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Brazil experienced a complete economic cycle with an ascending phase in the 2000s, followed by a decline during the following decade. Using the national accounts, the objective of this article is to trace the growth path of the Brazilian economy from the 2000s onwards through a detailed analysis of the financial balance and income flows of the institutional sectors. It will be shown that the economy has two relevant points of inflection: the first was the external shock occasioned by the 2008 global financial crisis, and the second was the change in domestic economic policy after 2015 following an austerity agenda. The article compares the financial balance of the institutional sectors at the two historical moments. It sheds new light on why the Brazilian economy entered the descending phase of the economic cycle and is stagnating and deepening its financialization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of our paper is to provide analytical arguments to explain why Brazil has not been able to restore its long-term capacity for economic growth, especially compared with its economy in the 1950-1979 period (7.3 per cent per year on average) or even with a select number of emerging economies in the 1980-2010 period (6.7 per cent per year on average, against 2.3 per cent per year on average in Brazil in the same period). We build our idea of convention to growth based on the Keynesian concept of convention. For our purposes, this concept could be briefly summarized as the way in which the set of public and private economic decisions related to different objectives, such as how much to produce and invest, how much to charge for products and services, how to finance public and private debt, how to finance research and development, and so on, are indefinitely — or at least until there is no change — carried out by the political, economic and social institutions. This analytical reference can be connected to the Neo-Schumpeterian National Innovation System (NIS) concept, which emphasizes not only institutions associated with science and technology per se, but also the complex interaction among them and other institutions. In this paper we identify two conventions to long-term growth in the last three decades in Brazil: the liberal and the neo-developmental. We show that the poor performance in the Brazilian economy in terms of real GDP growth from the 1980s on can be explained by a weak coordination between short-term macroeconomic policies and long-term industrial and technological policies. This weak coordination, in turn, can be associated with the prevalence of the liberal convention from the 1990s on, which has emphasized price stabilization to the detriment of a neo-developmental strategy whose primary goal is to sustain higher rates of growth and full employment in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My analysis complements the growing literature on Brazil's growthrate collapse, Brazil's reaction to the international financial crisis, and the Brazilian economic policies implemented during and after the international financial crisis. The objective of this paper is to emphasize Brazil's path towards becoming an EME, the impact of the international crisis on Brazil, and the predominance of the monetary dimension in the conduct of Brazilian economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More economies have sprung up through home-grown import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy in the developing world as compared to those that have plummeted by adopting the prescripts of the Washington Consensus. The recurring economic and financial crises, essentially the 2008/2009 experiences, present another perspective for macroeconomic policy embracement. For instance, major economies, especially those of the United States and the countries in the European Union, jettisoned their neoliberal ideology for protectionist measures in dealing with the 2008/2009 financial and economic turbulence. This lends credence to a rethink of macroeconomic policies for the less developed and developing economies. Using data generated from the World Development Indicators (WDI), an organ of the World Bank, in regression analyses, this article argues that the macroeconomic policy of import-substitution industrialisation contributed to the current economic developments in Brazil and South Africa. The article suggests that an import-substitution industrialisation policy is not only appropriate to galvanise industrialisation in less industrialised economies, but also augments a sustainable economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revista de Sociologia e Política is the property of Revista de Sociologia e Politica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Summary: “Populism” and expanded democratic participation often have been painted as the enemy of sane macroeconomics. Yet Brazil’s experience suggests possibly benign implications of stable mass democracy for national economic management in developing countries. Prior to 1930, agrarian elites ruled Brazil. As political participation gradually expanded, policymakers elaborated the regulatory framework of import-substituting industrialization (ISI). ISI not only generated strong growth but also chronically high and volatile inflation, with costs falling most heavily on the disenfranchised a poor majority. The advent of mass democracy in the mid-1980s gave the poor a political voice for the first time, and plausibly was the crucial cause for the demise of hyperinflation a decade later. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]