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The Hua-Yi 華夷 system that spread in East Asia in the form of tribute relationships during the Ming dynasty [1368-1644] began as a system based on China's perceived cultural superiority, but slowly evolved into a system centered on nationalism. Accordingly, the kinship networks embedded in the Hua-Yi system were also continually evolving, breaking down, and reforming in a cycle that repeated itself multiple times. Amid this process, ethnocentrism [ zi minzu zhongxin zhuyi 自民族中心主義] and "interest centralism" [ liyi zhongxin zhuyi 利益中心主義] played key roles in the formation and eventual dissolution of the Hua-Yi system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise has been accompanied by a rise in nationalism. But what are the characteristics of this nationalism now being witnessed? Does it support China's constructive engagement with the international order, or does it seek to assert China's supremacy? These questions lie at the hub of a rapidly expanding secondary literature on the emergence of nationalism in China and its impact on China's foreign relations. What is, however, absent from the academic discourse is the voice of the Chinese people themselves. What are their perceptions of the nation-state, and how do these beliefs shape their views of China's relationship with East Asia? To address this gap, we conducted a series of large-scale surveys in Beijing between 2011 and 2013 on the twinned topics of domestic nationalism and international relations. Our findings, as reported below, represent an initial attempt to answer this final and, arguably, most critical set of questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on thriving populism and populist nationalism and democracy in East Asia and its comparison with that in the West. It discusses the ignorance of populist governance in post-war East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and China. It states that history of national humiliation and wartime record are condemned as part of international conspiracy in these countries. It discusses extreme nationalism under leadership of Ja­pan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, China's Xi Jinping, and Korea's Park Guen-hye.

This paper applies a neoclassical realist approach that combines systemic- and domestic-level variables to explain important aspects of the current global delegitimation phase. The key unit-level variable is nationalism, which interacts with structural-systemic factors to create unexpected behaviors for both the rising power and its threatened neighbors. With respect to China, nationalism interacts with its power status and trajectory to produce an increasingly assertive foreign policy regardless of whether it continues rising or stalls. With respect to China's neighbors, nationalism makes it easier for leaders to mobilize public support for military preparation and sacrifices associated with internal balancing behaviors. But nationalism and other powerful domestic factors interact with system structure to constrain China's neighbors from aligning with each other. These domestic restrictions that reduce the apparent flexibility of alliances under multipolarity partly explain the puzzling absence of a counter-balancing coalition against a rising and increasingly assertive China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is changing the international order in East Asia. It is not only a matter of a power transition, but also a matter of a change in the international system. Chinese people tend to see the world order in hierarchical terms as they did for centuries; nationalism is used as a tool of national integration; and government control of the military is weakening. These are the factors behind the rise of China. If these trends continue, a hierarchical order with China as hegemon might be established in East Asia. It seems as if we are returning to the period before the nineteenth century when China led the world. However, the international order in the twenty-first century has to be based upon such principles as the rule of law, peaceful solution of conflict, democracy, and human rights. In order to establish such an order, Japan and other countries that have committed to those values should unite firmly. China also would benefit very much from that order in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article traces the evolution of heightened Chinese expectations and the resultant spike in national identity in 2010, using a six-dimensional framework: 1) ideological, 2) temporal, 3) sectoral, 4) vertical, 5) horizontal, and 6) intensity. A hybrid ideology rose to the forefront. Forceful historical arguments covered three distinct periods. The triad of economic, cultural, and political identity raised sectoral identity to an unprecedented level. The leadership kept pressing the case for vertical identity in contrast to the West. Above all, it put the spotlight on horizontal identity to draw a sharper contrast with the United States and neighboring states as well. If at the time of the Hu-Obama summit the tone softened somewhat, China continued its risky wager on widening the identity gap. Regardless of whether China's foreign policy is currently assertive, its national identity narrative remains a driving force for divisiveness in the regional and international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Sino-Japanese relations are quite stable presently, it was as recent as 2004–2005 that the two nations slid into the worst bilateral quagmire in decades. When in 2007 Japan was China’s third largest trading partner and China surpassed the US to become Japan’s largest trading partner, what is eating these two otherwise very pragmatic traders? History, nationalism and face, enabled by recent changes in the strategic environment, are the factors that have been most salient in bringing about the plunge in Sino-Japanese relations in 2004–05 and though Sino-Japanese relations have been much better since, these factors hang like a storm front over Sino-Japanese relations today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most notable attempts by Japan towards fostering regionalism in recent years has been through its active and positive participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS), envisioned to be a stepping stone towards the formation of an East Asian Community (EAC). The idea behind regionalism and efforts towards the EAS and EAC are to be perceived within the broader context of Tokyo's attempts to shape the regional environment and influence policies in the region. Its primary goal is to neutralize and dilute the influence of China. The EAS and EAC are bound to bring India and Japan together on a common platform which will be mutually beneficial for both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the Leith-Ross Mission, an important event in the Republican era in China, with a view in identifying the varying pulses that informed British policy towards East Asia in the mid 1930s. Within the Chinese business lobby, there seems to have been a distinction between the Nationalist agenda and firms seeking accommodation with the guomindang (GMD) to counter Japanese gains in the Chinese hinterland. It is noted in the article that the relationship between the GMD and the Eastern Exchange Banks is shifting from ideologically-based hostility to a begrudging resolution of the handover of British silver reserves. It is argued that the GMD manages to make a way out of the monetary turmoil sorrounding the great economic depression.

While the origins of nationalism are sought in global historical trends, few analysts have shown how nations themselves are constituted and re-shaped by circulating global power, ideas and models. The view from East Asia shows that these circulations are mediated by regional developments and interactions which bind these nations together in rivalry and interdependence. The histories of China, Japan and Korea have been closely tied together since the end of the nineteenth century and, with a gap of about thirty years during the Cold War, have intensified once again. The global and regional constitution of nations produces a dialectic between its global form and aspirations and misrecognition of this constitution arising from the self-perception of nationalism as historically immanent. This tension between the global constitution and national misrecognition contributes to the tenacity of nationalism. It also allows us to get a better grasp of the relationship between historical change and structure in nationalism and the relationship between state and popular nationalisms in the countries of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the regionalism and regionalisation in China. Definition of regionalism; Patterns of microregional integration in the country; Overview of multilateralism in East Asia and its relation to China.

The region "East Asia" is understood here to refer to China, Korea and Japan. Geographically, the Pacific littoral of the Soviet Union could be included in East Asia, but it is a part of a social and political unit whose centre is not in East Asia. Similarly the Mongolian Peoples Republic could be included but is not considered because of the author's limitations of knowledge. Looking at China, Korea and Japan in terms of the formation of a distinctive politico-cultural unit, we are impressed by the early formation and continuous development of such units by all three. In the case of China, this can be traced back to the Chou and the Chin dynasties. Chinese characters, Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies which have influenced not only the Chinese people but also the Koreans and the Japanese until the nineteenth, or even twentieth century, the idea of the Middle Kingdom which contained the assumption of the cultural unity and supremacy of China over external barbarians, all these were the products of the period of the Chou dynasty. In terms of political integration, the first emperor of the Chin dynasty, Shih Huang Ti took such important steps as the creation of a centralized administrative organization, the unification of weights and measures, and the construction of roads leading to the capital, of canals connecting north and south, and of the famous Great Wall which constituted part of the boundary of his empire.

Presents information on the politics of East Asia in relation to the political developments in South Korea and Taiwan as of October 2004. Observations made during their presidential elections; Factors which the Generation 386 in Korea hope to move the country towards nationalism; Efforts of the Taiwanese government to seek independence from China.

The article analyzes the resurgence of East Asia in the late 20th century in relation to nationalism, regionalism and globalism. It mentions the individual conception of the emerging region formation of the major players in the East Asian integration, namely, China, Japan and South Korea. Based on several works, East Asia was the core of a vibrant geopolitical and economic zone at the dawn of European capitalism between the 16th and 18th century. The China-centered tributary-trade order is cited as one of the key linkages that influenced the political economy and geopolitics of the region. Also cited are the changes brought by the opening of the U.S.-China relations.