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This paper provides an overview of the Canadian defence sector following the Cold War. A review of Canadian defence policy in this period indicates that, though the mission of the Canadian military did not change, fiscal realities forced severe restrictions on the size and capabilities of the organization. Comparisons between Canada and other G7 NATO nations indicate that throughout this period, Canada has consistently devoted fewer resources to the military than its allies. A review of Canada's defence industrial base and defence policy indicates that this limited funding has led to a small and uncompetitive defence sector in the Canadian economy. Lastly, a regression analysis of Canada's defence spending is undertaken which reveals that domestic economic variables are the primary determinant of Canadian defence spending during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responding to concerns about burden-sharing and aiming to improve internal defence cooperation, act more quickly and harness resource synergies, the European Union (EU) initiated the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. PESCO, however, is controversial. On the one hand, the United States (US) wants greater burden-sharing by European allies whilst concerned about greater European military autarky that would undermine US influence over NATO, Europe/EU and EU member states. On the other hand, at least one European NATO ally wants to leverage PESCO precisely as an instrument to shore up European "strategic autonomy". This tension over competing European defence futures leaves participation by third countries in limbo. Arguably, third-country participation would hinder greater European defence autarky. The article makes the case for the mutual benefits of third-country participation, focusing on Canada. Canada has a major stake in the outcome. NATO is Canada's most important multilateral institution and Europe is Canada's second-most important strategic partner, after the US. Canada's unequivocal strategic interests in Europe have long informed its expeditionary priorities -- from the two world wars, when Canada coming to Europe's defence long before the US proved existential for both parties, to nowadays. Since the 1970s, Canada and Europe have worked consistently together bilaterally beyond NATO to advance regional stability and mutual security interests. Canada's and Europe's defence futures are thus interdependent. Excluding third countries from participating in PESCO would have detrimental consequences for Canadian, European and transatlantic defence interests. In contrast, with third country participation, PESCO will be instrumental to effective transatlantic and transeuropean defence integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Synthetic Environment (SE) takes the power of computing, digital processing, artificial intelligence, extended reality technology, and other advancements borrowed from the gaming industry to create a computer simulation with near-perfect levels of realism. Designed to enable connectivity across all domains and platforms, SE has the potential to dramatically improve military training, force development, situational awareness, and communications. Our article provides a technical overview of SE and offers a high-level analysis of its use in Canada, the US, UK, and Australia. Informed by dozens of interviews and a roundtable workshop held with experts from academia, industry, and government, this article relates SE to Canada's future defence policy. We argue that leveraging SE effectively will require that Canada commit to a long-term SE program, promote new government-industry partnerships, encourage top-down leadership from both civilian and military officials, and consolidate domestic skillsets and industry knowhow to maintain and retain Canadian sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decade between the release of Canada's 1994 White Paper on Defence and its 2005 International Policy Statement was a period of crisis within the Canadian Forces. The Forces' operational tempo increased significantly even as the defence budget was cut by a quarter. Defence issues were perceived to have very little profile in Ottawa, and military officers felt their concerns were not being heard. Despite rapid changes in the global security environment, dramatic budget cuts, and frequent deployments, the government failed to update its policy guidance to reflect these new challenges. However, the Canadian Forces gradually learned to survive in the absence of political guidance. Defence planners initiated a number of reforms aimed at anticipating future missions, preserving combat capabilities, and winning more resources. Drawing on a series of interviews with senior military officers and civilian officials at the Department of National Defence and a reading of the relevant literature on Canadian defence policy and strategic planning, the author examines the process of adaptation, focusing particular attention on the adoption of capabilities-based planning for resource allocation and mitigating risk. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these developments for civil–military relations in Canada and presents a case for institutional reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For almost a decade, the Canadian military enjoyed substantial, sustained increases to its budget. This funding increase enabled the repeated deployment of the Canadian Forces abroad in the pursuit of international influence. This prominent role for the military in Canadian foreign policy is slated to change, however, as a shift to austerity is forcing significant cuts to Canadian defence spending. Despite official claims that these reductions will be made through back-office efficiency reforms, the magnitude of the budgetary losses and the manner in which they are structured mean that they will result in a significant reduction in military capacity. While front-line military capabilities will be retained, the operational readiness of these forces will be reduced significantly. As a result, the military will be unable to play the relatively active role in expeditionary operations it has in recent years, and Canada returns to a more realistic level of military activity for a secondary power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the comparative significance of security and defense policy continentalization in North America and Europe. Implication of continentalism on multilateralism in Canada; Involvement of conservatives in the issue of free trade in the country; Information on the Canadian international security policy to the United Nations.

We quantify the burden sharing between the United States and Canada within the context of the bi-lateral defense relationship regarding the North American Aerospace. Also known as the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), this bi-lateral military alliance has existed since the late 1950s. We use insights from the economic theory of military alliances as well as disaggregated defense expenditures on capital, labor and R&D to tease out nuanced assessment of burden sharing between the two countries and peer groups (Arctic Council). In addition, we provide some funding scenarios for the planned policy review in Canada to guide decision makers. We also show that there are considerable strategic, institutional, and operational constraints facing the fulfilment of Strong, Secure, Engaged (Defence Policy) and possible NORAD modernization. Improving these institutional issues, along with fulfilling the commitments outlined in the Defence Policy, will go a long way to assuaging the burden sharing debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2016, Canada joined the United States, Great Britain, and Germany in becoming a Framework Nation that leads a multinational battalion-sized battlegroup in Latvia. Canada thus appears to be reprising the role it played during the Cold War as a leading participant in North Atlantic Treaty Organization deterrence and reassurance initiatives in Europe. Yet the three tensions that made Canada reduce its military commitments to allies over the course of the ColdWar might resurface in the Baltic region. These three tensions relate to conventional specialization amid alliance nuclearization, low defence spending despite that specialization, and the potential decoupling of Canadian security interests from those of its European partners. Canada might find itself lacking the willingness and ability to sustain the tasks attending the Latvia deployment if the threat environment intensifies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Public Policy is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Public Administration is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Canada's defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, emphasizes the importance of leveraging Canada's diversity to strengthen the Canadian Armed Forces. Currently, women in the Canadian military are underrepresented across most elements and occupations, especially in the combat arms occupations, including among officers and non-commissioned personnel in combat units such as infantry, armored corps, artillery, and combat engineering. Research suggests that the benefits associated with the inclusion of women in combat arms occupations include an increase in collective intelligence, operational effectiveness, task cohesion, and diversity. This article explores the gender gap in the Canadian combat arms by examining the findings from two recent qualitative research studies on the perceptions of women in the Regular Force and Primary Reserve. The authors analyze female military personnel's perceptions of women serving in the combat arms, and the ways to increase their inclusion in the military. The key findings reveal the following themes on women's perceptions of servicewomen in the combat arms: great job for those who want it; challenging environment (e.g., working within a masculinized culture, necessary toughness, tokenism and the "Pink List," being treated differently, and family loyalty); unique challenges faced by women in combat roles; combat takes a toll on women's mental and physical health; and benefits of women's participation in multinational operations. The discussion highlights the need to increase diversity, equity, and inclusion, promote a culture change that fosters greater inclusion of women in the combat arms, and increase operational effectiveness through training and policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the impact that Canadian political parties have on the Canadian government's security and defense policy. Because Canada is dependent on the U.S. for its security, the author states, the Canadian public pays scant attention to Canadian defense policy. As a result, Canada's governing party can pass its security policy with little domestic political opposition. Topics include party differences that have little effect on policy outcomes and the geopolitical influence on Canada's defense policies.

In the policy world, the idea of ideational robustness deals with why and how policy elements can be maintained over time and the implications this has for government strategy and activity. Past approaches to ideas and their influence on public policy stressed the disparate roles of multiple policy mechanisms such as path dependency or the nature of policy networks in either driving policy change forward or ensuring persistence of a policy. Ideational robustness on the other hand allows for the possibility of some changes occurring in policy environments and components while motivating cognitive and normative policy ideas are adapted and retained. While ideational persistence has often been identified as a source of policy stability, the possibility that some ideas allow lesser or greater levels of change in policy components while basic policy content remains more or less intact (ideational robustness) is much less well understood. The article reviews the literature on policy change and stability which highlights the influence of different policy processes on overall policy dynamics and the role played by policy learning in promoting ideational robustness. Using evidence from military doctrines and procurement in Canada and Australia, the study finds that the two countries drew different defence policy lessons from the end of the Cold War which contributed heavily to the extent of robustness of their defence policy ideas. The case studies show that ideational robustness is important but also that its study must be combined with that of other policy mechanisms and processes in order to explain overall policy change patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Article 30 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples articulates a general ban on military activities that take place on Indigenous territory. Despite the potentially significant consequences of article 30 for Canadian defence policy, few scholars have devoted serious attention to the article. This article will fill that gap by discussing the meaning of article 30 and suggesting approaches to implementation that the Canadian state ought to adopt. This article argues that, far from constraining Canadian defence strategy, article 30 may well serve as a catalyst, encouraging Canadian defence planners to take a more community-based approach towards defence, particularly in Canada's North. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the coalition of Canada and Libya. It says that Canada plays a significant role in the 2011 international intervention in Libya, and has contributed several support, including the air and naval assets, associated personnel, and the mission of the overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It states that the Canadian politicians and the general public has affected the role of Canada in NATO and its success in Libya.

The Canadian government is now openly discussing the possibility of making cyberweapons part of its official national defence strategy. The new development was revealed in a recent government white paper, entitled "Strong, Secure, and Engaged" (SSE), which outlined defence policy across a wide range of activities. Specifically, the paper discusses working toward a "more assertive posture in the cyber domain by hardening our defences, and by conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries in the context of governmentauthorized military missions" with an explicit commitment to developing cyberattack capabilities. This direction not only opens up new possibilities for Canadian defence, it could also represent significant new risks. Without good answers to the difficult questions this new direction could raise, the country could be headed down a very precarious path. Cyberweapons do offer unique benefits. Since they tend to be far less costly to deploy than kinetic weapons - such as missiles, bombs and guns - they can level the playing field between richer, stronger states and weaker, poorer ones. Larger states may even be at further disadvantage by relying on larger, more sophisticated computer systems that could become a liability if successfully attacked. However, to date, countries have been reluctant to deploy cyberweapons in lieu of kinetic weapons. Furthermore, in those cases where cyberweapons appear to have been used by state actors, no state has accepted responsibility for using them. The Stuxnet virus used to cripple Iran's nuclear research equipment is a prime example: Israel and the U.S. remain the primary suspects, but both deny involvement. Cyberweapons also possess risks of unintended consequences that can make the unintended consequences of kinetic weapons seem trivial. Notably, cyberweapons have a much greater potential to impact targets that were not intended by the attacker. For instance, when a virus-like computer weapon is unleashed on the Internet to exploit vulnerabilities in certain system software in a target country, there is a real possibility that the virus could also infect and damage computer systems inside the attacker's own country that use the same software, or even infect the software of allies who use the software. It is also possible that the weapon could have unintended consequences within the target country, by infecting other systems that were never meant to be targeted and causing more collateral damage than expected. Launching a cyberweapon to disable an enemy's supply-chain computer systems and accidentally infecting its nuclear systems, setting off a nuclear incident, is a terrifying scenario. It might even rise to the level of a war crime. It is worth noting, however, that there are no international treaties governing the use of cyberweapons. If Canada engages in cyberwarfare without one, there will be no formal limits on what actions are acceptable and what actions are not. Indeed there are many discussions that still must be had within Canada and beyond to mitigate the risk of pursuing cyberweapons. The mere act of announcing someday that we are developing cyberweaponry (which, to be clear, Canada has not done) will already carry risk, suddenly making Canada suspect in future unattributed attacks, and perhaps enticing other countries to disguise their attacks by routing them through Canada. It is unclear even whether a prime minister or Parliament will be qualified to safely declare cyberwarfare, given its technical complexity. These are just some of the debates we need to have before Canada decides to embark on developing cyberwarfare capabilities. Now is a good time for those debates to start. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently released documentation has for the first time made it possible to describe the organizational evolution of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada. During the 60-year period surveyed in this article, the analytical groups involved in strategic assessment and the interdepartmental intelligence committee structure underwent a number of changes. These were almost invariably incremental steps—shaped by bureaucratic factors and resource constraints—rather than initiatives guided by a broader vision of the role of intelligence assessment in support of Canadian foreign and defence policy. This organizational study provides the foundation for long-overdue research into the foreign intelligence function in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the economic impacts of the North Warning System (NWS) modernization. It begins by first providing a summary of the creation and evolution of the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) and the NWS with a specific intention of setting the stage for the discussion on subsequent areas. Understanding how NORAD and the NWS developed to where it is today is important to understand the choices available to the Canadian government moving forward. Next, the current security environment in Canada's North will be reviewed. The impact of climate change and global warming, new technology, and new threats changes the strategic environment in the North and Canada needs to revisit how it approaches these challenges. Based on this review of the security environment, the literature on socioeconomic studies, electoral districts and defence spending in the North can be presented along with the empirical data that exists from past studies. The study looks at five scenarios taking a rough order of magnitude look at possible economic benefits to Canada's three northern territories and Labrador based on the requirement for modernizing the NWS, a critical issue for the future defence of Canada and North America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The workhorse of military alliances theory is the joint products model where the prominent existence of private benefits from alliance activities alleviates the free-riding problem. In the case of NORAD Modernization project, there are potentially large private economic benefits accruing to Canada. These benefits may include technology transfers and domestically produced inputs from some sectors exhibiting comparative advantage. In this latter case, the benefits will largely depend on whether a JSF type consortium will undertake the investments efficiently as opposed to the so-called benefits obtainable from Canada's fundamentally inefficient offsets program, Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB). The article focuses on Canada's Key Industrial Capabilities (KIC), the 17 sectors officially selected as supporting the country's operational capabilities. The width of this selection as well as the procurement and industrial policy interaction are briefly discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the political implications of the May 2011 election in Canada. It states that the election brought change to Canada with both a majority Conservative government and the emergence of the New Democratic Part as the Official Opposition. It indicates that Peter MacKay remains as Minister of the Conservative majority government which promises continuity in National Defence.

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the defence research and combat development in the early Cold War army of Canada. The author talks about the credibility of Canada as a nation that could successfully engage in combat development. He also tackles the move of the Canadian government to implement a defence policy designed to protect Canada's sovereignty and national interests amid the military aggression of Soviet and communist in Europe.

The article discusses and reassesses the legacy of Rick Hillier, Canada's chief of defence staff from January 2005 to June 2008. Hillier's attempt to transform the forces' command and force structure is examined. According to the article, he overstepped his bounds regarding civil-military relations which led to the civilian authorities reducing the military's input into defence policy. Hillier's impact on Canada's defence policy and politics as well as his policy achievements are explored. Hillier's successes in the country's increase in defence expenditures, public support for the Canadian forces, and military morale are considered. Hillier's views on Canada's involvement in Afghanistan are discussed.

The article focuses on the defence policy of Canada at the start of the 21st century. It mentions that the defence policy of Canada was evaluated by considering three primary goals of its Armed Forces. These inlclude protection of Canada, participation in the defence of North America in conjunction with the United States, and promoting international security. Many observers conclude that in reviewing this policy, the Canadian Armed forces must have an increased military budget.

In the wake of the Canadian government's pledge for a renewed role at the United Nations (UN) notably by reengaging in peacekeeping activities, this special issue focuses on Canada's added value to peace operations. Our aim is to identify the goals, challenges, and stakes for Canada's reengagement in peace operations as a central component of foreign and defence policy. One of the first questions to ask is how can Canada contribute to peace operations which are now characterized by more complex security environments, in a way that is consistent with its interests, resources, and capacity? The second question relates to Canada's engagement in peace missions in the context of a continuously evolving technological landscape. Finally, we address defence planning, equipping the Canadian Armed Forces, and managing personnel, as they relate to UN operations. The time is ripe to revitalize the debate on peace operations and analyze Canada's capacity in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the military plan of Canada. Contents of the white paper 'Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada'; Nuclear umbrella of the U.S.

The article presents abstracts of the articles "Legitimacy and Unmanned Vehicles in Conflict: Questions of the 21st Century?" by Greg Kennedy, "Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work?" by Keith Patrick Dear, and "A Return to Realism: Canadian Defence Policy after the Great Recession" by David Perry.

Newly available information has made it possible for the first time to examine the role of intelligence in decisions on the CF-105 Arrow. These records show that Canadian intelligence assessments of the Soviet bomber threat differed from US estimates. In the late 1950s Canadian analysts stressed the imminent shift from bombers to ballistic missiles as the main danger to North America. The Diefenbaker government's decision to cancel the Arrow program in 1959 was significantly influenced by this view of the changing strategic threat. In examining the role of intelligence, the article addresses a number of earlier myths, and provides a more complete picture of the decisions concerning this iconic Canadian aircraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In general, most Canadian historians have not paid much attention to their country's relationship with Japan immediately after the Second World War. Having declined to participate in the American-run occupation of the country from 1945 to 1952, the argument goes, Ottawa was allegedly uninterested in rediscovering Japan. As a result, the consequences of Canada's military deployment to Japan as part of the Korean War are usually ignored or simplified to the rowdy and salacious exploits of soldiers visiting the country on R&R. In this article, I argue that the war not only had a lasting impact on Japanese-Canadian relations by providing the Canadian armed forces with a critical logistical hub and leave centre for its forces in Korea, but also that it helped ordinary Canadian servicemembers transcend some of the more virulent anti-Japanese prejudices cultivated during the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with Canada's foreign policy conceptual orientations on the world arena. Historically, Canada's endeavor to define its position on both global and regional levels correlated with a number of factors, like the impact of the world super-powers, establishing international organizations (UN, NATO, OSCE), relations with the European countries in the realm of integrational processes on the European continent. The aim of the article is analysing basic principles of foreign policy formation in a post-war period and covering the main approaches: Continentalism, Europeanism and Internationalism. Methods of research involve systemic and chronological approach in theoretical analysis based on transdisciplinary scholars' investigation. The outcome of the research ensures multilateral approach towards realizing Canada's role in the world politics. Chronological analysis of transatlantic policy may result as follows: Canadian foreign policy effectively involves alternative external orientations, aimed at diversification of international relations, with the objective of its personal role as both neutral and active representative of international environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, a comparison is provided of the alternative Australian and Canadian government procurement policies for military aircraft in the post-Second World War period. Procurement was used by both governments to maintain manufacturing capacity that was established in the Second World War. By undertaking this analysis, the differing characteristics of the two policies are highlighted. In both cases procurement policies promoted the maintenance of aircraft manufacturing industries, however, the resulting industries were quite different in nature, a result partly of the differing natures of the policies, and different to some degree to the results of the policy in other Western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When individuals evaluate policies, they consider both the policy's content and its endorsers. In this study, we investigate the conditions under which these sometimes competing factors guide preferences. In an effort to combat the spread of COVID-19, American President Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau bilaterally agreed to close their shared border to refugee claimants and asylum seekers. These ideologically opposed leaders endorsing a common policy allows us to test the influence of a well-known foreign neighbor on domestic policy evaluations. With a large cross-national survey experiment, we first find that Canadians and Americans follow ideological positions in evaluating the policy, with right-leaning respondents offering the most support. With an experiment, we reveal how both populations shift their views when told about their neighboring leader's endorsement. Our findings highlight ideologically motivated reasoning across an international border, with broad implications for understanding how individuals weigh a policy's content against its political cues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2019, Canada released its newest Arctic strategy, the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. This is Canada's first regional strategy to deal with border management, it was co-developed with northerners, and includes four northern partner chapters in addition to those by the federal government. This article examines how border management is addressed by both the federal government and northern partners using a comprehensive approach to security that frames the analysis in the Copenhagen School's five security sectors (military, political, societal, economic, and environmental). Analysis shows that elements of border management are evident in all sectors, meaning there are a wide range of considerations for policy and practice. While border management is only prioritized in the federal chapters, this does not mean that border management is not important to northerners. For example, the partner chapters discuss issues indirectly related to the border, and border management was discussed during the strategy's consultation process. Moving forward, policy development must continue to be co-developed to ensure the needs of all regional actors are addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]