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Nowadays, the call for sustainable development is becoming stronger in all countries of the world, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance, as a vivid practice of this concept, has gradually received extensive attention from enterprises and investors. Financial institutions have an important position in the national economy as an important tool for the state to regulate the macroeconomy. Whether ESG performance can improve financial institutions' efficiency is of key significance for boosting sustainable development. Based on data from China's listed financial institutions from 2015 to 2021, this study aims to investigate the impact of ESG performance on financial institutions. The robust nonparametric boundary model and fixed-effects model are employed for analysis. The empirical results demonstrate that ESG performance and its sub-indicators of environmental performance and social responsibility performance can significantly enhance financial institutions' efficiency. In particular, this effect is more pronounced in the securities industry and diversified financial industry, as well as in non-state and small-scale financial institutions. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, the mechanism tests indicate that ESG performance can enhance financial institutions' efficiency by reducing downside risk and agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the analysis of data from listed enterprises in China between 2011 and 2022, we investigate the influence of digital transformation on the governance efficiency for minority shareholders. The results show that the extent of digital transformation exert a negative effect on the agency costs incurred from related-party transactions. The mechanism examination elucidates that digital transformation augments the governance efficiency for minority shareholders by boosting attendance at shareholders' meetings and enhancing the exit threat for minority shareholders. Subsequent analysis reveals that non-state-owned enterprises, compared to state-owned enterprises, exhibit a more pronounced effect in diminishing the second type of agency costs through digital transformation. Furthermore, the impact of digital transformation in curtailing agency costs is more significant in the eastern regions than central and western regions. The better the equity checks and balances in listed enterprises, the more effective digital transformation is in reducing agency costs. This study offers valuable insights for bolstering the governance capacity of minority shareholders in the context of digital transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a crucial component of internal corporate governance, remuneration controls possess the potential to influence the cash holdings of firms. However, identifying the causal relationship between these controls and such holdings presents a considerable challenge. To address this research gap, this paper leverages the implementation of China's Guidance on Further Regulating the Remuneration Management of Heads of Central Enterprises as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the relationship between executive remuneration controls and firms' cash holdings, utilizing a double-difference approach. Based on an analysis of a sample of listed companies from 2007–2012, the results indicate that firms subject to regulated executive compensation exhibit lower cash holdings. To ensure the robustness of these findings, various statistical techniques such as parallel trend tests, variable replacement, propensity score matching, and placebo tests were employed. Additionally, a mechanism test was conducted, whereby the mediating effect of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was examined, revealing a reduction in internal agency costs. Finally, the analysis of heterogeneity demonstrated that the impact of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was more pronounced in companies with high-quality internal controls, stronger management oversight, and lower information asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the impact of stringent environmental regulation on the investment behavior of firms. Using panel data for Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we take the implementation of the new environmental protection law (NEPL) in 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment and identify its impact on reducing overinvestment of high polluting firms. Further, for the potential mechanism, we find that the reduction in agency costs and the decrease in the financing caused by NEPL can help to alleviate overinvestment problems. Considering the heterogeneity of firms, NEPL has a greater effect on state-owned firms and large-scale firms, which have serious overinvestment problems. Our empirical evidence strongly supports that NEPL can realize a win-win situation for the environment and the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The innovative application of green credit policy as a means of financial regulation in the field of environmental governance is an important attempt to balance the relationship between environmental protection and economic development. It reshapes the credit financing environment of high-pollution enterprises, forces them to transform and upgrade, and arouses their enthusiasm for green development. At the same time, it can profoundly affect their ‘real-to-virtual’ transformation, that is, the financialization of real enterprises. Based on the wide application of the green credit policy and rapid development of the financial market, this paper selected the empirical data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019, and used the DID method to test the differences in financialization between high-pollution enterprises and non-high-pollution enterprises before and after the implementation of the Green Credit Guidelines. Benchmark regression showed that, compared with non-high pollution enterprises, green credit policy significantly inhibited the finan‑ cialization of high-pollution enterprises. After a series of robustness tests such as the parallel trend test, the placebo test, and PSM-DID, the results were still valid. The mechanism test showed that, this benefited from the technological innovation promotion and agency cost reduction resulting from the green credit policy. Heterogeneity test further showed that the inhibition effect on the financialization of high-pollution enterprises varied with the nature of the property rights of these enterprises and the intensity of the enforcement of regional environmental laws. Compared with state-owned enterprises and enterprises in areas with weak environmental law enforcement, the inhibition effect on the financialization of enterprises was more obvious in non-state-owned enterprises and areas with strong environmental law enforcement. The result confirms the effectiveness of the application of green credit policy at the micro level, which could help policymakers evaluate the policy effect, formulate and implement the incentive and restraint mechanisms of green credit policy, as well as remind the high-pollution enterprises of the importance of strengthening technological innovation, seeking green transformation, and rationally investing in financial assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Borrowing debt has impacted on the financing effect and governance effect of investment entities. Borrowing debt has become an important financing channel for the investment and construction of municipal infrastructure in China. In this paper, panel data from 2003 to 2018 in cities above the prefecture level in China are used to study the impact of borrowing debt on the efficiency loss of municipal infrastructure investment and construction. First, the results indicate that financing constraints have a greater impact than agency costs for the investment and construction of municipal infrastructure in China. Second, borrowing debt can effectively reduce the efficiency loss of municipal infrastructure investment and construction due to financing constraints. Third, the governance effect of borrowing debt is not very positive, but the rigid repayment of debt and interest to international banks will play some positive governance effects in the later stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Photovoltaic industry promotes the transformation of China's energy structure to green and low-carbon, which is of great significance to achieve the goal of "Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality." At present, the industry is mainly faced with problems such as the drastic reduction of government subsidies and the difficulty of financing. From the perspective of independent auditing, our paper takes 54 A-share listed photovoltaic companies in China from 2011 to 2020 as the research object to study the impact of audit quality on financing efficiency, and the role of agency costs in the relationship between audit quality and financing efficiency.The results show that audit quality is positively related to financing efficiency. For every 1% increase in audit quality, the financing efficiency will increase by 13%. In addition, agency cost plays an intermediary role between audit quality and financing efficiency. For every 1% increase in audit quality, agency cost can be reduced by 34% and financing efficiency can be increased by 25%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economy is an essential factor in constructing a resilient city, and listed companies play a vital role in the local economy. From the microbehavior of corporate governance, we examine the relationship among corporate governance, agency costs, and corporate sustainable development for a panel sample of 690 state-owned firms in China during 2015–2019. We found that agency costs mediate the relationship between board size, management compensation, debt ratio, dividend policy, and corporate sustainable development. Specifically, decreasing the board size can reduce agency costs and enhance the company's sustainable development capabilities. The existing compensation system is to the disadvantage of the sustainable development of the company. Increasing the salaries of managers will increase agency costs and reduce the company's ability to develop sustainably. Although increasing liabilities can reduce agency costs, increasing liabilities will increase financial risks. The bankruptcy costs caused by increasing liabilities are more significant than agency costs, which leads to a decline in the company's ability to develop sustainably. The implementation of cash dividend policies will help reduce agency costs, thereby increasing their sustainable development capabilities. This also provides new ideas for the Modigliani–Miller (MM) theory and agency cost theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access the relevant documents of the company in which they hold an interest, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry and reduce the agency costs inherent in the corporate structure. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, this Article shows that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both China and the United States. On the books, while shareholder inspection rights in both countries are broadly similar, there are some important differences on issues such as the proper purpose requirement. The empirical analysis of this Article further sheds light on how inspection rights operate on the ground. A good number of inspection cases are filed in both China and in Delaware. These cases are resolved by the courts relatively quickly. While inspection rights in both countries are frequently used as a presuit discovery device, the types of subsequent litigation that can be filed in each country are quite different. Efforts are made to explain, and draw implications from, the similarities and differences on shareholder inspection rights between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background of Problem: This research investigates the corporate governance and performance between founding family firms and non-founding family firms in Hong Kong, and the performance inside founding family firms under three different management status. Agency costs will be generated by the divergence between CEO interest and those of the outside shareholders if the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation. There are two different mainstreams of views regarding relationships between ownership and performance in family business: negative and positive effect generated from family ownership and control. To what extents the two different views are relevant to Hong Kong family firms are still unclear. Research Method and Data: By focusing on Hong Kong business, this research seeks to study 75 Hong Kong listed companies in HSCII for 5 years, yielding 347 observations, using archival data. The empirical result suggests that the founding family firms in Hong Kong may not outperform nonfamily firms, and the founding family firms with founders as CEOs are one of best performers among founding family firms. This research not only studies the performance behaviours of Hong Kong founding/ non-founding family business and inside founding family business, but also sets a foundation for further research. This research gives insights for entrepreneurs to manage their businesses and plan the succession of founding family business in Hong Kong. This research into corporate governance is different to that of countries such as USA, Taiwan, and Mainland China. The founding family firms in Hong Kong may not outperform the nonfamily firms and the founding family firms with the founder as CEO is one of the best management techniques inside founding family firms. This research shows agency costs inside founding family firms affects performance and succession of family firms, as descendants may not be the best successors for firm value maximization, and business continuity. Owners of Hong Kong founding family business should pay more attention on business governance and succussion planning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether firms' political connection affects their corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements and how the effects vary with different political ties, namely symbolic and material connections. These ties reflect different degrees of political embeddedness, interest alignment, network size, and monitoring with the government, and therefore impart divergent effects on managerial incentives for CSR practices. Our analysis indicates that CSR in firms with symbolic connection is much more associated with agency cost than CSR in firms with material connection. We also find that large firms with symbolic connection exhibit lower CSR performance than those with material connection, probably because the former group tends to substitute the prestige of their political capital for the goodwill associated with CSR engagement. These results show that accounting for the effects of different types of political connection on managerial incentives contributes some clarity to the debate about the compatibility of CSR with primary corporate mandates. • We examine whether a firm's political connection affects its CSR engagements • CSR engagement in firms with symbolic connection is associated with agency cost • CSR engagement in firms with material connection is associated with good governance • Large firms with symbolic connections exhibit lower CSR performance [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]