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We examine the (un)intended consequences of a mandatory dividend payout regulation for firms’ financial reporting choices using a natural experiment in China. Beginning in October 2008, China required firms desiring to raise new equity capital to maintain a cumulative dividend payout ratio of at least 30% over the past 3 years. We find that firms with a cumulative payout ratio from the prior year very close to but slightly lower than the mandated dividend threshold report lower discretionary accruals but do not increase dividends. In addition, this pattern is more pronounced in firms with greater cash flow deficits, firms with faster sales growth, and firms located in regions with lower bank development. We also find that the negative discretionary accruals are concentrated in firms with return on equity well in excess of another regulatory benchmark. In contrast, the only firms that increase dividends in response to the regulation are firms with a positive cumulative payout ratio far below the mandated threshold. Because dividend payout regulations have been suggested as a possible solution to agency problems, our results provide important policy feedback about the effectiveness of such regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We evaluate the explanations for accrual anomaly in the Chinese stock market using the decomposition method. The results show that institutional ownership best explains the accrual anomaly with an explanatory power of about 46%, equity growth (EG) explains 12% of the anomaly, and the residual fraction of around 32% is unexplained by any candidate explanations. Our findings indicate that the naïve investor fixation hypothesis is favored to explain the accrual anomaly in China, and the existing explanations cannot fully explain the anomaly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China issued the New Enterprise Income Tax Law in 2007, which changed the corporate income tax rate from 33 percent to 25 percent and came into effect in 2008. Using the simulated marginal tax rate as an indicator of firms’ earnings management incentives, and discretionary current accruals as a proxy for earnings management, we find significant tax-induced earnings management in 2007. However, the downward earnings management becomes less obvious for firms that have a greater percentage of shares owned by state-owned enterprises, have an audit committee on the board, and disclose certified internal control reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We examine the association between auditor choice and the accruals patterns of Chinese listed firms that cross-list in Hong Kong. Our evidence suggests that the clients of Big 4 auditors report lower unsigned discretionary accruals relative to the clients of non-Big 4 auditors. Further, we find that cross-listed firms with non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to understate their earnings and experience larger reversals of accruals in the future than cross-listed firms with Big 4 auditors. These findings suggest that Big 4 auditors play a meaningful role in improving earnings quality for cross-listed firms, which helps to explain why cross-listed firms have higher earnings quality than their domestic counterparts, as documented in the previous literature. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]