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Copyright of Revista Jurídica (0103-3506) is the property of Revista Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Contabilidade, Gestao E Governanca is the property of Revista Contabilidade, Gestao E Governanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We use extensive hand collected surveys reporting governance practices of Brazilian firms in 2004, 2006, and 2009 to build a broad corporate governance index and analyze the evolution of corporate governance in Brazil and the association between governance and firm value. We find that corporate governance practices improved significantly over this period. This evolution is due to two main factors: 1) growth in Novo Mercado and Level II (NM&L2) listings, mainly through IPOs by new firms, and 2) improved practices at non-NM&L2 firms, principally through adopting governance elements required for NM&L2 listing. Governance practices for firms already listed on NM&L2 were stable. Adoption of the elements of our governance index that are required for NM&L2 listing predicts higher firm value. In contrast, adoption of the remaining elements of our index does not predict firm value. Thus, governance changes appear to respond to investor preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We examine the corporate governance practices of Brazilian public companies. We identify areas where their governance is relatively strong and weak. Many firms have small boards, comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Even some very large firms have no independent directors. Formal board processes are limited. Audit committees are uncommon, but many firms use a substitute body—the fiscal board—which does not require that the firm have independent directors to staff the audit committee. Financial disclosure is mixed. Some firms voluntarily provide English language disclosure, but many do not provide cash flow statements or consolidated quarterly financial statements. Brazilian corporate law often provides limited protection to minority shareholders, but the Brazilian stock exchange, Bovespa, provides optional governance rules which go beyond the legal minimums. These optional rules have become increasingly popular with Brazilian firms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article investigates the impact on share prices when news released on the specialized media indicates that the interests of controlling and minority shareholders groups diverge. Methodologically, we analyze 24 announcements of conflicts between shareholder groups in Brazil using two event study methodologies. We find strong support for our hypothesis that such news constitutes a proxy for relevant agency costs taking place, leading to a higher perception of risk and reduced share price. To our knowledge, this is the first article to estimate the impact of specific agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders in an environment characterized by concentrated ownership structures. The article is relevant for all capital markets' investors, as well as for analysts and other capital markets' agents. For policy makers and practitioners, our results provide evidence on the potential corporate value loss owing to conflicts between shareholders groups. As a result, they reinforce the argument for the adoption of good corporate governance practices, in order to avoid corporate value destruction resulting from problems between different shareholding groups. The main author is a professor at the School of Economics, Management and Accounting of University of São Paulo (FEA/USP) in Corporate Governance courses at both graduate and undergraduate level. In addition, he is Executive Coordinator of the Center for Corporate Governance Research of Fipecafi (CEG – www.ceg.org.br), Vice-President of the Brazilian Society of Finance (www.sbfin.org.br) and Senior Researcher of the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC – www.ibgc.org.br). He is author of several books and articles on corporate governance, and writes a monthly column on corporate governance issues for Capital Aberto magazine, one of the most prominent capital markets' magazines in Brazil, making him well known among the corporate governance community in Brazil and Latin America. All persons involved with capital markets, media and policy makers should take note of these results, as most have corporate environments characterized by controlling shareholders, and their relationship with minority shareholders can be a potential source of relevant value destruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a CVM Instruction No.561 issued by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) which regulates the participation and remote voting in general shareholders' meetings of publicly held corporations that aims to enhance the corporate governance in the Brazilian market.