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The rise of China in recent decades has forged closer naval bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. Amongst these the Indo-Australian maritime ties have been a noteworthy development. Beijing's expanding maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region and growing influence in the South China Sea have become a core convergence in Indo-Australian cooperation. China's approach of asserting its rise as friendly while simultaneously becoming more aggressive in boundary claims has increased security concerns for Australia and India, thereby prompting maritime security convergences through the AUSINDEX exercises, increased trilateral engagements and establishing a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). However, the maritime convergence is not only based on hedging, as there are common views of maintaining an inclusive security framework with China to address non-traditional maritime security threats affecting the region. In examining the China factor, this article also draws in other players such as USA, Japan and the ASEAN states with stakes involved in the region as also influencing Indo-Australian relations in their considerations of China. This article will explore China as a strong point of interest in India-Australia maritime cooperation; the roots of which can be traced from 1991 and have culminated into synergies of collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to a more-contested Asia, Australia has placed the 'rules-based order' at the heart of its declaratory strategic policy. This move signals Australia's commitment to this order, to its alliance with the United States, and to a more active strategic role in the region. However, a failure to match rhetoric with action risks undermining Australia's strategic interests by emboldening China and reducing Australia's value as an American ally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses how Japan and Australia could contribute to a liberal and inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region. Critics argue that closer ties between Japan and Australia could undermine the stability of regional security, dividing Asia into ‘mutually hostile armed blocs’ consisting of US allies and China. Contrary to such a view, this article argues that deepening and enhancing Japan–Australia security cooperation could, if carefully managed, help to maintain an inclusive regional order based on institutions, norms and values, as well as a stable balance of power relations. In particular, the article contends that Japan and Australia can contribute to regional order by strengthening their ‘middle-power cooperation’ through regional capacity-building, institution-building, rule-making or norm-setting, and coalition-building, while supporting the US military presence in the region. It then concludes that, despite differing attitudes towards Beijing, Tokyo and Canberra can further contribute to the longevity of the current regional order by inclusive institutional architecture and liberal norms and values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In recent years, a perception has emerged among many policymakers and commentators that the deepening of the People's Republic of China engagement in the Pacific Islands Region, predominantly through its expanding foreign aid programme, threatens to undermine the existing regional order, in which Australia is dominant. In this article, it is argued that China's apparent ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific is mainly driven by commercial, not political, imperatives and is far more fragmented and incoherent than is often assumed. Hence, its (real) political effects hinge, not on any Chinese strategic designs for regional domination, or even a more limited resource security agenda, but on the intent and capacity of Pacific governments to harness deepening aid, investment and trade relations with China towards their own foreign and domestic policy objectives, which include limiting Australian interference in the internal governance processes of Pacific states. This argument is demonstrated by the case of Fiji after the December 2006 military coup. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Alliances continue to occupy a prominent place in the Asia-Pacific's security architecture. For many regional states such as Australia and Japan, their respective alliances with the USA are the unchallenged foundations of their security. But when the rise of China is causing major change in the region, and when many countries are increasingly reliant on China economically, is the region's network of alliances any longer appropriate or useful? This article reviews alliances in theory and practice, and argues that, while alliances are unlikely to disappear, their utility is nothing like as clear-cut as many of their supporters would have one believe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines the changing geo-political situation in the Asia-Pacific Region from an Australian defense policy perspective. The article focuses on China, the US, and Indonesia and examines Australia's strategic defense needs for the coming decade. The paper concludes by laying out four strategic defense options for Australia, 1. maintaining the US alliance, 2. going back to "fortress Australia," 3. towards Asian integrations, and 4. the "New Zealand" option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The publishing industry in China has changed rapidly since the 1970s and 1980s, in large part due to increasing ties with the West. The Chinese Government has begun encouraging these ties, recognising the importance of cultural links as well as economic ones. Australia is one of those countries with which China’s publishing industry has been developing a relationship, predominantly through shared publishing projects and international forums. Australia has a long history of Chinese publishing; and the demand for Chinese language materials in Australia is growing. As such, it is likely that the relationship between the publishing industries in the two nations will grow and develop in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Australia's approach towards world as revealed in Defence White Paper (DWP) 2013, released by Australia's former Prime Minister Julia Gillard on May 3, 2013. DWP mentions that Australia has approved several proposals for defence procurement including the unveiling of new aircrafts and has also signed strategic partnership agreement with China in an effort to strengthen its military system. Also discussed are Australia's good relationship with India and the U.S.

The question of whether Australia should change government policy to permit the export of uranium to India has divided Australians, arms control advocates and scholars. This article does not take a position for or against Australia's export of uranium to India. Instead, it argues that the concept of 'the national interest' is misleading as the analytical framework for assessing this important foreign policy decision, and leads to a distorted analysis and policy prescription. It is not all that difficult for the government to justify a decision to sell uranium to India as being in the national interest. But a more nuanced and complicated analysis results when the issue is discussed using a novel analytical framework of 'a balance of interests'. 'The national interest' is erroneous as a description of the empirical reality, substitutes tautology for explanation and is unhelpful as a guide to policy. 'A balance of interests' is superior on all three counts of description, explanation and prescription. In addition, it captures human agency and allows for human error and multiple balances as weighed by different people reflecting their personal predilections, professional backgrounds, life and career experiences, party philosophy, and institutional interests and perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented to a special section on U.S. economic relations with Australia, noting articles on topics on topics such as a 2004 preferential trade agreement (PTA) between the two nations, the regional organization Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the relevance of China's power.

This article considers the regional order-building challenges that Australia presently confronts in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The author argues that while regional stability within the IOR constitutes an increasingly important Australian security interest, policy makers will struggle to translate the order-building strategies they have previously pursued in East Asia into an Indian Ocean context. In East Asia, Australia has historically pursued a ‘dual track’ order-building strategy centred on its participation in a US-dominated ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system alongside multilateral regional engagement. The absence of an equivalent alliance system or an established tradition of multilateral security diplomacy conversely precludes an extension of this strategy into the IOR. Growing tensions between the USA and China and between China and India, meanwhile, further complicate IOR security dynamics, while underscoring the urgent need for a more coherent approach to regional order-building. With these challenges in mind, the author concludes by proposing a range of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives that Australia should pursue to stimulate the emergence of a more cooperative IOR security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Australia and China have evolved a synergistic relationship driven largely by the rapidly expanding Chinese demand for Australian resources. China's growing political and economic influence, regionally and globally, has prompted for different reasons the leadership of both countries to develop new channels and forms of communication. It has left Australian society with the unfamiliar task of engaging with a major center of power whose cultural and political traditions are radically different from its own. This article explores the scope and limitations of Australia's emerging dialogue with China. It makes the case for a sustained and multidimensional dialogue that harnesses more effectively the energies of civil society as well as business and government, thereby facilitating the task of redefining the relationship in a period of far-reaching transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1920s, the perceptions by Australians of the Chinese race was one of a single culture and single class. Chinese Australians continuously attempted to break from the shackles of this monolithic construction. A soccer tour in late 1923 provided the local Chinese with an opportunity to alter these stereotypes. Through the performances both on the field and off, through the persistence of the organisers to promote a ‘different type’ of Chinese and through the development of this alternative image in the Western press, the Australian public were afforded a view of Chinese they had not experienced prior, one which included well-educated, middle-class and athletic individuals. The paper investigates the projection of a multi-class society within China to white Australians as portrayed by the soccer tour and how it challenged the entrenched negative perceptions imposed on Australians through the White Australia Policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is an assumption in international relations literature that junior allies must choose between supporting a dominant global alliance partner and engaging with a rising power. Yet, Australian policy-makers have paradoxically managed to deepen Sino-Australian relations despite their bilateral alliance with the United States. They have developed a discrete China policy on the assumption that they could persuade Washington to accept it over time. They reasoned that this outcome was more likely if Australia used diplomacy to facilitate Sino-American cooperation and to develop an Australian China policy non-prejudicial to ANZUS. This article explores how this ‘diplomatic formula’ supported expansion of Sino-Australian relations under the Whitlam, Hawke, and Howard Governments. It explains Australia's intra-alliance influence and paradoxical foreign policy behavior and contributes to understanding the dynamics of asymmetric alliances during power transition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the role of Australia and South Korea or Republic of Korea (ROK) in the emerging new order in Asia. The influence of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the strategies of ROK and Australia are explored. The complexities of balancing strong ties with the U.S. and China while reducing interdependence on trade are issues discussed. Diplomatic actions and proposal such as the Sunshine Policy, "new Asian diplomacy," and the Asia-Pacific Community are also tackled.

What will be the nature of the relationships of the major Asia-Pacific Rim powers, including Japan, the United States and Australia with China following Beijing 2008? To what extent was China successful by means of Beijing 2008 in actually selling 'brand China' to the rest of the world, and particularly to its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region? Were they able to achieve the soft power objective of changing the perception of how other nations perceive them? The overarching ambition of China was that by hosting a 'successful' Olympics they would further add to their credibility as a global power. To achieve this China had to overcome a series of major obstacles, including issues of human rights, governance and its reputation of being the world's biggest polluter. As the Beijing Olympics began on 8 August 2008 the global financial crisis was beginning to bite, and in this contribution it will be asked, to what extent did this negate any potential positive global or regional geopolitical or diplomatic outcomes that China may have otherwise elicited from their hosting of the Games? The centre of gravity of global geopolitical power is shifting to Asia with China being positioned as a future leader in the region. Did this process accelerate as a consequence of the Beijing Olympics, and to what extent can it said that the geopolitical balance in the Asia-Pacific region will in any way be altered as an outcome of the Games or will the effects of the global economic crisis neutralize the energy China was to draw from hosting the 2008 Olympics to power its advance to global leadership? These questions will be considered through the analysis of policies and actions of the Australian Labor Party government, led by Kevin Rudd, the Mandarin-speaking ex-diplomat, who gained power in late 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the undertakings of the Commonwealth of Australia from July to December 2009. Topics covered include the Henry Tax Review, the Council of Australian Government's increased focus on health issues, water conservation and the management of the Murray-Darling Basin, foreign relations with China and efforts by Liberal parliamentarians to undermine the leadership of politician Malcolm Turnbull. The article also includes examinations of the political undertakings of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory.

This article suggests four criteria that any Australian Government should satisfy in promoting new forms of social and commercial engagement in the Australia-China economic and trading relationship. Any Free Trade Agreement (FTA) should require a high level of commitment to meet four standards. First, the inclusion of a labour clause within the agreement. Second, the government must now ensure that there is no disadvantage to Australian industry particularly for the purpose of applying anti-dumping provisions. Third, an Australia—China FTA would need to demonstrate how the economic and trading relationship would become more balanced and why a bilateral ETA will not further compromise the multilateral system. Fourth, the government must demonstrate its commitment to make Australia free trade ready so the nation can maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of commercial engagement with China and other counties. Ultimately corporate globalization will only work for the world's workers and their families when it is underpinned by a fair set of global rules including labour rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

General equilibrium modelling has been used to analyse many policy proposals. This article aims to help non-modellers assess general equilibrium analyses, particularly of a potential Australia-China free trade agreement (FTA). General equilibrium modelling is effective in studies of unilateral tariff reductions. However, most general equilibrium modelling assumes given technologies and information. For issues where the essence is technology transfer and new information, general equilibrium models can only produce results after most of the analysis has been done outside the model. In an Australia-China FTA, tariff cuts may be only a small part of the package. The main part may be goodwill, technology transfer and increased mutual awareness. Thus, for analysing FTAs, general equilibrium modelling is of limited value. The only conclusion for Australia that general equilibrium modelling of an Australia-China FTA can deliver with any certainty is that such an agreement will cause significant contraction in the Australian clothing industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the changing nature of Australian-American relations in the aftermath of the Iraq imbroglio and China's rise. While many observers see differences in Australian and US approaches toward China as a reflection of different interests, it is the contention of this paper that these different Australian-US perspectives on China are, in fact, premised more on some highly skewed assumptions and fallacious beliefs, misconceptions and myths that have lately come to underlie Australia's China policy than on divergent Australian-US interests. This article looks at the proposition that China's rise has the potential to divide Australia and America but concludes that Beijing is unlikely to succeed in driving a wedge between Washington and Canberra. The shared values and shared strategic interests ensure broad support for the Australia-US alliance in Australia which has now expanded into a global partnership encompassing the transnational security issues as well as the traditional geopolitical issues of managing the rise of new powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the changing nature of Australian-American relations in the aftermath of the Iraq imbroglio and China's rise. While many observers see differences in Australian and U.S. approaches toward China as a reflection of different interests, it is the contention of this paper that these different Australian-U.S. perspectives on China are, in fact, premised more upon some highly skewed and fallacious assumptions and beliefs, misconceptions, and myths that have lately come to underlie Australia's China policy, than upon divergent Australian-U.S. interests. This article looks into the proposition that China's rise has the potential to divide Australia and America, but concludes that Beijing is unlikely to succeed in driving a wedge between Washington and Canberra (or "doing a South Korea on Australia"). While in peacetime, Canberra may be unwilling to displease Beijing, Australia will ultimately side with the United States in any conflict because sitting on the fence in regional affairs has never been an option for Australia. The shared values and shared strategic interests ensure broad support for the Australia-U.S. alliance in Australia, which has now expanded into a global partnership encompassing the transnational security issues as well as the traditional geopolitical issues of managing the rise of new powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Australian government optimistically expects that China's rise can be easily managed. They predict US–China relations will be cooperative, and reject concerns that Australia may face hard choices between them. This optimism seems to be based on the view that as China grows it will become increasingly integrated into a US-led global system. That overestimates America's power, and underestimates China's ambitions. The best we can hope for instead is that China and the US will cooperate in a concert of power, but the US will be very reluctant to make the necessary concessions to China for that to happen. So there is a real risk of even worse outcomes: Chinese primacy, sustained US–China hostility, or war. Australia therefore needs to try to persuade America to work with China in building a new ‘Concert of Asia’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the need for countries to co-exist inspite of different ideologies and social systems in light of the Sino-Australian relationship. Effect of the cold-war mindset on intellectuals and public opinion in Australia; Identification of the need to build an accommodating world community; Assessment of the trilateral Australia-China-U.S. relationship; Prospects for Sino-Australian relationship.

Analyzes the Sino-Australian relations from an American perspective. Study of changes in the United States and Australia over three decades; Moves made by the U.S. and the Australian Labor and Liberal Parties to establish relations with China; Effect of the Tiananmen crackdown and the end of the Cold War on Australian and U.S. policies toward China; Overview of the U.S. policy under president George W. Bush.

Analyzes the steps taken by Australia to improve relations with China after decades of hostility. Australian approach towards China during 1949-1971; Transformation in the Australian policy since 1973; Overview of the Chinese takeover of South Vietnam; Developments of mutual talks with Labor Party delegation in China.

Presents the essay 'Australian Literature in China.' Conditions prior to the translation of Australian literature into Chinese; Translation of James Aldridge's 'The Diplomat'; Chinese reception of Australian writing; Forms of Australian literature popular in China.

Assesses the status of foreign relations between Australia and China at the end of the twentieth century. Discussion on the foreign relations of the countries in 1998 and 1999; Economic relations of the countries; Foreign policy issues faced by the two countries.

Examines relations between Australia and China concerning science and technology. Analysis of the compatibility of the objectives and interests of the two countries; Difference in perceptions of cooperation; Difference between the perceptions of scientists and government officials and institutions; Realization of the stated aims and objectives of the exchange agreement.

Investigates Australia's political relations with China. Australia's achievements in the 1980s; Objectives of Australia's policy toward China; Australia's reaction to the Tiananmen Square incident; Australia's attitudes toward human rights issues in China; Effects of Australia's relationship with Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The attitude of the early Menzies Government towards the recognition of the People's Republic of China has not been well understood in the literature on Australia's international relations. The early Menzies regime has been taken by some scholars to be implacably opposed to communism, including Chinese communism, by others to have ceased to consider recognition because of the Korean War and by a third contingent to have been responsive to United States pressure not to recognise the Chinese communist government. A perusal of the foreign policy documents of the period of the first Menzies ministry reveals that both Menzies and Spender were giving favourable consideration to recognising the People's Republic of China during late 1950 and early 1951 and that none of these three views were decisive in preventing recognition. The question for Menzies and Spender was not whether to recognise but when to recognise and the actions of the Chinese communists themselves, in particular their attitude to British recognition, created the greatest impediment to recognition by Australia at that time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how China has perceived the confrontational foreign and defense policy adopted by the new Australian government. It argues that Chinese leaders have suspected Australia of conspiring with the U.S. to operate a united policy to contain China. It also highlights the issues that accumulated to create an impression that Australia was becoming hostile towards China and considers the overall diplomatic reaction towards Australia in the context of China threat arguments. It puts forward an argument of neighborliness to explain why China has exercised restraint in reacting to Australia's actions.

The article presents a reprint of the article "New China and Australia: Morrison Oration: Professor Roberts at Canberra," which appeared in the June 7, 1939 issue of the "Canberra Times.” It presents an account of the annual George Ernest Morrison Lecture on Chinese-Ethnology given by S. H. Roberts, in which he discussed Australia's foreign policy regarding Pacific nations, especially China, the Sino-Japanese War, and China's government policies regarding industrialization, education, and language.

Presents a foreword to the articles published in the November 2002 issue of 'Australian Journal of International Affairs,' vol. 56. Contributions of Chinese ambassador to Australia, Shi Chunlai, Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam and American China analyst, Robert Sutter, to the study of Sino-Australian relationship; Commentary on the work of Hedley Bull; Study on Islam and Society in South-Eastern Asia.

Building its position as an Asia-Pacific power, Australia has maintained a close alliance with the United States, has built strong relations with Japan, and has forged friendly ties with China. It has emerged as a guardian, along with New Zealand, of troubled Pacific island states. To support its complex strategic stance, it has acted to strengthen its defence capabilities. A defence policy document issued in July shed new light on how Australia saw its role both globally and in cementing a new regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]