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While previous resource conflicts have often been linked to fuel minerals such as oil, future resource conflict may revolve around nonfuel minerals that enable strategic emerging technologies. During a 2010 diplomatic dispute, China reportedly blocked exports of rare earth elements to Japan, thereby leveraging China's near-monopoly to threaten Japanese manufacturers of advanced technologies including batteries and permanent magnets. Although this caused significant concern for manufacturers outside China, China's control over other critical minerals has yet to be studied comprehensively. Besides rare earth elements, perhaps no mineral has received more attention for its supply risks than cobalt. Here Chinese control is estimated for each cobalt material at each stage of the cobalt supply chain from 2000 through 2022. The results show that from mining, to refining, consumption, recycling, stocks, and trade, China dominates the cobalt materials that feed lithium-ion battery cathode production. Specifically, the results show that in 2022 Chinese firms had control over 62% of cobalt mine materials primarily used for cobalt chemical refining, 95% control of refined commercial-grade cobalt chemicals, 92% control of battery-grade tricobalt tetroxide, 85% control of battery-grade cobalt sulfate, and 91% control of nickel–cobalt-manganese cathode precursor materials. China's monopoly over cobalt battery materials may imply a serious supply risk to non-Chinese battery producing and consuming industries—especially given rising geopolitical tensions and the reemergence of critical mineral export restrictions including gallium for semiconductors, germanium for solar panels, graphite for lithium-ion batteries, and (again) rare earth elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 2000 through 2020, demand for cobalt to manufacture batteries grew 26-fold. Eighty-two percent of this growth occurred in China and China's cobalt refinery production increased 78-fold. Diminished industrial cobalt mine production in the early-to-mid 2000s led many Chinese companies to purchase ores from artisanal cobalt miners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), many of whom have been found to be children. Despite extensive research on artisanal cobalt mining, fundamental questions about its production remain unanswered. This gap is addressed here by estimating artisanal cobalt production, processing, and trade. The results show that, while total DRC cobalt mine production grew from 11,000 metric tons (t) in 2000 to 98,000 t in 2020, artisanal production only grew from 1,000 to 2,000 t in 2000 to 9,000 to 11,000 t in 2020 (with a peak of 17,000 to 21,000 t in 2018). Artisanal production's share of world and DRC cobalt mine production peaked around 2008 at 18 to 23% and 40 to 53%, respectively, before trending down to 6 to 8% and 9 to 11% in 2020, respectively. Artisanal production was chiefly exported to China or processed within the DRC by Chinese firms. An average of 72 to 79% of artisanal production was processed at facilities within the DRC from 2016 through 2020. As such, these facilities may be potential monitoring points for artisanal production and its downstream consumers. This finding may help to support responsible sourcing initiatives and better address abuses related to artisanal cobalt mining by focusing local efforts at the artisanal processing facilities through which most artisanal cobalt production flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, resource conflicts have often centered on fuel minerals (particularly oil). Future resource conflicts may, however, focus more on competition for nonfuel minerals that enable emerging technologies. Whether it is rhenium in jet engines, indium in flat panel displays, or gallium in smart phones, obscure elements empower smarter, smaller, and faster technologies, and nations seek stable supplies of these and other nonfuel minerals for their industries. No nation has all of the resources it needs domestically. International trade may lead to international competition for these resources if supplies are deemed at risk or insufficient to satisfy growing demand, especially for minerals used in technologies important to economic development and national security. Here, we compare the net import reliance of China and the United States to inform mineral resource competition and foreign supply risk. Our analysis indicates that China relies on imports for over half of its consumption for 19 of 42 nonfuel minerals, compared with 24 for the United States--11 of which are common to both. It is for these 11 nonfuel minerals that competition between the United States and China may become the most contentious, especially for those with highly concentrated production that prove irreplaceable in pivotal emerging technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]