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How did the 2003 California recall - a media circus with 135 candidates and no primaries - end up looking like a typical election? I examine how party elites recruited some candidates, compelled others to drop out, and punished non-compliant ones.The 2003 California recall election, media reports to the contrary, was anything but a circus. Despite the presence of 135 candidates, just three managed to split 94% of the vote, and the winner came close to achieving a majority. In this paper, I use elite interviews and a social networks analysis of campaign donations to study how the Republican Party sought to impose order on the potentially chaotic political environment. I find that a network of Republican donors, activists, and officeholders coordinated their efforts to advantage Arnold Schwarzenegger and pressure other Republicans out of the race. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a look at California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's first fifteen months in office. He came to office with an aura of Charisma which was reminiscent of governors from a California past—giants the likes of Hiram Johnson, Earl Warren, and Ronald Reagan. These were governors who adhered to a model of California politics that could be called ‘moralistic’ if one were to use the political labels designed by political scientist Daniel Elazar in the 1960s. Now that Governor Schwarzenegger has served his first fifteen months, it may be time to pause and consider if he has maintained his charismatic posture, and if his style of politics fits with the moralistic model he seemed to promise when he was inaugurated in November 2003. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the growing literature on the gender and marriage gaps in voting behavior in recent elections. Particularly, we examine the votes cast by men and women in California?s special recall election in October 2003. This election was highly unusual in many respects, not the least of which was the candidacy of movie actor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Gender-related issues were particularly salient in this election because of the charges of sexism and sexual harassment levied against former bodybuilde, while at the same time he and his wife made concerted efforts to promote his progressive views on the family and women in the workforce. A gender gap was apparent when the votes were tallied, but a small one relative to other statewide and national elections. Using county-level aggregate election and registration data coupled with 2000 Census data; we compute estimates of the impacts of various demographic characteristics on voting behavior. We find that, unlike other recent elections, marital status did not appear to influence votes cast by men and women in the election, but the region of the state in which they lived did. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We focus on the ways in which race and ethnicity are fundamental dimensions to understanding the 2003 election in California. The specific observation that gives rise to this effort is that 1,282,253 fewer voters supported Democratic Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante than voted against the recall of sitting Democratic Governor Gray Davis. Who were these switchers, and to what extent were these switchers racially motivated in their electoral decision-making? Using the Los Angles Times exit poll from the recall election, we examine the characteristics of voters who displayed two unusual behavioral patters and compare them to voters who voted in more conventional ways. In the first such pattern, a sizeable portion of voters voted No on the recall and Against Bustamante. The second unexpected pattern is where individuals voted Yes on the recall and For Bustamante. We find that Latinos and African Americans, as compared to Whites and Asian Americans, were far less likely to have defected from Bustamante given a ?no? vote on the recall, and far more likely to have voted for Bustamante given a ?yes? vote?and possibly a strategic ?yes? vote?on the recall. Moreover, every one of those relationships holds up in the multivariate analysis, even once we control for a host of other socio-demographic and political factors that might have conceivably created the appearance of a racial divide when there was none. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines evidence of behavioral change after California's recall election on October 7, 2003. Impact of the results of the recall on the strategic calculations of potential challengers who were deciding whether or not 2004 would make a good year to run for the legislature; Trends in the number of candidates who run in primaries; Shifts in the quality of nominees.

Most of the recent literature that investigates turnout and voter mobilization finds little or no impact on turnout as a result of get-out-the-vote phone drives. This paper describes three field experiments embedded within get-out-the-vote phone drives conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area in November 2002 and October 2003 (the gubernatorial recall election), all of which focused on new registrants. Two of the drives were explicitly partisan (Democratic), and the other was strictly non-partisan. These experiments were designed to investigate whether get-out-the-vote phone drives are effective tools for increasing turnout. Neither of the partisan get-out-the-vote phone drives had a detectable effect on voter turnout. There was a positive effect on turnout from non-partisan calls, but it was only effective on Democratic registrants, and then only when the caller was representing a local organization, rather than a national one. The overall results raise continued questions about the efficacy of get-out-the-vote drives. However, the finding regarding new Democratic registrants may provide insight on different dimensions of voters? party identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the first gubernatorial recall of 1921 with the second such recall of 2003. North Dakota Governor Lynn J. Frazier had always been a footnote in history with his removal from office over eighty years ago, but much can be learned by systematically comparing the first recall campaign with the whirlwind campaign surrounding the demise of California Governor Gray Davis and the rise of political neophyte Arnold Schwarzenegger. An initial review of the Progressive period is given, followed by an in-depth analysis of the 1903 birth of America?s first recall provision and the 1921 campaign to oust Frazier. The details of his recall are then compared and contrasted with the 2003 race. The paper concludes with a theoretical discussion of the power of the recall provision and how it may be applied to senior executives in the future. This ?right of removal? has been both a threat to gubernatorial power and a tool for citizen activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine differences in the electorates in the November 2002 general and October 2003 recall elections in California. The recall election provides a unique opportunity for scholars to examine the impact of direct democracy on participation, as well an election in which the increase in coverage of politics reduces the costs of gathering political information. Using data from the statewide voter file, we find that the recall brought younger, less experienced, less partisan, and less residentially stable voters to the polls. Yet these were not the youngest, least experienced, or least stable voters in the state. Instead, the recall engaged those at the middle levels of political interest and experience, particularly among occasional voters who move in and out of the electorate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major subplot in the 2003 recall of California governor Gray Davis was the flurry of litigation seeking to block, postpone, or modify the election. This paper provides a summary of the recall lawsuits and compares the courts’ role in the recall process to their role in checking the direct initiative. The paper argues that unlike the direct initiative, the recall is a hybrid between direct and representative democracy, and thus that the courts’ participation in the recall process was less consequential than their central role in checking the direct initiative. Instead, the heavy recall litigation can be attributed to: the untested nature of the recall rules; a litigious political culture; and the high stakes in removing the governor of the nation’s largest state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the recent literature that investigates turnout and voter mobilization finds little or no impact on turnout as a result of get-out-the-vote phone drives. This paper describes three field experiments embedded within get-out-the-vote phone drives conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area in November 2002 and October 2003 (the gubernatorial recall election), all of which focused on new registrants. Two of the drives were explicitly partisan (Democratic), and the other was strictly non-partisan. These experiments were designed to investigate whether get-out-the-vote phone drives are effective tools for increasing turnout. Neither of the partisan get-out-the-vote phone drives had no detectable effect on voter turnout. There was a positive effect on turnout from non-partisan calls, but it was only effective on Democratic registrants, and then only when the caller was representing a local organization, rather than a national one. The overall results raise continued questions about the efficacy of registration movements. The surprising finding regarding new Democratic registrants may provide insight on different dimensions of voters' party identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists and communications scholars have long documented the tendency of the media to focus on "horse race" elections stories at the expense of policy analysis. In this paper I identify the emergence of the circus metaphor to characterize elections as a hybrid form of political theater, media spectacle, and tabloid justice journalism. I examine the relative number of horse race, circus/spectacle and policy stories on the 2003 recall of California Governor Gray Davis and election of actor Arnold Schwarzenegger as his replacement. I find that major California papers varied in the tone and substance of their coverage. All of the newspapers educated their readerships about the recall process. Ironically, the newspaper paper with the highest level of horse race stories also informatively compare and contrast campaigns. Circus/spectacle stories did not dominate coverage, but exceeded the number of articles focusing policy issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inheriting a budget with a mammoth ?structural? deficit, and facing one of the most partisan and polarized state legislatures in the country (or in the history of California), Arnold Schwarzenegger confronted daunting challenges when he took office on November 17, 2003. He still does. However, after less than four months in office, he is off to an impressive start. Most significantly, he convinced the legislature to place two referenda dealing with the budget on the March 2, 2004 primary ballot. The more important and controversial of these provided for a $15 billion bond to tide the state over during a transition to budget stability. After trailing in early polls, the measure passed by a wide margin. Schwarzenegger?s? biggest challenges still lie ahead, however. He must convince a still divided legislature to accept his 2004-05 budget. Beyond that, the state?s respected legislative analyst projects that, even if all of Schwarzenegger?s proposals are enacted, California will still face annual budget deficits of billions of dollars for at least the next several years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research is the second part of a larger research project begun in 2004 to evaluate the ever-changing relationship between the executive and legislative branches in California in the post-recall era. The conclusions of the 2004 research suggested Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger had begun a bold campaign to alter the politics-as-usual attitude in Sacramento with little regard for traditional deal-making and compromise. Schwarzenegger's assault on the legislature was unrelenting and, for the most part, quite successful. Using the literature on legislative-executive relations as a guide (Clarke, 1998; Abney and Lauth, 1998; Morehouse, 1998; Bernick and Wiggins, 1991; and Beyle, 2004) it was determined that the governor had successfully used executive orders and the direct democracy approach to circumvent the California legislature and bring into question parts of the conventional divided government thesis. At the same time it was suggested that other governors around the country might begin to use this 'Schwarzenegger model.' All of this took a set-back in late 2005; however, as the governor took the political capital gained the previous two years and squandered nearly all of it in an ill-fated attempt to pass a self-proclaimed reform package that November. The package failed completely, Schwarzenegger's poll numbers tanked and it looked as if legislative dominance would return to the Golden State. Within a year the governor's status returned and the legislature was back to playing catch-up with a governor appearing destined for a second term. This project expands on events from 2004 and reviews the key events of 2005 and 2006 through the lens of the executive-legislative literature. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]