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China's role in Southeast Asia is of a multi-dimensional nature and, as in the case of all small and medium powers that are forced to deal with the presence of a great power in their midst, the Southeast Asian nations have to negotiate and mediate China's presence. The resulting conduct of foreign policy, foreign economic policy and security policy towards China is no longer based on the strategic considerations of insulated government elites, but are the result of complex decision-making processes which are also influenced by non-governmental actors. Consequently, foreign policy-makers have to reconcile international and domestic priorities and demands. Loosely based on Robert Putnam's analytical framework of "two-level games", this article looks at two case studies which highlight the interlinked reality of international and national agendas. First, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which was initially and enthusiastically embraced by ASEAN for general political reasons, and second, the conflicts in the South China Sea where the Southeast Asian claimants are carefully trying to balance a multilateral approach towards China (via ASEAN) with their specific national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of 2015 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will announce the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In theory, this agreement should produce an association-wide economic integration. However, following the announcement, and for the foreseeable future, ASEAN member states will continue in significantly less than full regional economic integration. Why? Some observers believe that the AEC plans involve an "overly ambitious timeline and too many ill-thought-out initiatives." Others point to ASEAN's traditional aversion to legally binding agreements. While progress has been made in reducing or eliminating intra- ASEAN trade tariffs, substantial non-tariff barriers to trade persist. However, for most member states, the ASEAN market is relatively small while external markets, especially China, are growing rapidly. Given this outward-orientation for ASEAN trade, is the lack of an unhindered regional market really a problem? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the growing pro-environment rhetoric in ASEAN-China relations resulted in the effective mainstreaming of environmental issue into trade agreements and multilateral cooperation frameworks? The article discusses the cases of the ASEAN China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and argues that there is no shortage of national and regional policy agendas that visibly link trade growth and environmental considerations. However, this nexus is still a weak one in terms of implementation and effectiveness. The most promising initiatives towards an effective reconciliation of trade growth and environmental sustainability are promoted and often driven by foreign donors, most prominently the European Union (EU). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Vietnam in 2008, domestic issues including political and economic conditions, and Vietnam's successes in foreign policy. Actions of the Vietnamese Communist Party are noted including its arrest of newspaper journalists for infringing on government interests. Vietnam's economy is said to affected by rising inflation. It notes Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and the political relationship between Vietnam and China.

The management of security and ultimately order building in ASEAN-China relations are loosely embedded in a declaratory process of community formation. While this process has generated generally beneficial soft institutions in economic and other policy areas, the current state of relative regional peace is primarily attributable to China's emerging role as a hegemonic stabilizer. The PRC increasingly sets the rules and organizes a growing network of security-relevant relationships in both traditional and non-traditional security fields, lust as in the cases of Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, the up-and-coming Pax Sinica is characterized by the creation and enforcement of rules that are profitable to the dominant state at the center of the security order. At the same time the policies of China as a hegemonic power on the horizon also bring security benefits to the states in its zone of influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]