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This article identifies corporate culture as a key contributor to the sort of egregious corporate misconduct identified in the current Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industries. The authors outline existing strategies for regulating culture in the banking and finance industry and consider the likely outcomes of the Banking Royal Commission. Taking the proposed Banking Executive Accountability Regime as a case study, the authors argue that the industry's privacy, autonomy and competition concerns, forcefully argued in policymaking circles, may well stymie any proposals that may be put forward, no matter how bad the conduct revealed turns out to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the extent to which the common law recognized public interest considerations when confronted with utility insolvencies in the UK, Australia, and the US in the period 1825 to 1970. Jurisprudence in all three jurisdictions concerning insolvent utilities arose in the nineteenth century out of the difficulties arising from the financial distress of railway companies. It is argued that public interest considerations were mobilized to justify various degrees of restriction on the usual rights of creditors in all jurisdictions. While evidence was found of the use of public interest theory in all jurisdictions, there was little development of it in the UK and Australia compared with the US. This may have been because of the early introduction of statutory schemes of arrangement in both countries and because of the nationalization of the industries for the better part of the twentieth century. In the US, on the other hand, public interest theory in the context of insolvent railways and other utilities was much more developed. In particular, it provided part of the rationale for the judicial development of the equity receivership into a comprehensive corporate reorganization mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing Feigenbaum, Henig and Hammett's typology, privatizations in the UK and Australia may be described as ‘systemic’ in the sense that their aim has been in part to ‘shrink the state’. Privatizations of essential services such as water, rail and energy in both countries appear to have failed in this endeavour. One example of this failure in the UK is the proliferation of special administration regimes which are initiated by the state and regulate the resolution of essential service insolvency. The recent introduction of an energy administration procedure in the Energy Act 2004 (UK) is yet another example of this process. Regulation of infrastructure insolvency appears on its face to have taken a different course in Australia, relying, for the most part on the usual insolvency regimes. However, the utilization of a contractual model for state oversight in the case of railway company insolvency and the willingness of the state to intervene in the financial distress of electricity generators suggest the Australian approach has also resulted in maintenance of the state’s role following privatization. This paper reviews the experience of the State of Victoria in the failure of a rail company and electricity generator and considers to what extent the non-statutory processes utilized by the state reflects its continuing role post privatization. In so doing, the paper evaluates the device of the UK special administration regime and in particular discusses the energy administration provisions of the Energy Act 2004 (UK). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]