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• There are interesting parallels between fireworks policy and drug policy. • Injury rates are similar in the U.S. per dollar spent on fireworks and cannabis. • Fireworks have alternately been prohibited or legalized in different places and times. • Fireworks prohibitions have been less strenuously enforced than drug prohibitions. • Use is highly concentrated in time for fireworks but by person for drugs. Nations wrestle with whether to prohibit products that can harm consumers and third parties but whose prohibition creates illegal markets. For example, cannabis is banned in most of the world, but supply for non-medical use has been legalized in Uruguay, Canada, and much of the United States and possession restrictions have been liberalized in other countries. Likewise, supply and possession of fireworks have been subject to varying degrees of prohibition in multiple countries, with those bans prompting significant evasion. Current and past history of fireworks regulations, sales, and harms are reviewed and contrasted with those for cannabis. The focus is on the United States, but literature from other countries is incorporated when possible and appropriate. This extends the insightful literature comparing drugs to other vices (such as gambling and prostitution) by comparing a drug to a risky pleasure that is not seen as a vice but which has been subject to prohibition. There are many parallels between fireworks and cannabis in legal approaches, harms to "users", harms to others, and other externalities. In the U.S. the timing of prohibitions were similar, with prohibitions on fireworks being imposed a little later and repealed a little sooner. Internationally, the countries that are strictest with fireworks are not always those that are strictest with drugs. By some measures, harms are of roughly similar magnitude. During the last years of U.S. cannabis prohibition, there were about 10 emergency department (ED) events per million dollars spent on both fireworks and illegal cannabis, but fireworks generated very roughly three times as many ED events per hour of use/enjoyment. There are also differences, e.g., punishments were less harsh for violating fireworks prohibitions, fireworks consumption is heavily concentrated in just a few days or weeks per year, and illegal distribution is primarily of diverted legal products, not of illegally produced materials. The absence of hysteria over fireworks problems and policies suggests that societies can address complex tradeoffs involving risky pleasures without excessive acrimony or divisiveness when that product or activity is not construed as a vice. However, the conflicted and time-varying history of fireworks bans also show that difficulty balancing freedoms and pleasure with harms to users and others is not restricted to drugs or other vices. Use-related harms fell when fireworks were banned and rose when those bans were repealed, so fireworks prohibitions can be seen as "working" from a public health perspective, but not well enough for bans to be employed in all times or places. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Aims Decisions on whether and how to 'schedule' drugs (i.e. to determine their legal status and penalties to be applied for sale or possession) are often heavily criticized. We sought to assess more comprehensively the results of such decisions for newly emerging drugs. Methods Through analysis of legislation and secondary sources, we identified 63 substances that have emerged since 1971, including all that have been added to the most restrictive schedule by the United Nations, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and/or New Zealand. Measurements For each jurisdiction we recorded whether, when, and how the substance was scheduled and note what decisions engendered substantial criticism or controversy within the international treaties' framework of balancing medical benefits with risk of abuse. Findings (i) The rate of emergence of new drugs has been fairly steady. (ii) There is broad cross-national agreement on what should be scheduled. (iii) The United States often acts first. (iv) Temporary bans that delay final decisions by 12-18 months can sometimes allow final decisions to be grounded on a substantially expanded research base. (v) It appears that no more than seven of the decisions reached by the United States with respect to the 63 substances are candidates for being considered errors, and arguably the United States has committed at most one serious Type I and one serious Type II error. Results for other countries are broadly similar. Conclusions The process for determining the legal status of new psychoactive substances appears to function reasonably well, within the framework of international treaty obligations. Most criticisms relate to one or a few substances (e.g. 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine) and/or complaints that the decisions discount benefits that are not recognized by the treaties (e.g. recreational or religious use). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on the paper "Changes in Canadian heroin supply coinciding with the Australian heroin shortage," by E. Wood and colleagues in a 2006 issue. The approach used by Wood and colleagues as straightforward. However, for the higher frequency and longest series, frequency of daily heroin injection by Vancouver injecting drug users, they indicated only that there is a difference between pre- and post-2001. They failed to state whether 2001 is the optimum break point.

Background : A number of countries are legalizing the supply of cannabis or are considering doing so. Beyond top-level design questions (e.g., who gets to supply and how will it be taxed?) lie many equally important and thorny regulatory issues concerning retail sale and use. These issues will often be hammered out at the local and state/provincial level by policy makers who are generalists, not experts in substance misuse, let alone cannabis. Objectives : This review provides a framework for thinking about the role of regulation and delves into three important topics with which these leaders will wrestle: Where and when can cannabis be sold? What can retailers sell? And where can their products be used? Methods : Literature review and drawing parallels with alcohol and tobacco regulation. Results : The common thread across these questions is that the public health interest is both nuanced and in conflict with other stakeholder interests, such as companies' desire to maximize sales and profits and governments' desire for tax revenues. Conclusion : There is a need for data and oversight structures that ensure that public health will not lose out over time.