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This article sheds new light on the drivers of bureaucratic resilience in the face of presidential attacks, an understudied but politically salient topic. Scholars have long shown how political advocacy can protect bureaucracies from presidential attacks on policy regulation. We argue, however, that advocacy is insufficient to defend bureaucracies against attacks on policy implementation, which occurs largely outside the formal political arena. Through a case study of Brazil's successful Covid-19 vaccination campaign, we call attention to two additional forms of support for agencies under attack--resource provision and social activism--that come into play during the implementation phase of policy. In conjunction with political advocacy, resource provision and social activism bolster bureaucracies under attack by filling in where other forms of support fall short. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The solution to weak bureaucratic capacity in developing countries is often presumed to be more accountability. This paper shows how accountability initiatives, intended to reduce corruption, can actually hinder the development of capable government agencies by making it harder for directors to recruit experts and spend their budgets. It further highlights a common way public servants escape the accountability rules that limit their effectiveness: outsourcing bureaucracies to nonstate organizations. This practice of outsourcing bureaucracy to avoid accountability rules creates what I call "shadow" state capacity and, paradoxically, it may help explain "pockets of effectiveness" among government social programs in developing countries. Drawing on in-depth interviews and descriptive statistics, I show how outsourcing was a critical factor in producing two of Brazil's most vaunted social sector programs. However, I also suggest that outsourcing bureaucracy may ultimately limit state capacity, even if it helps to build capable programs in the short run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: While the World Health Organization (WHO) has established guidance on COVID-19 surveillance, little is known about implementation of these guidelines in federations. which fragment authority across multiple levels of government. This study examines how subnational governments in federal democracies collect and report data on COVID-19 cases and mortality associated with COVID-19. Methods: We collected data from subnational government websites in 15 federal democracies to construct indices of COVID-19 data quality. Using bivariate and multivariate regression, we analyzed the relationship between these indices and indicators of state capacity, the decentralization of resources and authority, and the quality of democratic institutions. We supplement these quantitative analyses with qualitative case studies of subnational COVID-19 data in Brazil, Spain, and the United States. Findings: Subnational governments in federations vary in their collection of data on COVID-19 mortality, testing. hospitalization, and demographics. There are statistically significant associations (p < 0.05) between subnational data quality and key indicators of public health system capacity, fiscal decentralization, and the quality of democratic institutions. Case studies illustrate the importance of both governmental and civil-society institutions that foster accountability. Conclusions: The quality of subnational COVID-19 surveillance data in federations depends in part on public health system capacity, fiscal decentralization, and the quality of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the conditions under which participatory institutions increase the voice of marginalized groups in policymaking? Existing studies of local participatory institutions highlight the role of leftist politicians and a strong civil society in determining outcomes, yet they fail to explain significant variation among participatory institutions at the national level. Examining the case of Brazil's AIDS policy sector, this article argues that to fully understand the dynamics of national participatory governance, we must consider the role of bureaucrats. As studies of state-society synergy have shown, bureaucrats may seek outside political support from civil society when other actors inside the state prevent them from advancing their policy preferences. National bureaucrats may create new participatory institutions, and even help civil society delegates coordinate their engagement in such institutions, as strategies to strengthen their policy alliances with civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the state ensure the implementation of national policies in a context of decentralized political authority? This article identifies a new strategy utilized by national bureaucrats to regulate the behavior of subnational politicians: mobilizing civil society as government watchdog and political advocate. In the context of decentralized governance, in which local politicians administer most social sector programs, reform-minded bureaucrats often find that they have little control over the implementation of their progressive policies. In Brazil's AIDS policy sector, however, bureaucrats have ensured the successful implementation of their policies by developing allies outside government. These state actors-here called activist bureaucrats-have been largely overlooked in the English-language literature, yet they form a new layer of politics in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the once-popular notion of the central bureaucracy withering away as an outcome of decentralization, scholars have shown that in cases of local policy success, national bureaucrats have instead redefined their roles, strengthening their focus on monitoring and accountability. Yet building national capacity for effective oversight presents a challenge within a context of strong subnational autonomy such as Brazil. Comparing the dynamics of decentralization across two areas of health policy, AIDS and tuberculosis, this article presents one strategy utilized by federal bureaucrats to increase their regulatory capacity: seeking resources located outside the formal political arena. Specifically, national bureaucrats utilize international resources to mobilize local civic groups as policy watchdogs, thus increasing the accountability of subnational politicians both to the center and to the public. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]