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Since the employee representatives on the board of directors and board of supervisors were adopted by the Company Law in 1993, they have been powerless and gradually neglected by the policymakers and the enterprises. However, to realize the ambitious commitments regarding the labour protection in the agreement 'in principle' for a new the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), reached by the EU and China on December 30, 2020, China must promote the companies to enforce the labour laws consciously by improving these employee governance mechanisms. Under the Company Law, both the employee directors and employee supervisors are mandatory for the SOEs, while the private companies can decide whether they install the employee directors. Due to the dramatic increment of the employees in the private enterprises brought out by the excessive pursuit of efficiency rather than equity in the reform of SOEs and the failure of the labour laws as the external regulations of companies to isolate the workers from the intolerable exploitation in the large private companies the Amendment of Company Law, released on December 24, 2021, has realized the significance of employees' protection in the large private enterprises. But it has not yet changed the shareholders' meeting centred model, which fundamentally restricts the functions of the employee directors and employee supervisors. In this regard, this article suggests that the new Company Law should eliminate the supreme power of shareholders' meeting and impose the definite duty of complying with the labour laws upon the decision-makers of the corporations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to investigate the impact of the 2016 Charity Law of the People's Republic of China on corporate philanthropy and its mechanism. Based on the difference‐in‐difference framework, empirical results show that the charity law has significantly increased the charitable donation level of firms with direct product–consumer contact rather than that in other firms. The additional analysis indicates that corporate self‐interest motives, but not altruistic motives, are ruled out as the mechanisms through which corporate philanthropy is delivered. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals that the charitable donation has not remarkably enhanced firms' operating performance, while the capital market gives these firms a higher valuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from China's public debt markets, we study the value of corporate reputation and how it interacts with legal and cultural forces to assure accountability. Exploring lawsuits that change corporate reputation, we find that firms involved in lawsuits experience a decrease in bond values and a tightening of borrowing terms. Using the heterogeneities in legal and social capital environments across Chinese provinces, we find the effects are more pronounced for private firms, firms headquartered in provinces with low legal protections, and firms headquartered in provinces with high social capital. The results show that lawsuits that allege misconduct are associated with reputational penalties and that such penalties serve as substitutes for legal protections and as complements to cultural forces to provide ex post accountability and motivate ex ante trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from non-financial listed firms in China from 2008 to 2020, this study investigates the effect of the new Environmental Protection Law on corporate financialization based on the difference-in-differences model. Findings show that the law's implementation significantly increases the financialization behaviors of corporations in polluting industries. This effect remains robust after a series of robustness checks. Heterogeneity analyses suggest that the policy effect of the law is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with high fixed assets ratios, and enterprises in regions with excellent market competition. The new Environmental Protection Law also promotes the financialization of enterprises by increasing costs, reducing commercial credit financing capabilities, increasing risks, and hindering innovation. This article provides new evidence for understanding macro-environmental regulation and micro-firm effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines 781 proposals sponsored by minority shareholders of Chinese listed companies since the Company Law was revised in 2005, which made proposals more accessible to smaller shareholders. I find that the shareholder structure is essential for minority shareholders to target a company. When the controlling ownership is smaller and minority ownership is relatively larger, a company is more likely to be targeted by minority shareholders' proposals (MSPs). There is also evidence that minority shareholders target poor performers, but that only happens when the shareholder structure is optimal for minority shareholders to initiate activism. Power, in the form of ownership and identity, dominates the probability of activism behavior. The passage of MSPs heavily depends on whether the proposal is friendly to the management, the identity of the sponsor, and the issues involved. Being targeted by MSPs are often followed by forced top management turnover, but there are no performance improvements in the medium term. Minority shareholders' activism is more of a game of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Financial & Economic Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The resolution of insolvency of small and medium-sized enterprises ('SMEs') has attracted much attention and criticism globally. Studies from around the world suggest that regular insolvency law fails to address the particular needs and challenges of SME financial distress. China has recently introduced simplified rules aimed at improving the resolution of insolvent SMEs. This article examines these rules and assesses how well they address the identified needs and challenges faced by insolvent SMEs. It considers how the examined rules differ from regular insolvency law and how they compare with the broader international best practice and guidance for SMEs. The discussion evaluates new solutions and tools that have been used in China, their effectiveness and impact both on paper and based on the outcomes in practice. The article concludes by identifying eight lessons for other jurisdictions which are trying to improve resolution of SME insolvencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates whether and how social security contributions affect corporate financing decisions. Treating the 2011 Social Insurance Law in China as a quasi-natural experiment, our difference-in-differences framework utilizes two-dimensional variations: initial social security contribution rates across firms (i.e., high vs. low) and year (i.e., before and after 2011). We find that more social security contributions cause firms to issue less debt in their capital structure, particularly firms with more severe labor market frictions, greater labor intensity, unhealthier financial status, tighter financial constraints, and those located in low-income areas with less developed financial systems and greater fiscal pressure. Mechanism tests show that firms' operating leverage, bank credit default risk, and profitability volatility increase, while the supply of trade credit decreases, which is consistent with the financial distress hypothesis. The findings suggest that firms tend to choose conservative financing policies to mitigate the likelihood of financial distress caused by increasing social security contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natalie Mrockova essentially aims to demystify why the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law, including the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 1986 and its updated version of 2006, is not adequately implemented in practice, especially given the assumed economic benefits arising from an effective corporate bankruptcy system. Chapter ten asserts the desirability of reforming the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law for the sake of sustaining the healthy economic growth in China, followed by chapter 11 which recommends several reform options. Unlike similar books published recently, I Corporate Bankruptcy Law in China i expands and covers an examination of the Chinese judicial systems and lending practice, which makes it easy for the reader to appreciate the use of the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law against its political and economic backgrounds. [Extracted from the article]

Share repurchase becomes prevalent in the recent years in China, and China gradually changes its regulatory attitude from restriction to encouragement on it. In this paper, we present that the new round of Company Law revision in China reduces the signalling role of share repurchases; however, when the firms deliver good signals on dividends payout, the negative link between regulatory changes and market reaction to share repurchases becomes weaker. The paper sheds lights on the most up-to-date regulatory change in terms of share repurchases in China and its effect on market reaction to share repurchases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Northeastern University (Social Science) / Dongbei Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) is the property of Dongbei Daxue and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Financial & Economic Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the production of corporate legal elite through a systematic analysis of the profiles of the first three cohorts of partners in nine elite corporate law firms in Beijing. We argue that the social production of the Chinese corporate legal elite is primarily an outcome of domestic social factors rather than international factors. It is characterized by local elite recruitment from elite universities and endogenous elite circulation within the Red Circle firms. International credentials and work experience come only secondary to education and work experience in elite Chinese law schools and law firms for achieving elite status in the profession. Yet, international experience plays a role in promoting gender equality in elite professional service firms. This article contributes to the study of globalization and elite production in professional service firms by investigating how local and global forces manifest themselves in elite production in a major emerging market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compare the influence of legal and political factors on the corporate ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. We find that: (1) the improvement of corporate law quality and the less government intervene on firms lead to a decrease in corporate ownership concentration; (2) compared with the provincial corporate law performance, the effects of the provincial government intervention on the concentration of ownership is relatively significant; (3) the impact of government intervention on corporate ownership structure of state-owned firms are larger than that of private firms, whereas the impact of provincial corporate law implementation performance is more significant in samples of private firms. The policy implications are that most China's SOE reform measures have yet not cure the crux. The success of the reform may primarily depends on the re-examination and restructure of the political institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Northeastern University (Social Science) / Dongbei Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) is the property of Dongbei Daxue and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is the purpose of the corporation? The debate has continued for a long time without a clear answer partly because corporate law is often silent or ambiguous on the purpose of the corporation. The debate is largely academic and has limited dialogues with corporations that manage business in the real world. If corporations themselves articulate the purpose in their constitutive documents, it might be helpful to resolve the corporate purpose controversy. China offers a valuable empirical setting to examine how corporations formally state the purpose in their corporate charters. The empirical findings in this article show that the purpose clause in the articles of incorporation is not static but evolving with institutional and organisational demands. However, the purpose clause serves only a signalling or marketing function because of external and intrinsic constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been 13 years since statutory derivative actions were introduced into the Chinese Company Law. The lawmakers expected this mechanism could help enhance corporate governance by facilitating the provision of judicial remedies for shareholders. However, the statutory derivative action has had no significant impact on practice because of certain practical obstacles, such as funding difficulties faced by potential shareholder claimants. It should be mentioned that the fourth judicial interpretation of the Chinese Company Law enacted in September 2017 provides that shareholder plaintiffs could be indemnified by the company for rational litigation costs incurred in the derivative action. This article discusses: (I) the current practice of funding derivative litigation in China; (2) problems with funding derivative litigation in China; (3) proposals for funding derivative actions in China, for example, lowering case acceptance fees and introducing public funding for shareholder plaintiffs, particularly for minority ones; and (4) new funding mechanism introduced by the fourth judicial interpretation (2017) of the Chinese Company Law and how to facilitate the use of it. A conclusion is then made that the new mechanism may help to solve funding problems with derivative actions to a certain extent. But the good functioning of it needs more practical details, for example, how to define the scope of "reasonable litigation costs". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prestigious financial centres have attracted a number of Chinese companies seeking liquidity and international exposure (an example being the recordbreaking IPO of Alibaba in the US). This article seeks to explore how the regulatory cooperation of securities commissions can be a solution to the concerns arising from the regulation of these companies, given the perceived weaknesses in the governance of Chinese companies and the difficulties of cross-border enforcement. One notable example of regulatory cooperation can be seen in how the regulators in Hong Kong and China have worked closely together. Meanwhile, other overseas exchanges have started to pay more attention to the regulatory issues arising from Chinese listings. In the literature on cross-listing, this paper is the first to present a holistic approach, taking into account both the importance and the popularity of cross-listing as well as the most recent regulatory challenges and solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to shed light on the contentious theme of the reception of legal transplantation in the host environment, by examining the 2014 legislative reform of legal capital in China, which at least on paper imitates the enabling settings of US Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA). The paper looks at the interconnections between national-specific contextual elements, the resultant complexities, and the spillover effects of transplanted configurations in the unique Chinese socio-cultural setting, implicating the discrepancy between the ‘law in practice’ and the borrowed words ‘on the books’, and suggesting the importance of gaining a holistic understanding of ‘law’ involving the legal traditions in both the donor country and the recipient nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the area of environmental information disclosure has been developing as a way for listed corporations in China to adopt the concept of social responsibility. There are views that proposals to legislate corporate social responsibility must depend on existing legal rules of securities and corporate law. However, the foundation of structuring a legal system on environmental information disclosure by listed corporations is essentially incompatible with the legislative aim of securities law, which mainly focuses on protecting investors. As a result, it is hard to coordinate environmental law and securities law to regulate environmental information disclosure of listed corporations. Moreover, rules on environmental information disclosure by listed corporations would trigger a clash of institutional goals between stockholder protection and stakeholder protection, creating further tension with existing corporate law: via the principle of fiduciary duty. Thus, there are visible institutional barriers to introduce a mandatory environmental information disclosure system for listed corporations via existing securities law and company law. It is not that simple to legislate corporate social responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enactment of the new Companies Ordinance in Hong Kong has brought significant changes to the corporate law landscape by simplifying processes such as amalgamations, reductions of capital and the repurchase by a company of its own shares, with the objective of facilitating company restructuring. It is accordingly surprising that revenue legislation in Hong Kong has failed to keep pace with these developments and that published guidance issued by the Inland Revenue Department on point is both sparse and unsatisfactory. This article analyses the ad valorem stamp duty implications of court-free amalgamations and share buy-backs, with a view to identifying the lacunae in the Stamp Duty Ordinance, considering how the provisions in the two statutes as currently in force should interact and positing viable legislative solutions on the basis of the Singaporean experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When most of China's major cities are suffering from smog, people start to cry out for environmental improvement. The significance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become one of the hottest topics in China. CSR and shareholder primacy are widely debated idiosyncratic areas of corporate legislation. China's approach has thus far been unclear in both areas. This paper first considers all related provisions in Chinese commercial law in order to identify China's approach (law on the books) from the legislative perspective. Then, based on this conclusion of the schizophrenic Chinese corporate law, it further examines the enforcement of shareholder primacy and CSR laws using empirical methods (law in action). Finally, the efficacy of the current approach is analysed and assessed from a political economy perspective. The article concludes that it would be efficient for China to follow existing statutory requirements and imperatives. Moreover, China must correct practitioners' modus operandi in order to improve the rule of law. Social responsibility issues should, for the time being, be tackled outside the corporate law box rather than by meddling with already confusing director duties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate how state involvement in the ownership of non-listed entrepreneurial firms affects pollution fees levied by national and provincial governments in China (environmental levies). While the national government sets minimum environmental standards, provincial governments can enact requirements that exceed these minimums, and they are largely responsible for enforcing even the national standards, so environmental levies can measure concessions that provinces make to encourage development and employment. Furthermore, state ownership is a good proxy for a firm's political connections, which can influence the relationship between the firm and the environmental authorities. We find that firms with state ownership pay lower environmental levies, which indicates that concessions are made for political or economic purposes. However, these concessions are conditional on the level of development of the province offering them, with better developed provinces providing fewer concessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the provisions of China's Capital System Reform under the 2013 company law: reports the development of the company capital rule in the country; and mentions the evolutionary from the comparative law perspective.

This article provides a detailed analysis of the role of public shareholders in firm monitoring and corporate governance in one of the world's most concentrated ownership environments--China's controlled capital markets. It moves beyond the existing literature to explore in a comparative fashion innovative and sometimes idiosyncratic ways by which public shareholders can be involved in firm monitoring and corporate governance. In so doing, this article sheds new light on the global shift in the role of public shareholders towards greater empowerment and governance participation. Contributing to comparative corporate governance literature, this article offers a new analysis of current and prospective developments in the Chinese market, which is of particular importance globally as this market becomes increasingly central to the world economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issues related to the private nature of Chinese businesses and the emergence of Communist Party cells within China's private sector. It mentions that the issues such as trade, election, and corporate law for the necessity formal recognition regarding the corporate law. It also mentions that use of repurposed U.S. constitutional law doctrine by using certain legal tests which could prove instructive for lawmakers attempting to deal with party cells.

As a global popular corporate governance system developed in the us, independent directors were officially adopted by China through 'Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Systems of Independent Directors by Listed Companies' (hereinafter Independent Directors Opinion) in 2001 and through Article 123 of Company Law when it was amended in 2005. The emphasis on minority shareholders' protection by adopting independent directors in China can be attributed to the global influence of the American corporate governance model, which depends on disinterested directors as independent decision-makers. However, with more than 10 years having passed, independent directors serve as powerless advisers rather than decision-makers in China. Accordingly, this paper aims to ascertain some profound reasons for powerless advisers in China and provide recommendations to address this problem by comparing the role of independent directors in China and the us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the falling interest of foreign investors in China, as of January 2016; reports the China's legal framework governing foreign businesses; and evaluates the liability structures in the country that is subject to government approval.

The article discusses the role of common law derivative action and reports the British court case Foss v Harbottle concerning corporate law, which ruled that directors refusal to authorize legal action because it is not in their interests that the company should take legal action against them.

The article examines the adoption of derivative actions in the Chinese Company Law 2005 and discusses its consequences; reports the laws concerning protection of minority shareholders; and mentions the importance of proper governance of corporate management.

Corporate codes of ethics are integrated into supplier-auditing processes in the hope of ensuring sustainability throughout the supply chain. But little is known about what actually happens when one standardized code of ethics is disseminated and applied in audits on suppliers across the globe. This study builds on the literature on the ‘translation of management ideas’ and examines what happens when a corporate code of ethics travels in a global context. The specific case reports on a Swedish Multinational Corporation (MNC) with a standardized code of ethics applied in the practice of auditing a supplier in Eastern China. The study shows that the code can be translated in different ways in different organizational and geographical contexts. Observations of and interviews about how the code is translated in practice indicate that the code's ethics are negotiable. It is argued that sustainability and ethics are in danger of being negotiated or completely undermined when efficiency and contractual agreements set the agenda for audits, and that the relative buyer–supplier power relation can play a vital role in setting standards and demanding supplier compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many authoritarian regimes lack an independent judiciary. This article studies the effect of firms' political connectedness on court outcomes using a unique hand-collected data set of 3,323 commercial lawsuits involving listed companies in China. We find robust evidence that Chinese courts favor state firms and private firms with personal political ties. The positive effect of political connectedness is pronounced in the outcomes of litigation but not arbitration and is less pronounced in regions with better legal institutions. We also find that locally connected firms are favored in their home courts but not when the case is tried outside their home province. There is some evidence that China's 2007 Property Law reduces the advantage of state firms. Our results cast light on the welfare redistribution role of courts in emerging and transitional economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article surveys almost 300 court judgments in which shareholders have been sued for corporate debts under Article 20 of the PRC Company Law. The frequency of 'veil-lifting' can indicate how much weight is ascribed in China to fundamental corporate law principles such as limited liability, asset partitioning and the separate legal identity of the corporation. Our survey finds that shareholders were found liable for corporate debts in over 75% of cases, a significantly higher rate of veil-lifting than in jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. We challenge previous scholars' explanations of this phenomenon. We also argue that statutory vagueness has led to unfair and inconsistent veil-lifting judgments in a number of cases. The current interpretative system of Supreme People's Court Regulations and Guiding Cases needs modification to ensure that inconsistencies in adjudication are ironed out in a more timely manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses both empirical studies and case studies to answer an important question: is the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) protecting a "level playing field" in China's capital markets? The results of these studies demonstrate that the CSRC enforces regulations without considerable bias against either private listed companies or local-government-controlled listed companies in misrepresentation and insider trading cases. However, the CSRC grants regulatory subsidies to central-government-owned (CGO) listed companies. The CSRC's preferential policy towards CGO listed companies reveals the insufficiency of the "fragmented authoritarianism thesis". By contrast, investigating the relationship between the CSRC and the CGO listed companies under the "corporatism thesis" provides a more comprehensive explanation of the unique cooperation-based regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impetus behind the introduction of the statutory provision was the perceived need to protect the vulnerable minority shareholder against the unfair manipulation of the majority rule. Its raison d'être is clearly personal. And, as it is an important tool in the minority shareholder's arsenal, it is necessary that the scope of its application be sufficiently wide. The provision is therefore couched in expansive terms. This has led to questions being raised as to the scope of its application. Specifically, can a shareholder attempt to vindicate corporate claims through the provision? This short paper considers this issue against the background provided by the recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Ng Kek Wee v Sim City Technology Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has enacted a number of company law statutes since the early 1990s. These demonstrate a commitment to the adoption of the corporate form as a vehicle for business activity. In the 1993 and 2005 Company Laws, and in numerous amendments to these laws, Chinese legislators have shown that they have been well attuned to modern corporate law ideas and concepts. Nevertheless, these company laws reflect some important Chinese characteristics, such as the dominant role of the Communist Party and of the impact of the state in Chinese companies. Chinese company law has clearly evolved in the shadow of a strong authoritarian state. This has influenced the ways in which these laws have been implemented. This article explores key issues regarding the implementation of company law in China since 1993 and suggests that the language of the law cannot be understood without an appreciation of various institutional constraints upon the effect of company law upon Chinese companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Substantial amendments to the Company Law of the People' s Republic of China in 2005 and 2014 (together with the operation of the PRC ' s other associated laws, regulations, and international conventions and agreements) have made the " stakeholder-oriented" Company Law of the People' s Republic of China the most commercially effective and socially responsible model of corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper was to determine to what extent Hong Kong’s experience proves (or disproves) theories from corporate governance in the areas of family ownership, concentration, self-dealing in Hong, executive compensation and other issues. This paper – written in the comparative corporate governance tradition – uses data from Hong Kong to discuss wider trends and issues in the corporate governance literature. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use the comparative corporate governance approach – exposing a range of corporate governance theories to the light of Hong Kong data. The authors purposely avoid over-theorising – leaving the data to speak for themselves for other researchers interested in such theorising. Findings – The authors find that Hong Kong presents corporate challenges that are unique among upper-income jurisdictions – in terms of potentially harmful (shareholder value diminishing) family relationships, shareholder concentration and self-dealing by insiders. The authors also show that excessive executive compensation, accounting and audit weaknesses do not pose the same kinds of problems they do in other countries. The authors provide numerous comments on theoretical papers throughout the presentation in this paper. Research limitations/implications – The authors chose a relatively unused research approach that eschews theory building – instead, the authors use data from a range of sectors to build an overall picture of corporate governance in Hong Kong. The authors subsequently affirm or critique the theories of others in this paper. Practical implications – The original analysis conducted by the authors provided 22 recommendations for revising listing rules for Hong Kong’s stock exchange. Others – particularly Asian officials – should consider Hong Kong’s experience when revising their own corporate governance listing rules and regulations. Originality/value – This paper offers new and original insights in four directions. First, the authors use the empiricist’s method – presenting data from a wide range of corporate governance areas to comment on and critique existing studies. Second, the authors provide a system-wide view of corporate governance – showing how different parts of corporate governance rules work together using concrete data. Third, the authors provide a new study in the comparative corporate governance tradition – another brick in the wall that is “normal scientific progress”. Fourth, the authors pose tentative resolutions to highly debated questions in corporate governance for the specific time and place of Hong Kong in the early 2010s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the first detailed study of the Chinese oppression remedy under the PRC Company Law (article 20.1-2). Compared to its U.K., Canadian, and Australian equivalents, the wording of the Chinese remedy is vague, and the Supreme People's Court has not clarified its meaning. Legal scholars have virtually ignored this remedy due to its vagueness and apparent unenforceability, and the Supreme People's Court has not produced any authoritative interpretations to clarify its meaning. Yet Chinese courts have acted pragmatically, building up a body of de facto case precedents to transform this remedy into an effective tool for minority shareholders, both Chinese and foreign (and in some cases companies too), to obtain redress for a broad range of wrongs committed by abusive shareholders. At the same time, the vagueness of the statute has led courts to draw differing conclusions over issues such as who is a proper plaintiff; how the oppression remedy relates to the derivative action; and how the term "shareholder" should be defined. These differences need to be addressed by the Supreme People's Court or by legislative amendment to avoid further inconsistent outcomes for parties involved in intra-corporate disputes in China. Alternatively, the use of case precedents based on online judgment databases should be formalized in China to bring more predictability to statutory interpretation and more consistency among courts throughout the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]