Search

Between 2003 and 2016, Brazil carried out a World Bank-inspired "rule-of-law" reform that has failed to substantially increase access to justice. To buttress such a disheartening conclusion, this paper includes a case study of Brazil's biggest litigation ever, which centered on the losses that bank customers had incurred because of heterodox national economic plans implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By showing that the system of binding precedents consolidated in the reform ended up favoring "repeat players" over "one-shotters" in this litigation, this paper seeks to explain how institutional reforms that fail to tackle deep inequalities may backfire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica (0103-3506) is the property of Revista Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)