Search

Using daily data since 2017, we disentangle China-specific structural shocks driving Chinese financial markets and examine spillovers across global markets. The novelty of this paper consists of simultaneously identifying China shocks with shocks emanating from the United States and shocks to global risk sentiment - two major forces driving global financial markets - to ensure that China spillover estimates do not reflect common factors. Our results show that shocks originating in China have material impacts on global equity markets, although spillovers are much smaller than those following shocks in the United States, or those triggered by shifts in global risk sentiment. By contrast, shocks from China account for a significant proportion of variation in global commodity prices, more on a par with those of the United States. Nevertheless, spillovers from China can be significantly amplified in an environment of heightened global volatility, or when the shocks are large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we traveled back in time to the first half of the eighteenth century, we might notice that the cargo aboard an East Indiaman was rather diversified. But of these different products from different countries, a sizable number of them were manufactured in and originated from China. Why was China, alone among many other countries, able to secure its place as a world factory at the time? In this paper, I will suggest that we could not possibly understand how tea and porcelain became synonyms for China without tracing their histories back to the early modern world. We would not be able to deepen our understanding of Anglo-Chinese relations without taking into consideration the flow and circulations of goods between the two powers. My purpose here, therefore, is to outline these very connections throughout the early modern era, roughly from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, based on the fascinating studies conducted by pioneering historians in the field over the past few decades. If we follow the life histories of some of the Chinese commodities, can we determine the ways in which those imported items interacted with the European market in general and the British in particular? Other than treating these commodities as marketable goods, are there any other intellectual perspectives available to help us better comprehend their associations with the early modern world? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prices of oil and other commodities have fluctuated wildly since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is crucial to explore the causes of price fluctuations and understand the source and path of risk contagion to better mitigate systemic risk and maintain economic stability. The paper adopts the method of network topology to examine the path of risk contagion between China's and foreign commodities, focusing on the dynamic evolution and transmission mechanism of risk contagion during the pandemic. This research found that among China's commodities, energy, grain, and textiles are net recipients of risk contagion, while chemical products and metals are net risk exporters. Among international commodities, industries have positive risk spillover effects on metals and textiles. During the first phase of the pandemic, China's commodities were the main exporters of risk contagion. However, international industries and metals became the main risk exporters and exerted risk spillover on China's commodities in the second phase of the pandemic. Moreover, based on total volatility spillover index of commodities, the risk contagion among the commodities follows three paths: "interest rate → commodities → money supply", "China's economic expectation → commodities → foreign economic expectation", and "commodities → consumer confidence". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can traditional cultural practices thrive if they are commercialised? Or should the state protect them from "the market"? This study investigates these questions by studying the marketisation of traditional handicrafts in the tourism sector of Nanjing municipality (Jiangsu Province, China). Building on Boltanski and Esquerre's (2020) work on the "enrichment economy," I find that state- led marketisation efforts have simultaneously raised and distorted the value of intangible cultural heritage (ICH) commodities in China. Many ICH inheritors are stuck in the middle: although they benefit from enhanced recognition and valorisation of ICH products, they face difficulties in competing with "fake" and luxury ICH commodities. ICH commodities are thus characterised by an "in-between" status -- between the enriched and the mass economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to analyze China's trade and investment relations with Latin America, especially with Brazil and MERCOSUR in the context of the international economic crisis. In a scenario in which commodity prices appear to remain low, the region increases its dependence on China. Thus, the Chinese take advantage to advance on the economies of the region, increasing reprimarization of the economies of these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the expansion of the soybean complex in South America and the role of Chinese firms in expanding their presence in different sectors of the oilseed complex. The growth in trade relations between the two parties has been built on the export of primary commodities from South America and the import of Chinese manufactures—a trade pattern that reproduces core‐periphery dynamics identified by dependency theory scholars. Of particular importance in this bilateral trade is soybean, a crop that has been consolidated as the main export for several South American countries, fuelled by growing demand from China. This article explores China's role in the global political economy as a key agri‐business player and the implications for new relations of dependency by studying the strategies deployed by Chinese firms to increase their influence in the governance of the soybean nexus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'small commodity city' of Yiwu in China specialises in low-end products, enjoying economic success due to its early establishment of private enterprise, yet relying upon traditional forms of solidarity as well as those provided by the structures of the market. It has 'history', but one that has been reconstructed beyond all recognition. Drawing primarily upon the work of Doreen Massey, this article explores the burgeoning sense of place in Yiwu and the wider implications this has for thinking on place. The article analyses two specific elements: the 'Wenzhou model', on which China's small commodity economy is built, and the architectural form of the 'small district'. It argues that the use of the Wenzhou model in Yiwu situates it at the forefront of an economic national historical trajectory, and that the development of small districts, tied as they are to previous historical built forms, provides a sense of the past as an assemblage from which current identity can be forged. A sense of place, it proposes, has arisen precisely due to the unusual assemblage of those elements, but is less tied to traditional notions of place, being more grounded within moments and networks that resonate with current post-revolutionary lived experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses material religion in a commercial setting and sets off this discussion with Walter Benjamin's The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1936). Benjamin argues that mechanical reproduction emancipated works of art from religious rituals and evaporated the aura of art. This has resonance among some Tibetan Buddhists in the context of mass-produced Buddhist material objects. Are such objects fit to be given as gifts, implemented in rituals, and worshipped on altars? Based upon ethnographic work at a Tibetan Buddhist market in urban China, the article argues that although objects manufactured in factories for profit are not made or handled according to Buddhist tradition, the aura can be produced in different ways and at different points of an object's life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rapid growth over the past decade has been one of the main drivers of the rise in mineral commodity demand and prices. While concerns about the sustainability of China's growth model are rising, we assess to what extent rebalancing through a hard landing in China would impact other countries. After reviewing the main arguments pointing to a hard landing scenario—historical rebalancing precedents, overinvestment, unsustainable debt trends and real estate bubble—we use a global VAR methodology adapted to conditional forecasting to simulate the impact of a Chinese hard landing. We model metal and oil markets separately to account for their different end‐use patterns and consumption intensity in China. According to our estimates, emerging economies would be hardest hit—with a 7.5% cumulated growth loss after 5 years—in particular in Emerging Asia and in commodity‐exporting regions such as Latin America. The "growth gap" between emerging and advanced economies would be considerably reduced, leading to partial recoupling. In the light of these results, both the "commodity supercycle" and sustained convergence observed in emerging economies over the past decade could be to a large extent attributed to the high and unbalanced growth pattern in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document has as main objective to discuss the dual role that China is playing in Latin America, on one hand, a strategic trade partner in Asia, source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and key ally in the international arena, on the other hand, China is a formidable competitor particularly in the manufacturing sector. To reach the main objective, we make a brief description of the international trade relation between China and Latin America for the last 15 years, also, a review of the investment flows in different economic sectors, and lastly, a description of the political and diplomatic relation between Latin America and China. From this, it can be inferred that the bilateral relation is prominently framed by the trade of commodities from Latin America to China and the Chinese investment in the sourcing of natural resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides empirical evidence on the effects of Chinese resource demand on the resource-rich natural resource supplier using the example of Australia. A structural VAR model is used to examine the effects of Chinese resource demand, commodity prices and foreign output on the macroeconomy with a formally specified mining and resource export sector. The key findings of the article are that shocks to Chinese demand and commodity prices result in a sustained increase in commodity prices and mining investment and a positive impact on the resource sector. However, these shocks eventually lead to lower real domestic output with factors of production moving out of the nonresource sectors and into the resource sector, resulting in a fall in nonresource sector output which is not fully offset by the rise in resource sector output. The results also indicate some market power by the natural resource supplier. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Sub-Saharan African economies have been exposed to major global changes, in particular a long cycle of increase in commodity prices since the early-2000s, the growth of emerging countries, which are key drivers of high commodity prices and have become significant trade and investment partners, and since 2008, recession in their traditional export markets. These changes may generate structural transformation, hence requiring a reconceptualisation of the integration of Sub-Saharan Africa into the world economy. China is a major trade partner and investor in commodities, industrial sectors and infrastructures in Sub-Saharan Africa. Will this trade and investment pattern preserve the status quo and entrenchment of market and export structures characterised by the pre-eminence of commodities? Or, in improving governments' fiscal space, will it foster opportunities for structural change? It is argued that it is the presence of ‘developmental’ political economies that, in the end, creates opportunities for diversification, industrialisation and structural transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the third month of the 30th year (1551) of the Jiajing era (1522-1556), the Ming government decided to offer a trade agreement to the Mongols led by Altan Khan, which would set up markets (mashi) where Mongolian horses would be traded for valuable Chinese commodities. This paper explores the political history of the late phase of the era through an analysis of the decisionmaking process leading up to the Ming government recognizing trade with Altan Khan, while continuing to refuse a long-standing demand to grant the Mongols tributary status. The research to date on the political situation at the time understands it as a period of political stagnation attributed to Emperor Shizong's withdrawal from governmental affairs and incompetence on the part of Yan Song, senior officer of the Grand Secretariat. Moreover, recent attempts to reexamine the situation have still not been able to produce a complete picture of what exactly was happening on the contemporary poltical scene in concrete terms. The opportunity to offer the trade agreement was furnished ironically by Shizong's increasing desire to conduct a military campaign against Altan Khan. During the eighth month of 1550, after Altan's army had surrounded Beijing (the so-called Gengxu zhibian) in protest of being refused tributary status, Shizong ordered that plans be drawn up for a punitive expedition against the Mongols. Although such a campaign was clearly unrealistic, Yan Song, other central bureaucrats, and the supreme commander and grand coordinator of the northern region went through the motions ouot of respect to Shizong's will, but in reality took every action possible to avoid such a campaign. While respect was shown for Shizong's refutation of tribute relations with the Mongols as an attitude consistent with the ideology supporting the traditional Chinese world order, attempts to satisfy Mongol's material demands by means other than "tributary trade" and thus pacify the unrest threatening China's borders gave birth to the idea of a "mashi" trade arrangement. The idea caused virulent opposition from government officials outraged by such a display of impudence toward the will of the emperor, but as the debate raged on, the proponents after several attempts finally persuaded Shizong, and a decision was reached to set up the "mashi" trade. However, due to such factors as Shizong's obstinate attitude and the fiscal situation on the ground, it became impossible to generate a scale of trade sufficient to satisfy Mongol demand, leading to an escalation of Mongol attacks. Consequently, after it became apparent that the hopes of Yan Song and his cohorts were unattainable, the "mashi" trade agreement was ended in the ninth month of 1522. From his investigation of this turn of events, the author concludes that the political history of the Jiajing Era should be placed in the context of a group of policy makers confronted with an emperor's stubborn espousal of ideals in no way reflecting reality and thus trying to bring the situation into a soft landing by navigating for areas of compromise linking political ideals with present reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oil continues to be a major source of world energy, but oil prices and funds have experienced high volatility over the last decade. This study applies the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity-mixed-data sampling (GARCH-MIDAS) model on data spanning 1 July 2014 to 30 April 2020 to examine volatility transmission from the equity, bulk shipping, commodity, currency, and crude oil markets to the United States Oil Fund (USO) and BlackRock World Energy Fund A2 (BGF). By dividing the sample into two subsamples, we find a significant volatility transmission from the equity market to the oil ETF and energy fund both before and after the 2018 U.S.–China trade war. The volatility transmission from the bulk shipping, commodity, and crude oil markets turns significant for the oil ETF and energy fund after the 2018 U.S.–China trade war, extending into the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. The results suggest that investors can use the equity market to predict the movement of oil and energy funds during both tranquil and turmoil periods. Moreover, investors can use bulk shipping, commodity, and crude oil markets in addition to the equity market to forecast oil and energy funds' volatility during the turmoil periods. This paper benefits investors against the high volatility of the energy funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]