1. Endogenous Institutions: Electoral Law and Internal Party Dynamics in Brazil.
- Author
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Lyne, Mona M.
- Subjects
- *
SOCIAL institutions , *POLITICAL parties , *POLITICAL science , *DEMOCRACY - Abstract
Institutionalists have both argued that institutions are endogenous, yet also analyzed Brazil?s electoral institutions, including open-list PR, as exogenous variables that inhibit national party unity to the point of precluding national party reputations. In an analysis of the two most recent periods of democracy in Brazil (1945-64, 1989-present), the paper demonstrates that in the current period, party leaders are now acting to mitigate the incentives of open-list PR by distributing valuable perks based on the degree to which rank and file vote with the party leadership. Electoral institutions are constant across the two periods, yet party leaders are now acting to promote party reputations, while they failed to do so in the earlier period. The paper resolves this paradox by developing a general theory of electoral competition based on two dimensions: whether voters choose direct (clientelistic) or indirect (programmatic/personal) exchanges with politicians, and whether electoral institutions are party or candidate-centered. The theory yields a four-fold typology of electoral incentives with distinct and observable implications for internal party delegation and behavior. The theory endogenizes electoral institutions to a more general theory of electoral competition, and provides an electorally-based explanation for why politicians chose unmitigated open-list PR in the earlier period, but now opt to modify its anti-party incentives in the current period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2004
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