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This paper seeks to understand the nature and characteristics of Canadian national intelligence culture post–Cold War using the analytical insights of the strategic culture and intelligence culture literature. Previous studies have focused on an organizational description or historical studies of Canadian intelligence during the Cold War or after 9/11. Yet, no studies have examined the characterization of a national intelligence culture in Canada and proposed to contextualize the Canadian intelligence system in light of its national intelligence culture. Building on a culturalist approach of national intelligence systems, this paper proposes an operationalization of the national intelligence culture concept drawn on the strategic and intelligence culture literature. The paper concludes that Canada's national intelligence culture is mostly defensive and minimalist. However, we note that recent changes in the Canadian intelligence apparatus have led to a gradual evolution of Canadian intelligence from defensive to offensive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic culture provides a good starting point to explain Canada's goldilocks grand strategy. But it also has important theoretical shortcomings. This article offers an important reconceptualization of strategic culture. It synthesizes the insight from strategic culture and cybernetic theory to better account for Canadian strategic behavior. It introduces the notion of standing operational doctrines—continental soft-bandwagoning and defensive weak-multilateralism—through which Canada's strategic cultural beliefs, attitudes, and inclinations are standardized and regularized. This theoretical synthesis provides strategic culture with greater specificity, better use as a causal explanation, and can be potentially applied to other cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Canadian strategic culture, or dominant views of policy makers about the role of Canada in international affairs, from 1949-2009. Discussion of international relations theory in Canada is included with theories such as continentalism, Europeanism, and internationalism. Also discussed is Canadian foreign policy in wars, such as the Afghan war, influenced by Europe and the U.S. It is suggested that the theories are not applied along political lines but do influence the foreign policy decisions of Canadian leaders like politicians Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney.

The article examines the commitment of Canada to maintain the economic and security relations with the U.S. while developing the Inuit community. A brief overview about the Inuit community which inhabited Canada during the colonial rule is offered. The strategic vision of the nation towards the Artic Region is highlighted.

Why did Australia fight in Iraq, while Canada did not? In this paired comparison, we go beyond explanations centered on the role of leaders to consider three alternative factors--ruling party opinion, public opinion and strategic culture. We argue that in both countries the Iraq decision followed the dominant views within the ruling party as well as the dominant strategic culture among the elites. As for the public opinion, its impact was significant in Canada, especially concerning the province of Quebec, while in Australia its impact was mostly neutral. This type of explanation, we suggest, is not only more historically grounded, but it can also illuminate broader patterns of Australian and Canadian foreign policy behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Could a growing transatlantic rift regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? The first part of the paper argues that, in addition to its liberal-democratic values, Canada's bicultural national identity accounts for much of its Atlanticist international security policy. The second part of the paper examines the prevalence of this Atlanticist strategic culture in the face of two contemporary cases of transatlantic (dis)unity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to assess the potentially disruptive nature of transatlantic discord on Canada's political unity. It finds, somewhat counter-intuitively, that transatlantic unity - rather than disunity - could more probably generate national unity crises in Canada in the event of continuing 'out-of-area' military operations undertaken by NATO allies. This is mainly because of a growing tendency among Quebec's sovereignist political elites' to mobilise Quebecers' distinct attitudes regarding overseas military expeditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an examination of Canadian strategic culture and explores changes that have occurred in the collective memory of Québec's residents regarding the historical relationship between France and Québec. It examines changes in the historical interpretation of the two country's relationship and explores how Québec no longer subscribes to the once-popular notion that France abandoned French Canadians. It examines how the abandonment myth fits into the strategic culture of Québec, discusses how France's importance to Canada has shifted over time and explores the process the led to Québec's abandonment of the abandonment myth.

The article discusses Canadian realism by highlighting the importance of cultural factors that underpin the interpretation of national interests. Identity and strategic culture are employed by the author to argue that Canada's international security policy is identity-based. The ideas of identity and strategic culture to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis are explored. Canada's three simultaneous strategic cultures, which are referred to as continental soft-bandwagoning, defensive internationalism, and soft-balancing Atlanticism, are discussed.