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Countries increasingly rely on subsidies to assist their producers leading to concerns about their potential misuse. The WTO regulates its members’ subsidies by defining subsidies that are permissible, as well as by providing means to retaliate against subsidies of partner countries if these subsidies hurt one's interest. However, these subsidy rules might have an unintended effect. As both subsidies and tariffs are substitute instruments of protection, tighter subsidy rules might lead to a decrease in the pace of tariff liberalization. In this paper, we present first empirical evidence in support of this prediction. Using China's accession to the WTO in 2001 as a case study, we show that China's accession to the WTO was associated with a relative increase in its tariffs for products that faced a higher threat of retaliation against subsidies. More importantly, we also show that increases in tariff were larger in products with higher potential costs imposed by retaliation. Finally, we include several robustness tests as well as conduct two counterfactual exercises to verify that the results we obtain are indeed due to perceived threat of retaliation against subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on industry-level data to analyze the political economy of the use of the antidumping statute by 10 less developed countries (LDCs) against China. Test results suggest that Chinese import competition is an important factor explaining the pattern of LDC antidumping initiation against China. Macroeconomic factors such as gross domestic product growth rate also play some role in influencing the pattern of LDC antidumping determination against China. Importantly, statistical analyses did not yield any evidence suggesting that China's membership in the World Trade Organization has disciplined developing countries' use of the antidumping policy. The paper conjectures that China's Most-Favored-Nation status under the World Trade Organization, the designation of China as a nonmarket economy in antidumping investigations until 2016, and the retaliatory incentives generated by the growing deflection of Chinese exports to developing country markets may have overwhelmed the institutional effect of the trade organization in shaping the pattern of LDC antidumping decision making toward China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a 1995 national survey of 2,870 Chinese private entrepreneurs, this article examines collaboration between private business and government in times of economic transition. Much as in the late 18th century situation in France as described by Tocqueville, special moments occur when a newly emerging business class offers monetary payments for charity and for honorary offices. In exchange, the government, desperate for new sources of revenue, provides social recognition and political access. The data suggest that into at least the 19905 Chinese private entrepreneurs donated generously to government welfare projects, and in exchange gained political access and social status via appointment to political councils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]