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Given Canada’s extended geography and regional economic diversity, individual provinces have differing exposures to particular international trade agreements. We demonstrate this by estimating the impacts of the Canada-Korea free trade agreement on the province of Ontario, using a dynamic general equilibrium model to generate Canada-level impacts, which are then decomposed on the basis of partial equilibrium model simulations on a trade dataset in which Ontario is represented as a separate international trading entity. We show that geography and sectoral specialization matter and that general equilibrium effects must be taken into account in partial equilibrium assessments of sectoral impacts of major trade agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper analyzes the impact of the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement on the basis of the published text and agreed schedule of commitments. We find that the Agreement reinforces existing patterns of comparative advantage between Canada (agriculture and resource-based sectors) and Korea (autos and other industries). The sensitive sectors that held up the deal for years – autos into Canada and beef into Korea – witness major trade gains, but are not unduly disrupted. In both economies, the major output gains otherwise come in non-traded services sectors, driven by income effects. We find that trade diversion effects are quite significant; this lends support for the domino theory of major free trade agreements – since the Korea-EU agreement broke the ice, the pressure has intensified on third parties to re-level playing fields by striking their own deals. The study breaks new ground in modelling services trade by developing policy impacts based on the extent to which the text of the Agreement modifies Korea's and Canada's scores on the OECD's Services Trade Restrictiveness Index and by providing estimates of Mode 3 Services trade impacts. The analysis of the Agreement as negotiated, the present study, in our view, is a step forward in understanding the impact of modern free trade agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Canada's commercial relationship with Asia. According to the authors, Canada's economic relationship with Asia has seemed to be in decline since 1997, when Canada served as chair of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. They argue that people to people linkages between Canada and Asia have deepened as a result of immigration, tourism, and academic student exchanges. The focus of the article is the strength of Canada's presence in Asia and an in-depth examination of how Canada's poor performance adds significance and urgency to the kind of global economy that will emerge out of the global economic crisis that began in 2008, such as the impact on global trade.

The world's first anti-dumping measure was introduced by Canada as a‘special duty’ that could be levied administratively rather than being enacted. This paper describes the features of this first measure in light of subsequent evolution of anti-dumping practice and sets it in its historical context– an era that was a high season of globalisation but also an era marked by an awakening of economic nationalism in newly industrialising countries, and by growing angst over the power of large corporations that were emerging to exploit the economies of scale allowed by mass production, as evidenced by the concurrent evolution of anti-combines legislation. Anti-dumping's early integration into economic theory as an international counterpart of domestic competition policy has received some official ratification in international treaties, and governments see it as a legitimate policy, albeit one in need of international disciplines. However, analysis of the pattern of its use reveals it to be an instrument of political economy, as a convenient alternative to the WTO safeguard option. The paper explores contextual reasons why today, in another high season of globalisation, marked by concerns over corporate globalism that evoke those of the earlier era, anti-dumping actions are proliferating where they did not then. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]