the post-Covid-19 era, maligned with the Russia-Ukraine war and American support to Ukraine under the banner of NATO. The theory of meditated realism (a third kind of realism, which results from contemplation and introspection, which leads to being proactive instead of reactive.) is used in the paper to explain the trilateral agreement. China is heading towards more alliances and agreements with Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa. It is reshaping the global world order and striving to replace the dollar with the yuan. It may start a new financial war between China and the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a theoretical logic and character of a Chinese model of international order. We begin by considering general problems of power transition and hegemonic order-building, with reference to the American experience with liberal hegemony. China will, like all powerful states, seek an order that protects its interests. But unlike its predecessors, China faces an existing order containing elements that threaten its domestic political and economic model. We describe this domestic model and consider how it might be defended at the international level—embedded in the logic and organizational principles of hegemonic order. Our contribution is to theorize the consequences of China's hegemonic interests, including domestic preservation, and its order-building practices, for the operation and underlying character of a China-led hegemonic order. Though not inherently illiberal in form, we outline how the emergent order could generate illiberal outcomes. This article therefore theorizes the concept of illiberal hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s head-of-state diplomacy has played a guiding role in 2022. China’s diplomatic work has focused on ensuring the success of the 20th CPC National Congress as top priority and on building a community with a shared future for mankind as our vision. We have adapted to changes, addressed adversities and broken new ground. We have conducted major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in an all-round way, making new contribution to upholding world peace and promoting common development. As we look to the future, the report to the 20th CPC National Congress has pointed the direction, provided the basic policy and made strategic plans for major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. We will better serve head-of-state diplomacy and central tasks expand all-round diplomacy in a coordinated manner, continue to look for the widest possible convergence of interests in global governance, and actively serve high-quality development and opening-up. We will build a stronger line of defense to protect our national interests, focus on strengthening our international communication capacity and make our voice heard loud and clear, maintain a global vision, and forge ahead with greater resolve. We will write a new chapter and secure new successes in major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics from a broader perspective and through stronger actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on how China views the normative structure of the international order. It integrates the Chinese cultural idea of guanxi into the established English School tradition in International Relations theory and argues that the norm of guanxi is an emerging pluralist primary institution. In this article, the author first presents the emergence of guanxi as a purposive norm in China's foreign policy, and the interplay of this norm between China and other international actors. Second, the article scrutinizes the establishment of secondary institutions reflecting the norm of guanxi. Third, this article discusses how this primary institution has been consolidated at regional and global levels. In conclusion, this article briefly draws on two major developments of international politics: the cultural diversity of the international order and the emergence of a China-centred international society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(How) are Chinese actors contributing to increased state influence in Internet standard-making? In its open and private-based dimension, the Internet is possibly the twenty-first century's epitome of the liberal international order in its global spatial dimension. Therefore, many see deep normative challenges deriving from the rise of powerful, non-liberal actors such as China. In particular, China and Chinese stakeholders are often portrayed as supporters and promoters of a multilateral Internet governance model based on digital sovereignty aimed at completely replacing the existing multistakeholder, private-based model. Academic views on this topic have become less dichotomous throughout the years, especially as China's position on it has become more nuanced. However, this academic and policy debate is still open. This article analyses Chinese stakeholder actions in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the key venue for Internet standard-making. Through network analysis, this article maps the engagement of Chinese stakeholders in selected working groups of the IETF over time. Through expert interviews, this article interprets the drivers, evolution, and impact of such engagement. This research yields two main findings: first, it shows that the Chinese government does not have full control of its domestic private actors, among which there is both collaboration and conflict. Second, it concludes that Chinese stakeholders have increasingly accepted the existing functioning of IETF standard-making as they grew influential within it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International lawyers have finally turned their attention to cities. However, the emerging interdisciplinary literature on International Law and Cities has largely overlooked Chinese cities cultivating in a distinct political context. Such neglect may further contribute to a crude understanding of China's growing ambition in its international legal strategy in general and Chinese cities' practice of international law in particular. This article aims to fill that gap by reflecting upon the relationship between China's central government and local governments in dealing with international legal affairs and elucidating how Chinese cities engage with international law in global politics and governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the mechanics through which the EU's relations with China may harm its values and institutions, providing specific examples that precisely illustrate the Chinese Communist Party's malign influence in Europe. It also intends to reflect on the extent to which the two distinct political and economic models are compatible with the preservation of a liberal international order. Accordingly, we aim to assess whether the EU has the capacity to counteract China's sharp power, highlighting concrete policy actions that help strengthen the EU's position while also identifying persisting shortcomings. It is argued that the EU has considerable economic deterrence to push China into respecting global defined rules and arrangements. Indeed, recent reforms, such as the investment screening mechanism and the global sanctions regime, were an important step towards the affirmation of an EU committed to its values. However, the unanimity requirement in the Common Foreign and Security Policy's decision-making will likely remain a relevant obstacle for a coherent and efficient EU's external action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing debate over whether China's economic model can be managed within the rules of the multilateral trade system, a debate with major implications for international order. Critics argue that the China model is a systemic rival to the liberal trade order, a view that implies future decoupling. For those who reject the rivalry view, the default position is to propose more trade agreements with China, with the goal of driving liberal reforms in the country. This article engages the debate by contributing a conceptually informed and empirically supported analysis of China's institutional development. Combining 'second image' insights with a comparative capitalism framework helps explain why nations evolve distinct varieties of market economy, which then shape their multilateral preferences. Applying these insights to China's institutional development suggests two things: (1) the country is in transition to a socialist, rather than liberal, market economy, grounded in a fundamentally different legal and normative order; (2) the socialist market economy shapes Chinese preferences towards challenging the liberal trade order at a systemic level (i.e. over the rules of the game, rather than within them). Empirically, the article highlights two modes of systemic contestation by China that confirm the paper's conceptual expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an important public product, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road has been developing well since it was proposed. Global governance is facing new situations and challenges, and the ‘four deficits’ of global governance, namely the peace deficit, the governance deficit, the security deficit, and the development deficit, have come to the fore. As an important element of global governance, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is also faced with challenges. Despite the constraints and hindrances of the ‘four deficits,’ green development is still playing a leading role in promoting proper values and is an important way to promote global governance. This article explores and analyzes the challenges of green development in the construction of the Maritime Silk Road. These challenges mainly include the lack of green justice, the deficiencies of green development regulations, the increase in global turmoil, the lack of distributive justice, and the inherent contradiction between economic growth and green development. The causes are ideological influence, interstate game constraints, differences in economic strength, and extensive development patterns. Based on this, this article puts forward the following coping strategies: further promote the development of a human community with a shared future and alleviate the peace deficit; improve the regulations of green development and consolidate the foundation of governance; implement the global security initiative and eliminate security crises; promote green economic growth and tackle the development deficit; and promote marine ecological governance and consolidate the foundation of green development. As a successful model of global governance, the Maritime Silk Road associates it⁃ self with green development and serves as a cornerstone and path to solving the ‘four deficits’ in global governance. China will play a major role as an important participant, contributor, and leader in global governance, propose Chinese wisdom and solutions to alleviate the ‘four deficits’ in global governance, and promote the building of a ‘community of green development.’ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global health governance (GHG) was one of COVID-19's earliest victims. Soon after the novel coronavirus escaped China, the World Health Organization (WHO) was marginalized, and the International Health Regulations became practically irrelevant, as nations adopted uncoordinated, ad hoc responses. Existing explanations of GHG's collapse are largely utopian, criticizing states for failing to empower the WHO with sufficient supranational authority. This misunderstands how GHG was supposed to work in the first place and hence mistakenly diagnoses the causes of failure. We argue that COVID-19 exposed the pathologies of an entire, neoliberal approach to global governance: metagovernance and state transformation. In this approach, international organizations are hollowed out and their role shifts to metagovernance—developing and disseminating 'best practice' policies, institutions and rules for states to embed domestically. Such global regimes' efficacy, therefore, depends on states' capacity to enforce global disciplines. However, nation-states are also hollowed out by neoliberal strictures, undermining practical implementation. Consequently, GHG was failing long before COVID-19, leaving the system dependent on ad hoc interventions by dominant states. With the latter also affected by COVID-19, GHG was left in disarray. Reform proposals should therefore focus less on global institutions and rules and more on building domestic capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Along with the accelerated development of digital technology and the digital economy, the international community faces more risks and challenges. Global digital governance has become a frontier issue and a critical task in global governance. After early coordination purely on technology, the international community has progressed in digital infrastructure construction, digital economy framework, digital taxation reform, and regional digital cooperation. China has actively led and participated in this process, making a significant contribution. However, under the complex and changing international situation, global digital governance faces many challenges at five levels: foundation, rules, methods, subjects, and objects. China understands the current dilemma in global digital governance and has been making efforts on fundamental concepts, institutional platforms, scientific and technological innovations, and forefront responses based on its experiences and theoretical guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]